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ABSTRACT
 
The ill-effects of corruption on the society, polity and economy of a country are 
far reaching. They have a corrosive effect on the rule of law, on governance and 
on the welfare of the society. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
of 1996, whi ch  i s  the  supreme law of the country,  places as an expectation 
and obligation on the government accountability of state, and a government free 
of corruption and the malignancy of economic nepotism. South Africa’s anti-
corruption framework is designed as a control-based approach that is multi-
faceted and executed through legislation, supporting regulations, audit trails, 
anti-corruption structures, law enforcement, and public vigilance and reporting 
structures, amongst others. Be that as it may, South Africa is battling the 
scourge of corruption and other self-serving behaviours, often amongst the 
upper echelons of governing power, as demonstrated by the State capture. Some 
of the acts of corruption stems from the very same institutions that are meant to 
be the upper guardians of law and order. Numerous corrupt practices occur 
almost daily, including but not limited to fraud, bribery, extortion, nepotism, 
conflict of interest, cronyism, favouritism, theft, fronting, embezzlement, 
influence-peddling, insider trading/abuse of privileged information, bid-rigging 
and kickbacks and money laundering. The list is not exhaustive.  Based on 
the  findings of this study, numerous recommendations and /or 
suggestions are made. The value of the study lies in the contribution it makes 
in South Africa’s fight against corruption to become comparable to countries 
whose corruption perception index is all time favourable, such as Botswana, 
Seychelles, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
1.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
[C]orruption is a serious criminal offence, which threatens the 
rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines good 
governance, fairness and social justice, distorts competition, 
hinders economic development and endangers the stability of 
democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society 
(Liberati, 2000).  
On the 25th of February 2013 the heads of Anti-Corruption Agencies of the 19 
Commonwealth African Countries, namely: Botswana, Cameroon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, 
met in Gaborone (Botswana) to launch an anti-corruption partnership 
Commonwealth Africa Anti -Corruption Centre (CAACC). Currently, South Africa is 
represented at the CAACC by the Special Investigation Unit (SIU). The creation of 
CAACC, in my view, was by great measure an indication of the awareness and 
acknowledgement by the CAACC that a concerted effort is needed to fight 
corruption. It was noted by Dr Roger Koranteng, the commonwealth governance 
advisor, at the CAACC regional conference held from 25th -29th May, 2015 at 
Bahari beach hotel, Daresalaam Tanzania, under the theme “engaging the civil 
society as partners in the fight against corruption” that the lack of political will is one 
of the main impediments to fighting corruption in Africa and the institution to fight 
corruption. 
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The 2013 National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) has as its vision a state free of 
corruption and corrupt activities (see Pillay, 2016:124). This vision appears to be 
fast becoming just a pipe-dream. Like in many countries that have transition from 
undemocratic to democratic government South Africa has not been saved from 
state capture and the rise of corruption and corrupt activities. There is a non-abating 
prevalence and evidence of the scourge of corruption and other self-serving 
behaviours, often amongst the upper echelons of governing power.  The 
government, citizens and law enforcement agencies are calling for immediate 
measures to be taken to combat corruption or to at-least address factors that make 
corruption so rampant in the country. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the anti-
corruption agencies in South Africa plays a great role in the realisation of the 
prescripts of the NDP regarding corruption prevention. 
Corruption is a prevalent and continuing problem throughout the world. Its corrosive 
impacts are beyond any measure. The ill-effects of corruption on the society, polity 
and economy of a country are far reaching. Corruption is the epicentre of many 
political, economic and social ills in many countries. It is omnipresent in different 
forms and proportions, with devastating effects on the lives of common citizens and 
the whole of society (Sibanda, 2015:1). Its corrosive effect has been more 
pronounced and deeply felt in the public sector of developing countries like South 
Africa. As Hanna, Bishop, Nadel, Scheffler, and Durlacher, state (2011:2): 
In many developing countries, public sector corruption is a key 
barrier to effective service delivery. Corruption can prevent the 
equitable allocation of goods and services to citizens by seeping 
into all aspects of life, from starting a new business to getting a 
passport or to seeing a doctor. It can take many forms, from 
bureaucrats asking citizens for bribes to perform basic services, to 
hospital employees stealing medicines that were meant to be 
distributed to the poor, to bureaucrats receiving salaries for jobs 
that they do not accomplish. On a macro level, many scholars 
believe that corruption impedes economic growth and 
development. 
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It is trite to say that South Africa is facing a scourge of corruption and other self-
serving behaviours, often amongst the upper echelons of governing power, which 
is often labelled a symptom of apartheid. In the case of Glenister v the President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Glenister II), the South African 
Constitutional Court observed that “[c]orruption has become a scourge in our 
country and it is posing a real danger to our developing democracy. It undermines 
the ability of the government to meet its commitment to fight poverty and to deliver 
on other social and economic rights guaranteed in our Bill of Rights”. As aptly 
summarised by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime: 
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive 
effects on societies. Corruption undermines democracy and the 
rule of law. It leads to violations of human rights, erodes the quality 
of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to 
human security to flourish (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004:iii). 
As Ahmed et al., (1992) correctly note, there are many areas in which corruption is 
likely to take place. Examples are the state procurement and tender processes; the 
disposal, sale and allotment of government property; embezzlement of public funds; 
and many other shop-floor malpractices.  
Though this study does not intend to look at specific corruption and corrupt 
practices, it suffices to state that corrupt practices include but a r e  not limited 
to: fraud, bribery, extortion, nepotism, conflict of interest, cronyism, favouritism, 
theft, fronting, embezzlement, influence-peddling, insider trading/abuse of 
privileged information, bid-rigging, rent-seeking, state capture, kickbacks and 
money laundering. The list is not exhaustive and many of the practices/crimes 
are indeed not listed as crimes by South African substantive criminal law, which 
makes policing and managing them a greater task both legally and administratively. 
Numerous institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks exist in South Africa 
designed to combat corruption or to allow for mechanisms to combat corruption 
(O’Brien, 2013:3–6; Kututwa, 2005:5; Majila, Taylor & Raga, 2017:88-89; 
Mosselini, 2013:3–4; Naidoo, 2012:10; Adetiba, 2016:27). In brief, the current 
approach to combatting corruption occurs within a legislative framework supported 
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by institutions that implement and effect the mandate extended by enabling 
statutes. The control-based approach is multi-faceted and executed through 
legislation, supporting regulation, audit trails, anti-corruption structures, law 
enforcement, and public vigilance and reporting structures, amongst others.” From 
a structural or institutional perspective the following are examples of 
structures/institutions with anti-corruption or corruption investigation mandates in 
the South African milieu: the Office of the Public Protector, as it discharges its 
functions and obligations as mandated by sections 182–183 of the Constitution; 
the Auditor-General as mandated by sections 188–189 of the Constitution; the 
South African Police Service’s (SAPS) Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
(Hawks); the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) established in terms of the Special 
Investigating Units and Special Tribunal Act, Act No. 74 of 1996 (SIU Act); the 
Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) established in the Office of the National Director of 
Public Prosecution to focus on the implementation of chapters 5 and 6 of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act, No. 12 of 1998; the Special Anti-Corruption 
Unit (SACU) launched in 2011 as part of the Department of Public Service and 
Administration with a mandate to assist the SIU; the National Treasury; and the 
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), established in terms of sections 2–45 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act No. 38 of 2001. 
In this study, a critical appraisal of the strategies and structures available in South 
Africa to combat corruption is undertaken. The study will interrogate various aspects 
of corruption and the responses thereto in the South African milieu.  
South Africa is by no means an isolated example of corrupt societies, or a society 
burdened by a lack of appropriate response to corruption. It is submitted, however, 
that what is important is how the country responds to corrupt activities or to persons 
acting corruptly. The how part can be determined with reference to the success of 
the country’s anti-corruption agencies and the clamping down of the prevalence 
and rise of corrupt activities. 
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1.1.1   The Challenge of the Escalation of Corrupt Activities in South 
Africa 
Public perception of and dissatisfaction with corruption in South Africa has been 
on the upward trajectory over years. Grand scandals such as the State capture 
has dampened the jubilation of South Africa as the post-colonial Africa success 
story; and put a doubt on the efficacy of the country’s anti-dumping agencies 
and normative frameworks. A review of the literature on anti-corruption 
legislation in South Africa reveals that it has not been successful, and highlights 
additional acts that need to be regarded by the law as offences. Corruption and 
corrupt practices have permeated all levels in society and the public service, 
painting anti-corruption efforts and the applicable framework as toothless. 
Interestingly, this is all happening in the presence of a myriad anti-corruption 
strategies, institutions and legislative frameworks. Masiloane and Dintwe 
(2014:186) remarked that the existence of numerous legislative and policy 
frameworks relevant to corruption and corrupt activities in the South African 
public sector has not reduced the growing scourge of corruption and its 
prevalence. According to Majila, Taylor and Raga (2014:223&227), there is 
every indication that corruption, particularly in the public sector, continues to 
escalate in South Africa. Indeed, historical anecdotes on corruption show that 
the problem is not abating either. For instance, the then head of the Special 
Investigating Unit (SIU) Willie Hofmeyr in his report to the Portfolio Committee 
for Justice and Constitutional Development in October 2011 stated that “SIU was 
investigating 588 procurement contracts valued at R9.1-billion and about 360 
conflict-of-interest matters valued at R3.4-billion” (Sibanda, 2019a).  
Cases of grand corruption, maladministration and illicit enrichment are common 
place in South Africa. For instance, a number of government executives have 
been found with hands in the cookie jar and their transgression widely reported. 
Notable being the Public Protector of the Republic of South Africa, report In the 
extreme: Report No.11 of 2011/12 of the Public Protector on an investigation 
into allegations of a Breach of the Executive Ethics Code by the Minister of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Mr Sicelo Shiceka, MP , which 
addressed  allegations that the late Sicelo Shiceka, then Minister for Cooperative 
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Governance and Traditional Affairs, misused government resources by visiting 
“a girlfriend in a Swiss prison” (Sibanda, 2019a). Also, the Public Protector report 
entitled Against the Rules Too, Report of the Public Protector in terms of Section 
182(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and Section 8(1) 
of the Public Protector Act, 1994 on an investigation into complaints and 
allegations of maladministration, improper and unlawful conduct by the 
Department of Public Works and the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
relating to the leasing of SAPS accommodation in Durban, 2011. The report 
followed an investigation that Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, then Minister of Public 
Works, was involved in the “awarding of two tenders worth R1,116 billion and 
R604 million respectively to a politically well-connected businessman for the 
lease of new premises for the SAPS at above reasonable market price” 
(Sibanda, 2019a).  The most infamous corruption scandal related to the 
upgrades at the homestead of former President Jacob Zuma in Nkandla at the 
cost of R60-million. The allegations of corruption and maladministration of the 
Nkandla project were investigated and resulted in the issuing of the report by the 
then Public Protector Thuli Madonsela in 2013, entitled Secure in Comfort: 
Report by the Public Protector on an investigation into allegations of impropriety 
and unethical conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security 
measures by the Department of Public Works at and in respect of the private 
residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal province, 
Report No: 25 of 2013/24, March 19 2014,  which “revealed that the former 
president and his family had unduly benefited from upgrades which has 
escalated from R60-million to R246-million in costs” (Sibanda, 2019a). 
Below is sample typology of recent commissions and enquiries relating to 
corruption and maladministration in South Africa, which is reflective of the 
challenge and malady of corruption and corrupt activities: 
▪ Commission of Inquiry into allegations for impropriety regarding Public 
Investment Corporation: The Commission was appointed by the President of 
the Republic of South Africa on 17 October 2018, under section 84(2) (f) of the 
Constitution, under the Honourable Justice Lex Mpati, the former President of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, as Commissioner. The mandate of the 
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Commission is, amongst others, to look into whether a director or employee of 
the Public Investment Corporation has misused their position for personal gain; 
and whether legislation or policies regarding the protection of whistle blowers 
reporting corrupt activities were complied with. The deadline of the Commission 
to submit an interim report of its findings was by February 15, 2019 and to 
submit their final report to the President on the April 15, 2019. The researcher 
had no sight on the interim report at the time of submission for examination. 
▪ National Prosecuting Authority Act: Enquiry into fitness of Advocate Nomgcobo 
Jiba and Advocate Lawrence Sithembiso Mrwebi to hold the office of Deputy 
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Special Director of Public 
Prosecutions: The enquiry, led by Justice Mokgoro, was instituted in terms of 
section 12(6) of the NPA Act, also heard allegations of corruption and 
interference with the functions of the NPA is prosecuting corrupt activities. 
 
• The Commission of Inquiry into allegations of fraud, corruption, impropriety or 
irregularity in the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages (SDPP): This 
Commission, popularly known as the Seriti Commission or the Armaments 
Procurement Commission, chaired by Judge Seriti, former judge of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, was formally announced as constituted on 24 
October 2011 by the President, in terms of section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution, 
to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption, impropriety or irregularity into the 
Strategic Defence Procurement Package (SDPP).  
• Enquiry into the fitness of advocate VP Pikoli to hold the office of National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, 2008: This Enquiry, which was headed by Mrs 
F Ginwala, was another enquiry to question a head of the NPA’s fitness and 
integrity to hold office,  was established in terms of section 12(6)(a) of the NPA 
Act of 1998, following the suspension of Advocate Vusi Pikoli (“Adv Pikoli”) from 
office as the National Director of Public Prosecutions (“NDPP”) by the President 
on 23rd September 2007. In the context of this study, it is important to note that 
the terms of reference included determining: a) “Whether he, in exercising his 
discretion to prosecute offenders, had sufficient regard to the nature and extent 
of the threat posed by organised crime to the national security of the Republic” 
and “Whether he, in taking decisions to grant immunity from prosecution to or 
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enter into plea bargaining arrangements with persons who are allegedly 
involved in illegal activities which constitute organised crime, as contemplated 
in the NPA Act, took due regard to the public interest”. (Pikoli Enquiry Report, 
2008:6-6).   
 
• The Commission of Inquiry into allegations of state capture, corruption and 
fraud in the Public Sector including organs of State, 2018: Currently this 
Commission, headed by the Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, has had 
ripple effect following sordid details of allegations of State capture and the 
supposed involvement of some government executives in enabling grand 
corruption and the capture of the state. 
The challenge of South Africa as a country battling with combating corruption and 
related corrupt activities is further highlighted in the scores and the raking the country 
obtain in corruption perception index (CPI) of Transparency International. The CPI 
reflects South Africa as a country besieged by corruption and corrupt practices. For 
instance, South Africa scored 43 points out of 100 on the 2017 CPI. 
 
Table 1: South Africa Corruption Index 2008–2018  
 Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/corruption-index 
Table 1 attests that South Africa’s tumultuous relationship with corruption and 
corrupt practices seems to have hit high levels over the years, with the country’s 
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international corruption perception index at a low. Corruption Index in South Africa 
averaged 46.79 points from 1996 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 56.80 
points in 1996 and a record low of 41 points in 2011. The escalating problem of high 
corruption perception of South Africa persists to date and there have been calls to 
put in place measures to address this.  Responding to the 2017/2019 CIP, Sibanda 
(2019a) remarked that “CPI puts South Africa at an unenviable position number 73, 
with a score of 43 in the perceived level of public sector corruption out of 180 
countries /territories in the world.  
 
 
Table 2: Global Corruption Data 2019. (Source: Transparency International) 
 
Table 2, read with the narrative of table 1, shows that South Africa’s CPI is still high 
considered from a global perspective. It pales in comparison with Botswana, 
Seychelles, Singapore and Hong Kong to name a few.  Botswana, a country that 
together with Hong Kong and Singapore is regarded by many as exemplary with 
regard to the South African corruption management, was ranked 34 with the score 
of 61 as the second least corrupt country in the whole of Africa after Seychelles. 
(Sibanda, 2019a). In terms of the 2017/2018 CPI corruption perception of South 
Africa remained unchanged since 2016/2017. 
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Unlike comparator countries – Botswana, Singapore and Hong Kong – there is 
a growing doubt cast on the effectiveness of the law-directed anti-corruption 
approaches in South Africa and the country’s anti-corruption institutions (Majila 
et al., 2014:223&227). According to Cronin (2013), this failure can be attributed to 
poor management, which results in weak application of laws and regulations, and 
the subsequent deterioration of the application of internal systems, which in turn, 
creates opportunities for corruption.  
The ethical and moral ability of the anti-corruption agencies to fight corruption and 
not to find themselves involved at the center of corruption scandals is also 
questionable. For instance, in a study that explores corruption and related offences 
in selected Gauteng police stations of the South African Police Service (SAPS), 
Rajin (2017:12-3) finds that even the image of the police who are supposed to be 
the vanguard of or against corruption have their “image blemished by corruption”. 
Typical being the arrest and conviction of the late former Commissioner of Police 
Mr J Selebi, and the many numbers of corruption investigations and convictions 
involving the police (Rajin, 2017). The dire consequence of the involvement of 
police in corruption or perception of their involvement in corruption when they 
should be at the forefront of fighting it has resulted in communities “fast losing trust 
in the entire Criminal Justice System (Rajin, 2017:2). This reality of corruption within 
law enforcement ranks has let to Rajin (2017:17) “famously stating that Corruption, 
if allowed to continue, will spread throughout the organisation, fermenting and 
becoming an epidemic until it leads to the growth of “rotten trees” and eventually a 
“rotten apple” orchard’”. However, the problem of corruption is not only confined to 
the law enforcement sphere, the problem is wide spread in government perpetrated 
by government executives and public servants (Rajin, 2017:17). 
Currently the issue of corruption, integrity and legitimacy is not only confined to law 
enforcement agencies. The NPA has also been rocked by allegation of unfitness of 
its officers to hold office, which in part stem from their alleged involved in corrupt 
activities in the form of partiality in prosecuting corruption. Typical example in the 
Mokgoro Commission of Enquiry, which was set up to probe, amongst others, the 
fitness of former NPA head, Advocate Jiba to hold office. It is submitted that the 
events that led to the establishment of the Mokgoro Commission fly on the face of 
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established case law that directs the NPA to act with impartiality in the interest of 
the general public and not certain individuals or government executives. 
Exemplifying the litany of these cases is R v De Kock 1914 EDL 348, which stated 
(at 354) that:  
The Crown Prosecutor should have no other interest in the case than to 
lay before the court such facts as may assist the court in arriving at the 
truth.  This is his sole and only duty. 
Other relevant cases speaking to the integrity of the NPA include for example S v 
Chogugudza 1996 (1) SACR 477 (ZS). The court in S v Chogugudza, at 487h, said:  
Prosecutors are placed in positions of authority.  It is their duty to ensure 
that accused persons are dealt with properly and in accordance with the 
law.  As officers of the court, their bounden obligation is to uphold the law 
and by their conduct set an example of impeccable honesty and integrity.  
A failure to do so will lead to an erosion of confidence in the minds of the 
public.   
Addressing the impartiality of the prosecuting authority the court in S v Takaendesa 
1972 (4) SA 72 (R.,A.D.), at 74F-G, held that “[i[f the prosecutor had been aware of 
the true facts and concealed them from the court, he would have been guilty of a 
gross dereliction of duty and one that could only be strongly condemned.” It is 
relevant to mention this case because prosecutors or former heads of the NPA at 
the Mokgoro Commission should be considered to have been in dereliction of their 
duties, if they were aware of the alleged corrupt activities of the government 
executives but elected to cover them up by declining to prosecute or applying 
delaying tactics to the executives not to see their day in court. It is submitted that 
such alleged acts highlight the challenge of the problem of ineffectively and/or 
unprofessionally dealing with corruption in a matter that does not instil confidence 
in the general public, which compromises the independent position of the 
prosecuting authority as just a tool subservient to the executive or political masters 
(see S v Bothma 1971 (1) SA 332 (C) at 344F).  It is further submitted that such 
questionable conducts by members of the NPA with regard to fighting corruption 
fails to honour what the court in S v Majavu 1994 (2) SACR 265 (CK), at 275H-H to 
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276A (quoting Rand J in Boucher v The Queen (1955) 110 CCC 263 at 270), 
regarded as the role of the prosecution authority officers: “…to be efficiently 
performed with an ingrained sense of dignity, a seriousness and justness of judicial 
proceedings.” Also, to “… to carry out their public functions independently and in the 
interest of the public,” as remarked by the court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security and Others 2002 (1) SACR 79 (CC) at 82H-I.  
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A research problem should always address an important question in order that the 
answer can make a difference in some way or another and should further advance 
the development of knowledge that will lead to new ways of thinking and suggestions 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:45). A research problem is thus “an intellectual stimulus 
calling for an answer” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992:51). According to 
Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:14), a research problem is some challenge or 
problem in either a theoretical or practical situation that a researcher seeks to obtain 
a solution for. Problems related to the combating of corruption in South Africa range 
from the prevalence and the growing incidents of corruption itself, to the effectiveness 
and efficacy of the relevant law enforcement agencies tasked with investigating and 
prosecuting corruption. Similarly, the legislative or normative framework based on 
which these law enforcement agencies are established and operationalised have 
faced legitimacy crisis. In particular, their autonomy from political interference and 
investigative and prosecutorial integrity has come under the spotlight with the malady 
of State Capture. Even the role of an institution like the National Assembly has been 
put to question (Landsberg et al., 2006:7). 
On paper, and focusing predominantly on the existence of globally comparable anti-
corruption institutional and normative frameworks, South Africa appears like a 
country having a good handle on corruption. But, realism points to corruption as 
endemic in the country and threatens the existence of good governance. To put it in 
the words of Van Vuuren (2014:1):  
The way in which South Africa has responded to issues of 
corruption is evidence that the country exists as a functioning 
democracy. South Africa has successfully developed laws and 
institutions that have formulated a response to instances of 
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corruption at a national level. It is not a fundamentally corrupted 
state, nor does it use heavy-handed means to fight corruption. The 
rule of law generally prevails. However, digging deeper reveals a 
country that is grappling with measures to counter corruption and 
the abuse of power. The law is applied inconsistently and corruption 
fuels already high levels of economic inequality. (Researcher own 
emphasis). 
The South African government has for a long time not put its money where its mouth 
is. “It would appear as though government commits to the fight against corruption 
mostly in speeches only and to a very limited extent take action on corrupt individuals, 
posits Rajin (2017:21). There has now been some publicly evident actions taken by 
the government against corruption, such as the arrest of Bosasa State Capture 
syndicate in 2019, with Mr Angello Agrizzi who blew the whistle on the State Capture 
at the Zondo State Capture Commission of Enquiry. His arrest including other current 
and former Bosasa functionaries came alongside the arrest of former commissioner 
of the Department of Correctional Services (DCS), Mr Linda Mti and the former DCS 
CFO Patrick Gillingham (Makhosandile Zulu, The Citizen, 2019). 
Likewise, the Presidency is now alive to the problem of corruption, particularly 
concerned about the State Capture revelations, and has committed to ferociously fight 
corruption. During his 07 January 2019 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President 
Cyril Ramaphosa announced the imminent establishment of an independent anti-
corruption directorate (IACD) within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The 
announcement was met with mixed reactions of excitement at the prospect of a 
dedicated anti-corruption unit on one hand and with the scepticism that saw the 
announcement as nothing by re-inventing the bringing to life of a politically bias 
toothless dog. It is submitted that the latter reaction may be justified based on the 
challenge that rendered the now defunct Directorate of Special Operations (also, 
known popularly as Scorpions) and the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
(commonly referred to as the Hawks) inefficient. In a more pointed attack on the 
President’s announcement of the establishment of the directorate, Hoffman (2019) 
stated: 
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Against this background the decision of the President to announce, 
during his SONA on 7 February 2019, that he intends to establish a 
State Capture Investigative Directorate in the National Prosecuting 
Authority is perplexing. He is a lawyer, he must surely understand that 
the anti-corruption machinery of state cannot be independent and 
secure in its tenure if it is within his own executive gift, ahead of the 
executive branch of government, to create it and to end its existence, 
as well as to determine its terms of reference. The provisions in the NPA 
Act upon which he will rely in establishing the new unit are clearly 
inconsistent with the Constitution as it was interpreted in the two cases 
mentioned above. 
As stated already, the above doubt may be justifiable given what has happened 
before and the caution issued by the courts, which highlighted the independence of 
anti-corruption agencies as problematic. In Helen Suzman Foundation v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others; Glenister v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others [2014] ZACC 32 (Glenister III), at para 32, the Constitutional 
Court stated that “[t]he overriding consideration is whether the DPCI legislation has 
inbuilt autonomy-protecting features to enable its members to carry out their duties 
without any inhibitions or fear of reprisal.  
Another problem South Africa has had to deal with is the many and sometimes 
fragmented legal framework designed to address criminality in the country. A 
perception seems to be that corruption activities are poorly managed. With this 
perception or rather a challenge, can it not be considered streamlining the South 
African anti-corruption institutions, some with the broad mandate like the Office of 
the Public Protector, as an answer? Blaauw (2016:xv), for instance has argued, it is 
difficult for an office with a broad mandate to efficiently and effectively discharge its 
mandate. He uses as an example, removal from the mandate of Office of the 
Ombudsman in Namibia the function of investigating corruption and assigning it to 
the ACC as having increased the effectiveness of the Ombudsman. On the other 
hand, the ACC played a role of “an interlocking institution” with respect to fighting 
corruption (Blaauw, 2016:xv).  
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Majila et al., (2014:223&227) cite Cronin (2013), who attributes the failure of South 
Africa’s poor management of corrupt activities to weak application of laws and 
regulations, and the subsequent deterioration of the application of internal systems 
which, in turn, create opportunities for corruption. It has been confirmed with the 
event in early 2019 when after sitting on an investigative report of evidence of 
corruption at Bosasa, the SIU sprung to action after those implicated in their reports 
presented damning allegations at the Zondo State Capture Commission of Inquiry. It 
had to take a public admission by those implicated for the SIU to act to be seen doing 
something. 
 In sum, notable problems in the South African corruption management architecture 
are inefficiencies within and among institutions with regard to anti-corruption 
mandates; lack of effective and efficient enforcement of the current legislative 
framework dealing with corruption; lack of effective prosecution of corruption cases 
and judicial effectiveness; a lack of effective investigation and/or follow-up on 
complaints of corruption; inefficient application of disciplinary systems; 
underdeveloped management capacity in some areas; diminishing integrity of anti-
corruption institutions, with particular reference to the NPA and the SAPS; political 
interference and diminished autonomy of anti-corruption agencies in dealing with 
corruption, executing their powers and functions; and societal attitudes that weaken 
anti-corruption efforts (RSA, 2009:8). In other words, there is a lack of a co-ordinated, 
centralised, independent yet accountable response to corruption; this in turn causes 
a top-down approach resulting in public lack of trust, thus weakening legitimacy and 
ultimately the rule of law. According to Montesh (2007:03), the lack of proper 
communication, guidelines, and specificity regarding the exact functions of the 
different functionaries, contribute to the ineffective and inefficient manner of dealing 
with corruption in South Africa.  
  1.3 AIM AND PURPOSE OF STATEMENT 
The statement of purpose of the research provides the major objective or intent or 
“road map” of a study (Creswell, 2013:134). Likewise, Locke, Spirduso and 
Silverman (2014:214) posit that research aims need to be clear, specific and concise. 
In simple terms, the aim and purpose of the research is discovered by asking the 
question: “What is my research for?” (Mason, 2002:20). According to Denscombe 
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(2002:27), the main driving force behind research is the desire to solve a practical 
problem or to improve procedures. Babbie (2010:92) reasons that three of the most 
useful purposes of conducting research are exploration, description and explanation 
and that most studies will accordingly comprise some or all of these elements. 
This study critically evaluates South African anti-corruption strategies and structures 
from an historical and comparative perspective. In particular, this study investigates 
the current situation regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies in South 
Africa. The specific intention is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current procedures used to investigate corruption cases and process corruption 
crime scenes. Ultimately, recommendations on how to improve the current 
system are made.  
1.4  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions specify exactly what is to be investigated. They are not the 
broad goals of research. They are specific things that are to be observed, measured 
and interrogated in order to shed light on the broader topic (Denscombe, 2010:15). 
According to White (2009:87), research questions play an important role in directing 
and focusing the research. Questions should clearly indicate what the research aims 
to achieve and what it does not. It is important that questions are formulated in a 
way that effectively “bounds” the study, thus informing readers, and reminding 
researchers, exactly what topics the research intends to address. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2013:39) state that questions can be an excellent way of 
collecting data and providing guidelines on how the researcher should analyse and 
interpret data. De Vos et al., (2011:352) as well as Flick (2011:90) encourage 
researchers to follow a logical sequence and limit the research questions. The 
following research questions guided the research study and achieved the research 
goal: 
1.4.1 What is the prevailing scholarship and discourse on fundamental issues, 
concepts and knowledge in corruption as a phenomenon?  
 
1.4.2 What are the impacts of corruption on the society and governance in general? 
1.4.3 How does ethics influence the maintenance of effective and efficient anti-
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corruption strategies and good governance?  
1.4.4 Which leadership approaches will assist in forming a governance structure 
that is resistance to corruption in the public sphere? 
1.4.5 What are the key national legislative or normative framework and South 
Africa’s regional and international obligations to combat corruption?  
1.4.6 What are the successes and failures of the South African anti-corruption 
agencies in their fight against corruption?  
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
According to De Vos et al., (2011:108), research objectives identify specific issues 
the researcher intends to examine and should be clearly stated and specific. Each 
objective should describe only one issue. The following are the specific issues 
addressed in this study: 
1.5.1 Identify the relevant theories of corruption, analyse them, and apply them 
to determine the causes and effects of corruption and its impact on 
organisations and society. 
1.5.2 Review the current South African anti-corruption legislative and regulation 
framework. 
1.5.3 Conduct comparative studies of anti-corruption structures and strategies in 
countries that are known to have effective anti-corruption strategies in place. 
1.5.4 Make suggestions and recommendations intentioned to help the country 
formulate and design effective and efficient anti-corruption framework. 
 
1.6 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
De Vos et al., (2011:107) and Denscombe (2010:24) are of the opinion that research 
must be able to be used for practical purposes, should be useful to the intended 
target group and must contribute to the generation of new knowledge. In this 
study it is thus expected that: 
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1.6.1 From the unique nature of this research, organisations and individuals may 
benefit by considering and implementing the research results. 
1.6.2 Forensic investigators, auditors and detectives in various South African anti-
corruption agencies and government departments will benefit from this study 
as it can be used as a toolkit for additional knowledge and appreciation on 
how to execute their powers and functions towards fighting corruption. 
1.6.3 Additional knowledge regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies 
and the formulation of a single anti-corruption agency in South Africa will 
come to light. 
1.6.4 The findings of this research can be positively utilised to the benefit of the 
academic world, prospective and current students in the field of criminal justice 
and forensic investigations. 
1.7 STUDY ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Assumptions are things that are accepted as true, or at least plausible, by researchers 
and peers who will read the study. The working assumptions in this study are the 
following: 
1.7.1 South African law enforcement agencies have always considered and 
discharged their anti-corruption duties according to the spirit and the letter of 
the existing framework. 
1.7.2 South African anti-corruption agencies and institutions have the requisite 
understanding and competency to deal with the plethora of enabling legislation, 
policies and procedures intended to combat corruption and related criminality.  
1.7.3 South African anti-corruption agencies are conversant with the various ways in 
which corruption manifests itself. 
1.7.4  South African anti-corruption agencies are well resourced, independent and 
free from political interference and are able to execute their mandate with no 
fear or favour. 
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1.8    RESEARCH APPROACH, PARADIGM AND METHODOLOGY 
The underlying research paradigm and methodology in this study are as follows: 
1.8.1   Research Approach 
As explicated by McMillan and Schumacher (2001:428), there are a number of 
strategies available in a qualitative approach, namely participant observation, in-depth 
interviews and artefact collection. This study does not focus on data collection through 
questionnaires, systematic data analysis, observations and/or interviews. The study 
relies mostly on library materials, which include but are not limited to textbooks, 
reports, legislations, regulations, charters, policies, amendments to legislation, 
journals or academic journals, government gazettes, the Constitution, and 
international or national and local journals. 
 
1.8.2 Research Methodology (Data Collection) 
To start with, it must be noted from the outside in this study methodology is understood 
as a scientific discipline involving setting out and defining the most appropriate ways 
of discerning the subject of investigation in the study. Thus, in this study legal 
methodology (Vibhute & Aynalem, 2009:16) is used to discern law and legal 
phenomena of corruption.  According to Chen et al., (2007) methods denotes a range 
of approaches used to gather data, which are to be used as a basis for inference and 
interpretation, for explanation and prediction. Thus, methods is in essence data 
collection or data gathering (Sibanda, 2015:59).   
Below are the data collection methods used in this study: 
 
 1.8.2.1 Literature Review and Document Analysis 
Documents as a data gathering technique are described by Maree (2011:82) as 
“written communication that may shed light on the phenomenon researched”. There is 
a distinction between a literature review and document analysis. A literature review 
involves published documents, such as books and journal articles, whereas 
documents may include government documents and company minutes; these 
documents are not published but may provide valuable information about the study to 
the researcher. 
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This study is premised in part on the literature review in Chapter 2.  According to 
Creswell (2009:25), the foundation for conducting a literature review is to share the 
results of other studies that are similar to the study being undertaken, to provide a 
framework for establishing the importance of the study undertaken, and to provide a 
benchmark for comparing the results of the study with other findings. For the purpose 
data collection in this research, a literature review was conducted in the fields of 
corruption, bribery, fraud, anti-money laundering, money-laundering, crime, 
organised crime, terrorism, prevention, deterrence, education, investigation, forensic 
investigations, and other related subjects and presented as Chapter 2. Thus, the 
study is primarily a desk-top study. 
The literature in this research was used inductively, as it was incorporated 
throughout the discussion of the research and was also used to substantiate, 
compare and contrast the themes and results that emerged from the study (Creswell, 
2009:27).  
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2013:51), the role of literature review is to “look 
again” at what others have done in areas that are similar, though not necessarily 
identical, to one’s own topic of investigation. Fouché and Delport (in De Vos et al. 
2011:134) and Creswell (2009:29) recommend the following steps when collecting 
literature in a study: 
a) Finding appropriate literature/ Data Location: The research topic is 
determined, studied and analysed in order to find similar literature on the 
problem. The researcher will identify key concepts, namely corruption, bribery, 
fraud, anti-money laundering, money-laundering, crime, organised crime, 
terrorism, prevention, deterrence, education, investigation, investigators, in an 
attempt to find literature on the topic and research questions in the study. The 
separate concepts of the topic, as well as the key words of the research 
questions, are used to search the computerised database of the University of 
Hong Kong SPACE and University of South Africa (Unisa) library for journals, 
books, research reports, short dissertations, dissertations and theses related 
to the topic. In addition, the researcher requests the Unisa subject librarian to 
conduct a literature search. The researcher searches the online computerised 
databases of the University of Hong Kong SPACE and Unisa library websites 
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that are most frequently reviewed by social science researchers, such as 
Google Scholar, ProQuest, the Social Science Citation Index and others. The 
internet is also searched using “search topics/words” to find material relating 
to this research. 
 
b) Document selection: The researcher reads through all the relevant literature 
obtained, and the literature directly related and central to the researcher’s 
study is duplicated for further study. During this process the researcher 
continually strove to obtain a sense of whether the obtained literature will make 
a useful contribution to the topic under study. Thus, throughout the process 
of identifying relevant literature, the researcher compiled a literature map, 
providing a visual picture that illustrates how the study fits into the larger body 
of the literature obtained through the literature review. Summaries were 
compiled of the relevant literature that are discussed in the relevant chapters 
of the study and are listed in the list of references. 
 
c) Document analysis: The documents found and selected as indicated above 
were analysed. Documents selected for analysis included public documents, 
such as court records or case law reports – reported and unreported cases, 
forensic investigation reports, government gazettes government policy 
documents, newspapers, letters and e-mails, such as the accessible Gupta 
email leaks. Also secondary documents / academic documents such as journal 
articles, books and conference papers.  
 
1.8.3 Research Paradigm 
In this study, research paradigm is as a set of beliefs and assumptions that guide the 
researchers on how to successfully executive their studies (Creswell, 2009). Thus the 
research paradigm is intended to guide the inquiry in this study, as observed by 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2011: 39).  With the many understanding of research 
paradigm in existence, it is not surprising when each researcher “approaches research 
with a plethora of interlocking and sometimes contradicting philosophical assumptions 
and stances” (Sibanda, 2015:51).  
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The following research paradigms are used to analyse and interpret available data to 
answer research questions or phenomena in this study: 
  1.8.2.1 Interpretive and Descriptive Paradigm 
The primary research paradigm in this study is interpretive. The study focuses mainly 
on interpreting existing laws/pieces of legislation and/or judgements, and observing 
and analysing the implementation of the existing anti-corruption framework and 
structures. Also, on interpreting observations and views on the subject from literature 
review. 
With regard to descriptive paradigm, the researcher provides a descriptive analysis 
of the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption strategies in South Africa; the lack of 
synergy between the various anti-corruption strategies in the South African 
government; and the lack of interaction between these anti-corruption strategies 
and various government departments – circumstances that negatively impact non-
compliance and adherence to policy. To this end, the researcher gathered, 
assessed and recorded all relevant information and/or data in order to classify and 
categorise it with the sole purpose of discovering and advancing the body of 
knowledge in this field of study. Using the information, data and knowledge gained 
throughout this study, the researcher identifies links and associations between 
government departments in order to build possible relationships to deal with the 
scourge of corruption in both public and private institutions. 
  1.8.2.2 Critical Paradigm 
As the title of the study postulate, undertaken in the study is a “A critique of the 
South African anti-corruption strategies and structures” from a comparative lens. 
Thus, a critical paradigm is used to achieve the objective of this study through 
critically investigating the anatomy and efficacy of the South African anti-corruption 
normative framework and its implementing agencies. To this end, critical discourse 
analysis is employed (Asghar, 2013:3124) in this study to allow the analytical and 
critical nature of the study, and also to expose and challenge the inefficiencies of 
dealing with corruption in South Africa. 
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1.8.3 Comparative Paradigm 
Fombad (2017:984) posits that comparative legal research, as a research paradigm 
“is of such critical importance to legal research” that it defies logic why it is not part of 
the design of African universities legal research studies. He argues, and correctly so, 
that “all legal research involves, directly or indirectly, some degree of comparison” 
(Fombad, 2017:985), and that it is indispensable that legal studies or legal research 
apply certain of the principles and methodologies of comparative law. To justify this 
argument Fombad writes: 
One reason for this is that it is difficult to see how the law of a single 
country can form the basis of a serious independent scientific study. This 
is because one can only appreciate the role of the South African Public 
Protector and scientifically assess and comment on its effectiveness by 
referring to similar comparable institutions in other jurisdictions. These do 
not have to be similar institutions operating in other legal systems, 
although this latter aspect has to be factored into the analysis and the 
conclusions that will be drawn at the end of the study. No legal problem 
is inherently or exclusively national in nature or character.  
Perhaps a more telling example is a study, for example, on “the limitation 
of rights under the South African Constitution of 1996.”… This [section] 
clearly directs the court as well as the researcher to undertake a 
comparative inquiry about the practices in other free and democratic 
societies. Once again, it need not be a society operating under a different 
legal system but rather one that has a similar limitation clause. It is 
therefore clear that because no legal system is self-contained and self-
reliant, legal research on any topic is either explicitly or implicitly 
comparative [Researcher’s own emphasis]. 
The legal comparative research methodology was used in this study, focusing on 
selected national jurisdictions and on continental and international frameworks for anti-
corruption is also employed. Comparative evaluation (Van Hoecke, 2011) is used with 
regard to carefully selected comparator jurisdiction, namely, Botswana, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, to determine how divergent their anti-corruption systems are with 
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South Africa in combating corruption. Also, to determine if there are any valuable 
lessons that can be learned from their normative frameworks and the operations of 
their anti-corruption agencies. Another important consideration highlighted by Fombad 
is that “comparative legal research is key to any research aimed at drafting 
harmonised laws or drawing up international conventions and agreements” (Fombad, 
2017:991). In the context of this study, comparative research is important because 
legislative changes in the South African anti-corruption framework are made. 
1.9 RESEARCH DEMARCATION AND LIMITATION 
According to Goddard and Melville (2001:14), the process of demarcation specifically 
involves researchers determining the scope of the study; what variables are 
involved; how the study will be conducted; and what practical constraints or 
challenges will be experienced.  
The following are the delimitations of this thesis: 
1. As indicated in Chapter 3, the South African criminal justice system consist of 
many legislation dealing with specific areas of criminal justice, some mutually 
exclusive and others mutually inter-dependent. A focused academic study like 
this may not cover all these legislation. Thus in this study only a selected band 
of legislation is considered, namely: PRECCA, POCA, PFMA, MFMA, CPA, 
NPA Act, SIU Act, Public Protector Act, and the Criminal Laws Amendment 
Act. However, not all these selected legislation are dealt with in depth for the 
purposes of this study. Some are already addressed generally elsewhere in 
some major studies, such as POCA (see Basdeo 2014) and will be discussed 
to the extend they are relevant for the subject of corruption and corrupt 
activities.  
2. In Chapter 4 a number of institutions are referred to as relevant to the broader 
scheme of fighting corruption. These are, for example, the Office of the Public 
Protector, the Office of the Auditor-General of South Africa, the South African 
Human Rights Commission, Parliament, and the several law enforcement 
divisions. Some of these institutions such as the South African Human Rights 
Commission are not dedicated specifically or primarily to fighting corruption or 
criminality in general and they will thus not be discussed extensively. 
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3. State capture, which is one of the key considerations in this study, was 
recently unearthed in South Africa. The Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo 
Commission of Inquiry into State Capture only began its work in 2019. So are 
other commissions such as the Mokgoro Commission of Inquiry into the 
Fitness of Advocate Jiba to Hold Office at the NPA. These are very critically 
commissions to the investigation in this study. Unfortunately, this thesis may 
not have the benefit of the conclusions and outcomes of these commissions 
by the time of submission for examination. It is submitted that some of the 
conclusions and recommendations of the Commission may impact on the 
findings, submissions and recommendations of this study. Information on 
these commissions is thus based on testimonies and submissions at the 
commissions, some of which are yet to be cross-examined.  
4. A number of bills relevant to this study have been introduced in Parliament 
and/or under discussions for introduction to deal with corruption. Notable is 
the PRECCA Amendment Bill, the Political Funding Bill, the NPA Amendment 
Bill, and the Ant-Corruption Commission Bill. Until they are enacted into law 
not too much reliance on them can be made in this study. Thus any discussion 
of their provisions is made to advance a specific argument or submission 
made by the researcher. 
1.10 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
Creswell (2014:201) posits that each study draws strength on its validity, the 
accuracy and reliability of its findings. Thus the validity and reliability of the research 
must not only be accurate from the perspective of the researcher; it  must also be 
accurate from the reader of an account and the participants, in case of empirical 
research,  validity and reliability in this study was secured through the following 
strategies / approaches: 
a) Soliciting critical expert peer-review of the study or parts of the study. 
b) Avoid bias as far as possible. Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007:150) 
describes bias as a “systematic or insistent tendency to make errors in the 
same direction, that is, to overstate or understate the true value of an attribute.” 
In this study self-reflection created an open and honest narrative and should 
resonate well with readers. Thus, the researcher indicated his research visit to 
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Hong Kong were he gained first-hand information on the anti-corruption 
regulatory and institutional framework of Hong Kong. This experience has 
partly influenced the researcher’s election of Hong Kong as one of the three 
compactor countries alongside Botswana and Singapore. Good qualitative 
research contains comments by the researcher about how their interpretation 
of the findings is shaped by their background. 
1.11 CLARIFICATION OF KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
According to De Vos et al., (2005:32) “definitions are used to facilitate 
communication and arguments”, particularly because they present terms and/or 
concepts simply and clearly, thus avoiding vagueness or ambiguity. Defining terms 
focuses the researcher (Maxfield & Babbie, 2005:12). In defining a term or concept 
a researcher begins by declaring the term to mean “whatever you want it to mean 
throughout the research” (Berg, 2004:29). Berg (2004:36) highlights the value of 
conceptualising a term in order to ensure that readers understand what is meant by 
certain concepts and to further enable readers to consider how effectively identified 
key concepts are applied in a study.  
The following key theoretical concepts of this research are therefore defined: 
1.11.1 CORRUPTION 
The word “corruption” has its origin in a Latin verb “corruptus”, meaning, “to break”. 
Literally, it means “a broken object”. There is no universally accepted definition of 
corruption. Rajin (2017:7) correctly observes that the phenomenon of corruption is 
complex to define, and that it covers variety of activities or offences including the 
abuse of power and authority of public office (Rajin, 2017:16). The abuse of power 
and public office is broader than bribery as a corrupt activity. Conceptually, 
corruption is a form of behaviour that departs from ethics, morality, tradition, law and 
civic virtue. McCusker (2006:1) explains corruption with reference to its 
manifestation and its scale, be it petty, grand, political or bureaucratic corruption. 
The UN Manual on Anti-Corruption (2001:40), Transparency International, and 
multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
define corruption as “abuse of public office for private gains”.  
The phenomenon of corruption is fully discussed in Chapter 2. 
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An observation by Fazekas and Toth (2017) that a broad and integrated 
understanding of corruption should be employed merits following in this study. For 
example, the authors advocate the adoption of:  
a broad approach that is adept at capturing high-level political 
corruption in situations where even some regulations could be 
enacted to serve rent extraction. Thus, in the context of public 
procurement, institutionalised grand corruption denotes the 
allocation and performance of public procurement contracts by 
bending prior explicit rules and principles of good public 
procurement such as public procurement laws to benefit a 
closed network while denying access to all others (Fazekas & 
Toth, 2017:322).  
This definition that goes beyond defining corruption as “simple bribery in public 
administration is well fitted to the context of public procurement where political 
discretion is broad, and political and technocratic actors necessarily codetermine 
decision” (Fazekas & Toth, 2017:322).  
Section 3(a)(ii) of the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act No. 12 of 
2004 (PCCA Act) defines what conduct constitutes corruption. The PCCA Act came 
into force on 27 April 2004 with the repeal of the Corruption Act, No. 94 of 1992. 
Corruption is considered so serious that the court in Phillips v The State (370/2016) 
[2016] ZASCA 187 (1 December 2016) ruled that the PCCA Act does not limit the 
discretion of the sentencing court in determining punishment. In particular, Zondi JA 
held that a trial court must “have regard to all relevant considerations”, otherwise 
another court would be able to interfere with the sentence imposed on the grounds 
of sentencing misdirection by the trial court. What is important for the purposes of 
this study is Zondi JA’s pronouncement that in crimes, such as corruption all relevant 
issues must be taken into consideration. “But I do not agree with the reduction in this 
case of the sentence from seven years to four years by the learned judge, given the 
seriousness of corruption in South Africa”. Otherwise one would be giving credence 
to an assertion debunked in S v Sadler 2000 (1) SACR 331 (SCA), that corruption 
and white-collar crime hurt society less because they are mainly crimes of an 
economic nature and individual crimes. The researcher agrees with the sentiment of 
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Baqwa J in Mofomme v State Case No: A812/2016 (9/11/2017), who stated that: 
[at para 22] The seriousness of the crime of corruption is such that, of 
the triad of the crime, the criminal and the interests of society, the latter 
looms the largest. Corrupt groupings and individuals ought to be left in 
no doubt that these tendencies shall not be condoned by the Courts. 
When our Courts, which symbolise justice, are seen to promote crime 
in any manner or shape, then society shall be left totally unprotected 
and it shall be open season for criminals and charlatans to turn it into 
what is colloquially referred to as a ‘banana state’. 
The court in Mofomme v State Case No: A812/2016 (9/11/2017), para 25, held that 
the crime of corruption is “not an individual crime; it’s a crime that has wide-ranging 
implications which undermine the hard-won constitutional democracy”. In fact, the 
court agreed with the dictum in S v Shaik and Others 2007 (1) SA 248 (SCA) that 
corruption as a crime which “threatened the constitutional order’’ (at para 26). The 
country was at one point on a good trajectory when in cases like S v Shaik and 
Others 2007 (1) SA 248 (SCA) the accused’s conviction in the High Court on 
corruption and fraud and sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment were confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). The SCA in casu stated: 
The seriousness of the offence of corruption could not be 
overemphasised. It offended against the rule of law and the principles 
of good governance, lowered the moral tone of the nation, and it 
threatened the constitutional order. No fault could be found with the 
reasoning of the trial court that no substantial or compelling 
circumstances existed in relation to counts one and three that would 
justify the imposition of a sentence other than the prescribed minimum 
of 15 years’ imprisonment. [There was no appeal against the sentence 
imposed on count two.] In the result all the sentences imposed by the 
trial court stood. Appeals against convictions and sentences 
dismissed. 
The word “corruptly” or the phrase “corrupt activities” is sometimes used in this study. 
However, the use of the word corruptly was not oblivious of its rejection in other 
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jurisdiction as vague and unconstitutional. For instance , in Lameck & another v 
President of the Republic of Namibia & others 2012 (1) NR 255 (HC) the definition of 
‘corruptly’ contained in section  32 of the Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003 Act was 
declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid because of its 
vagueness. Interestingly, section 32 of the Namibian Anti-Corruption Act is couched 
broadly stating in part that term corruption includes “acts in contravention of or 
against the spirit of any law, provision, rule, procedure, process, system, policy, 
practice, directive, order or any other term or condition pertaining to – (a) any 
employment relationship; (b) any agreement; or (c) the performance of any function 
in whatever capacity.” 
  1.11.2 FORENSIC INVESTIGATION 
Van Rooyen (2008:14) submits that forensic investigation is in most instances 
associated with the investigation of computer-related crimes, corruption, fraud, 
embezzlement and other white-collar crimes. According to Bennett and Hess 
(2007:06), forensic investigation is a step-by-step enquiry, observation, thorough 
examination and recording of evidence and further is intended to establish facts using 
science to present evidence before a court of law. Forensic investigation 
professionals play a vital role in the detection and prevention of crime. This role is 
complementary to “the government anti-fraud and anti-corruption agencies in 
strategies and policies to curb menace of corruption in the system” (Mau, 2015). 
   1.11.3 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
According to Bennett and Hess (2004:06), criminal investigation, is a process of 
discovering, collecting, preparing, identifying and presenting evidence to determine 
what happened and who is responsible. This view is supported by Monckton-Smith 
(2013:2), who state that “criminal investigation” is a process organised to meet 
the demands of a system of justice and, often, the more serious the crime, the 
more complex and demanding the investigation. 
  1.11.4 FRAUD 
The New South Wales Cancer Institute (2013:5) defines fraud as a “deliberate and 
premeditated turn of events which involves the use of deception to gain advantage 
from a position of trust and authority”. The types of event include acts of 
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omission, theft, the making of false statements, evasion, manipulation of information 
and numerous other acts of deception. Fraud is regarded as a form of corrupt 
conduct (i.e. a sub-set within the definition of corruption) and therefore is subject to 
the same rules of reporting that apply to suspected corrupt conduct. 
The South African SCA in S v Sadler 2000 (1) SACR 331 (SCA) stated that white-
collar crimes like fraud and corruption were serious in and of themselves with 
devastating consequences for the society. Fraud and related white-collar crimes or 
corrupt practices entail serious and gross breaches of trust. Judge Squires stated: 
[par 11] I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case call for the 
imposition of a period of direct imprisonment and that the interests 
of justice will not be adequately served by leaving the sentence 
imposed by Squires J undisturbed. So-called “white-collar” crime 
has, I regret to have to say, often been visited in South African 
courts with penalties which are calculated to make the game seem 
worth the candle. Justifications often advanced for such inadequate 
penalties are the classification of “white-collar” crimes as non-violent 
crime and its perpetrators (where they are first offenders) as not truly 
being “criminals” or “prison material” by reason of their often 
ostensibly respectable histories and background. Empty 
generalisations of that kind are of no help in assessing appropriate 
sentences for “white-collar” crime. Their premise is that prison is 
only a place for those who commit crimes of violence and that it is 
not a place for people from “respectable” backgrounds even if their 
dishonesty has caused substantial loss, was resorted to for no other 
reason than self-enrichment, and entailed gross breaches of trust. 
[par 12] These are heresies. Nothing will be gained by lending 
credence to them. Quite the contrary. The impression that crime of 
that kind is not regarded by the courts as seriously beyond the pale 
and will probably not be visited with rigorous punishment will be 
fostered and more will be tempted to indulge in it. 
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[par 13] It is unnecessary to repeat yet again what this Court has 
had to say in the past about crimes like corruption, forgery and 
uttering, and fraud. It is sufficient to say that they are serious crimes 
the corrosive impact of which upon society is too obvious to require 
elaboration …  
 1.11.5 MALADMINISTRATION 
Maladministration is an activity or practice that results in non-compliance with 
regulations but is normally the result of a genuine mistake rather than any deliberate 
plan to gain an unfair advantage. Where a centre or provider repeatedly makes 
mistakes, this will eventually constitute malpractice (Institute of Leadership and 
Management, 2012:4).  
It is submitted that there is a thin line between corruption and maladministration in 
South Africa. This was demonstrated by the Gauteng High Court decision ordering 
Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) to pay back R316 m to the South African Social 
Security Agency (Sassa). According to Tsoka J, the payment to CPS by Sassa was 
an unlawful one that “robbed a substantial amount of money intended for the most 
vulnerable and poor people of our country.” The payment was fraught with acts of 
manipulation of services that generated the payments sought.  
  1.11.6 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
According to Schedule 1 of the Public Service Commission (PSC) Rules on 
managing conflicts of interest (2009), conflict of interest is defined as “any financial 
or other private interest or undertaking that could directly or indirectly compromise 
the performance of the public servant’s duties or the reputation of a public servant’s 
department in its relationship with its stakeholders”.  
Kanyane (2005:1) refers to Grupe (2003), who provides as practical examples of 
conflict of interest the following: “self-dealing, accepting benefits, influence peddling, 
using the employer’s property for personal advantage, using confidential 
information, obtaining outside employment or moonlighting, and taking advantage in 
post-employment.” Conflict of interests have been addressed in many state tender 
transactions. It is thus a requirement in the Declaration of Interest document that 
tenderers must declare any bond, whether family, friendship or work-related, with 
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any member of the tender board or the department concerned.  
In S v Tshopo and Others (29/12) [2012] ZASCA 193 (30 November 2012), Hefer 
JA regarded declaration of interests as important to root out fraud in state tenders.  
 [par 37] Fraud in the procurement of state tenders is a particularly 
pervasive form of dishonest practice. It undermines public confidence in 
the government that awards tenders, apparently without regard for 
nepotism, and it creates perceptions unfavourable to the services 
provided pursuant to such tenders. It is proving notably difficult for the 
authorities to identify and root out such malpractices. The courts are 
obliged to render effective assistance lest the game be thought to be 
worth the candle. 
1.11.7 BRIBERY 
Bribery involves the promise, offering or giving of a benefit that improperly affects the 
actions or decisions of a public servant. This benefit may accrue to the public 
servant, another person or an entity. A variation of this manifestation occurs where 
a political party or government is offered, promised or given a benefit that 
improperly affects the actions or decisions of the political party or government 
(Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), 2002:7). 
1.11.8 FRONTING 
Fronting is related to or is a sub-species of corruption in which, for example, black 
people are fictitiously presented as shareholders of companies that are essentially 
white-owned. When these companies bid for state tenders they benefit illegally from 
preferential rules of black economic empowerment (BEE) (Mynhardt, 2011:21). In 
South Africa fronting is explained in relation to the abuse of tender processes. 
Thus fronting with reference to the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
53 of 2003 (BBBEE Act), section 1 (c), is the “conclusion of a legal relationship with 
a black person for the purpose of that enterprise achieving a certain level of broad-
based BEE compliance without granting that black person the economic benefits that 
would reasonably be expected to be associated with the status or position held by 
that black person”. It is “any practice or initiatives which are in contravention of or 
against the spirit of any law, provision, rule, procedure, process, system policy, 
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practice, directive, or any other term or condition pertaining to BEE under the codes” 
(Mynhardt, 2011:3).  
Fronting was addressed in Swifambo Rail Leasing v PRASA (1030/2017) [2018] 
ZASCA 167 (30 November 2018) where the locomotive tender awarded was set 
aside after being found to have been secured through irregularities, corruption of 
officials of PRASA and “fronting” within the meaning of the BBEEE Act No. 53 of 
2003. In this case PRASA alleged that Swifambo, which had a level 4 BBBEE rating, 
“was a “front” for Vossloh. “This company would not have been able to bid itself 
because it was not based in South Africa and did not meet the requirements of the 
procurement policy nor the request for proposals, which necessitated that it be 
Broad-Based Black Employment Equity (BBBEE) compliant” (Swifambo Rail Leasing 
v PRASA (1030/2017) [2018] ZASCA 167 (30 November 2018), para 25). However, 
Swifambo argued that it was aware that it was party to a transaction that was based 
on a fronting practice, thus it could not be held liable for violating the relevant 
provisions of the BBBEE Act.  
1.11.9 State capture 
The most demonstrative and succinct definition of state capture is put forward by 
Bhorat, Buthelezi, Chipkin, Duma, Mondi, Peter, Qobo, Swilling, and Friedenstein 
(2017:15), positioning it with corruption as follows: 
Corruption tends to be an individual action that occurs in exceptional 
cases, facilitated by a loose network of corrupt players. It is 
somewhat informally organised, fragmented and opportunistic. 
State capture is systemic and well-organised by people with 
established relations. It involves repeated transactions, often on an 
increasing scale. The focus is not on small-scale looting, but on 
accessing and redirecting rents away from their intended targets 
into private hands. To succeed, this needs high-level political 
protection, including from law enforcement agencies, intense loyalty 
and a climate of fear; and competitors need to be eliminated. The 
aim is not to bypass rules to get away with corrupt behaviour. That 
is, the term corruption obscures the politics that frequently informs 
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these processes, treating it as a moral or cultural pathology. Yet, 
corruption, as is often the case in South Africa, is frequently the 
result of a political conviction that the formal ‘rules of the game’ are 
rigged against specific constituencies and that it is therefore 
legitimate to break them. 
According to Myburgh (2017), state capture is systematic corruption that is 
symptomatic of the lack of leadership in South African public institutions. It led to one 
family exploiting the state’s resources. More instructive in defining state capture and 
contextualising its understanding is the 2018 article by Dassah entitled Theoretical 
analysis of state capture and its manifestation as a governance problem in South 
Africa (Dassah, 2018). In a literature review, Dassah grapples with understanding 
the concept of state capture. The outcome of his literature review is that state capture 
arose out of the system of paying bribes to purchase political influence (Dassah, 
2018). Amongst the many definitions of state capture referred to by Dassah is: 
“efforts of firms to shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own 
advantage by providing illicit private gains to public officials” (quoting Hellman & 
Kaufmann, 2001:1). Particularly interesting in the context of South African state 
capture is the “the propensity of firms to shape the underlying rules of the game by 
‘purchasing’ decrees, legislation, and influence, or efforts of firms to shape and 
influence the underlying rules of the game (i.e. legislation, laws, rules, and decrees) 
through private payments to public officials” (Dassah, 2018 quoting Hellman et al., 
2000:4).  
1.11.10   ETHICS 
Moral and ethical considerations are very important in the fight against corruption. 
(Thonzhe & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2017:138) define ethics “as a system of moral 
principles relating to that branch of philosophy dealing with values on human 
conduct, with respect to rightness or wrongness of certain actions.” Explicit in this 
definition is that ethics “constitutes the basic principles of correct action undertaken 
based on rules of conduct” (Thonzhe & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2017:38).  
A number of authorities cited by Thonzhe and Vyas-Doorgapersad (2017) highlight 
the importance of organisational ethics, and how public sector ethics enhance good 
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governance (Thonzhe & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2017:139).  
In Chapter 3 of this study, the relationship between ethics and occupation, and the 
importance of ethical leadership is explicated. For benefits of ethical leadership on 
combating corruption discussed (see Whitton, 2001; Pillay, 2016; Igoda-Gadot, 2000; 
Cheteni & Shindika, 2017; Gildenhuys, 2004; Naidoo, 2012; Okagbue, 2012; Igbim, 
2018; Mendonca, 2001; Van Aswegen and Engelbrecht, 2009). Suffice to say at this 
stage, and stated by Igbim (2018:23), “trust and commitment are positive externalities 
that are associated with ethical leadership”. It is this trust and subscription to ethical 
conduct that will enhance the image of South African authorities as they fight against 
corruption. 
1.11.11 INTEGRITY 
As noted by Hoekstra and Zweegers (2016), and correctly so, definitions of the word 
or phenomenon “integrity” are varied across the globe. And they are also dependent 
on the circumstances and the environment at play. In the Netherlands, for example, 
integrity is taken to be more than anti-corruption principles and values, and broadly 
refers to “promoting an ethical climate marked by features including openness, 
safety, respect, trust, leadership, and justice” Hoekstra and Zweegers (2016:54).  
According to Huberts et al., (2016:13), the following are visions of integrity or what 
the operational definition of integrity is about as identified in integrity research and 
policies: 
▪ Integrity as wholeness 
▪ Integrity as integration into the environment 
▪ Integrity as a professional responsibility 
▪ Integrity as conscious and open action based on moral 
reflection 
▪ Integrity as a (number of) value(s) or virtue(s), including 
incorruptibility Integrity as compliance with laws and codes 
▪ Integrity as compliance with relevant moral standards and 
values 
▪ Integrity as exemplary moral behaviour 
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Relevant to the context of this study, Hubert et al., (2016:14) provides a typology of 
integrity violations, which links strongly to corruption and corrupt practices. These 
are: 
▪ Corruption: bribery 
▪ Corruption: favouritism (nepotism, cronyism, patronage) 
▪ Fraud and theft of resources  
▪ Conflicts of (private and public) interest through ‘gifts’ 
▪ Conflicts of (private and public) interest through side-line activities 
Improper use of authority 
▪ Misuse and manipulation of information 
▪ Indecent treatment of colleagues or citizens and customers 
▪ Waste and abuse of organisational resources 
▪ Misconduct in private time 
Furthermore Hubert et al., (2016:15, quoting Van Tankeren & Montfort, 2012) states 
the following: 
[R]egardless of the definition of integrity …, integrity policy can be 
described as the set of intentions, choices and actions designed to 
promote and protect integrity within organisations. That set may involve 
a wide range of initiatives and instruments, which will ideally be a 
combination of ‘software’ (ethical culture), ‘hardware’ (rules and 
procedures), and an ‘operating system’ (organisation and coordination 
of integrity policies).    
In view of the expressions above, it is submitted that a definition of integrity and 
ethics as separate concepts is largely a matter of academic exercise. There is a 
very close and overlapping relationship between ethical and moral conduct on the 
one hand and the requirements to act with integrity on the others.  This is particularly 
evident in the in-depth discussions in Chapter 3 of this study dealing with Ethical 
dimensions of corruption and corrupt practices in governance and public service in 
South Africa, and in part 2. 
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1.11.12 Fitness to Hold Office 
The concept of fitness for the office of the NDPP that requires the person to be fit 
and proper to be “entrusted with the responsibilities of the office concerned.” 
However, this concept is not explained nor defined in the NPA Act.  In the Ginwala 
Commission, the commission chairperson declined to define the concept, but stated 
that (Ginwala Commission, 2008:1): 
amongst others, the person must possess an understanding of the 
responsibilities of such an office. There must be an appreciation of the 
significance of the role a prosecuting authority plays in a constitutional 
democracy, the moral authority that the prosecuting authority must enjoy 
and the public confidence that must repose in the decisions of such an 
authority. To that must be added an appreciation for and sensitivity to 
matters of national security. 
It is submitted that the understanding of the concept “fit and proper” person in the 
legal profession may shed light on how the fitness of a person to hold NDPP office 
may be construed.  Fit and proper is not explained in the legal practice legislation but 
court have sought to give the phrase or words ‘fit and proper’ some context. In Kaplan 
v Incorporated Law Society, Transvaal 1981 (2) SA762 (T) by Boshoff JP at 782B, 
for example, said that: 
taken by themselves they have a variety of dictionary meanings which 
include in the case of “fit”, adapted, adjusted, qualified or suited to some 
purpose, competent and deserving; and in the case of “proper”, 
excellent, admirable, commendable, fine, goodly, of high quality, of 
good character or standing, honest, respectable, worthy, fit apt, 
suitable. 
It is submitted that in line with the judgment in Kaplan v Incorporated Law Society, 
the enquiry into a person’s fitness to hold office as envisaged in the NPA Act is a 
question of fact that involves a value judgment. It must be a determination that looks 
into the integrity and professional abilities and competency of such person to oversee 
the country’s prosecution directorate and prosecute cases without fear or favour and 
with the greatest degree of impartiality. 
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1.11.12 INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
For the purposes of this study, a definition of institutional or organisational 
effectiveness by Blaauw will be adopted. According to Blaauw (2009:1): 
Institutional effectiveness denotes something different for the public 
sphere than it does for the private sphere because it accords each a 
particular role in the governing process. In the case of a government, 
institutional effectiveness refers to its ability to fulfil its functions and 
responsibilities as stated in, among other instruments, the constitution. 
Therefore, from a governmental perspective, effectiveness emphasises 
the checks and balances within government institutions. More 
specifically, the existence of institutional effectiveness is related to the 
way different elected and appointed agencies are perceived to have 
performed or are performing their duties. In simple terms, it alludes to 
the notion of political trust. 
It is submitted that the definition by Blaauw resonates with the essence of this study, 
which is to finally determine the effectiveness of the South African anti-corruption 
agencies and legislative framework. 
1.12 CHAPTER LAYOUT 
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 demarcates the field of study and 
outlines the research design and methodology. It includes a statement of the 
research problem, research questions, research objectives and limitations, and 
provides an overview of the entire study. 
 
Chapter 2, contains a literature review, setting out in a thematic approach current 
scholarship and debates engendered by such scholarship. It explores critical issues 
emanating from and guided by the research question and sub-questions.  
 
Chapter 3, explicates the constitutional and legislative framework on anti-
corruption in South Africa. For completeness, this chapter also makes reference to 
other related laws such as common law and the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 
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1977 (CPA). The relevant case law is also referred to in order to give application 
content to the framework. 
  
Chapter 4, undertakes a comparative analysis of selected countries and anti-
corruption models. Specifically considered in this chapter are continental and 
international legal frameworks on anti-corruption. With respect to corruption 
frameworks and practices, the countries considered are Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Botswana. These countries were identified for this study because, amongst other 
things, they show some common and interpretable patterns in combatting 
corruption. Botswana is a leading African country in combatting corruption. Regional 
anti-corruption initiatives and instruments such as those in the African Union (AU) 
and the Organisation of Economic Co-operation (OECD) are also considered. 
 
Chapter 5, discusses in depth, the South African Anti-corruption Strategies, 
Structures and Related Institutions, which are the crux of this study. It also responds 
to the sixth research question (question 1.4.6) of this study that questions amongst 
others the successes and failures of the South African anti-corruption agencies in 
their fight against corruption. 
 
Chapter 6, Foreign Jurisdictions and the Fight Against Corruption: Lessons from 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Botswana, a comparative enquiry of best practices and 
successes of foreign jurisdictions are undertaken. 
 
Chapter 7, a comparative determination and appraisal of the South African anti-
corruption strategies and structures is undertaken in this thesis. In particular, the 
thesis focuses on the efficacy on the anti-corruption agencies and the role they play 
in combating corruption in South Africa.  This chapter contains a general 
conclusions and findings from data obtained from both literature review and 
qualitative research. The chapter makes a number of important submissions and 
recommendations for consideration by the South African authorities. Provisions for 
recommended constitutional and legislative reforms are suggested were possible. 
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1.13     SUMMARY 
Chapter 1 contextualised the study by demarcating and outlining the research 
problem, research questions, research objectives and limitations, and research 
design and methodology. It provides an overview of the entire study. Moreover, the 
chapter clarified certain important terms and concepts in paragraph 1.8 such as 
corruption and State capture. Preliminary findings in Chapter 1 were that corruption 
is a serious problem in South Africa. This has been confirmed by both the 2017 and 
the 2018 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the Transparency International. A 
number of instruments are used to rate and measure country corruptions. The 2018 
CPI, for instance, showed no improvement in South Africa’s CIP from that of 2017. 
Like in 2017, South Africa is still ranked at number 73 with a global average score of 
43.  South Africa’s ranking, according to Sibanda (2019 – Daily Maverick), is a far cry 
from the countries that the study used for comparative purposes.  Singapore is 
ranked position number 3, Hong Kong ranked number 14 and Botswana ranked 
number 34 with a global average score of 61.   
The next Chapter deals with literature review. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REFLECTION ON EXTANT LITERATURE ON CORRUPTION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Randolph (2009), the following is key to what a literature review is all 
about: “Conducting a literature review is a means of demonstrating an author’s 
knowledge about a particular field of study, including vocabulary, theories, key 
variables and phenomena, and its methods and history. Conducting a literature review 
also informs the student of the influential researchers and research groups in the field.”  
In conducting a study entitled A critique of the South African anti-corruption strategies 
and structures: a comparative analysis, there is a need to contextualise the research 
with regard to relevant prior studies. Therefore, in a thematic approach, the literature 
review is conducted looking specifically at issues of the current and historical 
prevalence of corruption in South Africa; perceptions and understanding of the 
meaning and import of corruption and corrupt practices in South Africa and other 
jurisdictions, including the concept of state capture; best practices in the combatting of 
corruption and the appropriate institutional, legislative and regulatory frameworks in 
the selected comparative jurisdictions; and international and regional anti-corruption 
instruments. The consideration of regional and international instruments in particular 
is important given section 39 (1) of the Constitution, which requires that “When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – (a) must promote the values 
that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law”. 
In brief, this chapter is an attempt to answer the following questions: What has been 
written about this topic before, if anything? What are the existing relevant debates? 
What are the key ideas and findings in the current literature on the topic and the 
specific problems identified? What are the gaps in the literature that call for further 
research? 
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2.2 CORRUPTION AS A SERIOUS OFFENCE 
The seriousness of the crime of corruption has been pronounced in several examples 
of case law, and by different scholars. In S v Shaik and Others [2006] ZASCA 
105; 2007 (1) SA 240 (SCA), para 222, the SCA stated:  
[the] seriousness of the offence of corruption cannot be 
overemphasised. It offends against the rule of law and the principles 
of good governance … Courts must send out an unequivocal 
message that corruption will not be tolerated and that punishment will 
be appropriately severe … It is thus not an exaggeration to say that 
corruption of the kind in question eats away at the very fabric of our 
society and is the scourge of modern democracies. 
So serious is the crime of corruption that it may also blur the lines of other related 
corrupt activities. In S v Shaik, for example, Shaik was convicted of transgressing the 
PCCA Act, and for fraud. 
It is submitted that the above definitions, or rather categorisations, of corruption are 
complementary, particularly considering other manifestations of corruption including 
state capture. There seems to be consensus amongst scholars on the negative impact 
of corruption all over the world, including its negative financial implications for the 
economy and the poor, and how it undermines good and effective governance, 
oversight and accountability and ethical leadership. 
2.3 SOCIETAL ILLS OF CORRUPTION 
Okpokwu (2016:17) points out that “corruption erodes public trust in government, 
deprives the citizens of basic services by transferring public funds into private gains of 
few individuals. It is the betrayal of public trust by those in positions of power.” It is an 
act that involves undue benefits in order to allow an unwarranted action or inaction 
(Doig, 2014:672). As unlawful conduct, corruption delegitimises the action taken and 
also affects the legitimacy of processes and consequences. With regard to the issue 
of legitimacy, the World Bank Report (2017:77) states: 
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corruption undermines legitimacy because it affects public perceptions 
of the fairness of decision-making processes. In the long term, 
corruption negatively affects growth by diverting resources from more 
productive use. It negatively affects equity by disproportionately 
benefiting those in power, although in the short term it may grease the 
wheels of the economy. 
A similar view is held by Stapenhurst, Johnston and Pelizzo (2006:15), who assert that 
“Corruption in politics undermines the legitimacy of political leaders and leads to 
public’s disaffection with the government of the day. Corruption facil itates trafficking, 
money laundering and organised crime which ultimately contributes to weak 
economies, inequality, environmental damage, illegitimate leaders and also increases 
social polarization.”  It is submitted that generally many authors, scholars and 
commentators find corruption to be cancerous, repulsive, and eroding the very sense 
of good governance and public good (see for example Rajin, 2017; Pillay, 2016; 
Serfontein, 2015; and Sibanda, 2005). 
The South African National Planning Commission (NPC) has conceded that corruption 
is “a monster which weakens government’s ability to deliver services, increase social 
mobility and overcome inequalities, which in turn exacerbates the potential for 
corruption” (National Planning Commission, 2014:26). In addition, this has been 
observed in “many developing and under-developing countries” (Majila et al., 2014:1), 
with differing costs. From the point of view of governance and public good, it is clear 
that the implications of corruption are dire. It affects the rule of law and weakens the 
state institutions tasked with enforcing the country’s laws; it affects the distribution of 
income, assets, unemployment and health to the comparative disadvantage of the 
poor (KPMG, 2016:9). The ANC National Policy Conference (ANC, 2017:4) also notes 
that “the magnitude of the scourge of corruption in the public sector, diverts these 
much needed and scarce resources from the upliftment of communities and also 
undermines development and social cohesion.” According to Stapenhurst et al., 
(2006:2), factors that have a probability of increasing corruption are: 
• Missing mechanisms to ensure government accountability and 
transparency (oversight bodies, active opposition parties, independent 
media, free and fair elections); 
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• Weak law enforcement structures (such as effective prosecution, 
specialised anti-corruption agencies, and an independent and well-
resourced judiciary); 
• Missing regulatory frameworks (legislation, codes of conduct, and audit 
requirements); 
• Low levels of education and literacy; 
• An unprofessional civil service (exposure to nepotism and patronage); 
and 
• Lack of private-sector competition in service provision.  
 
Corruption is also particularly damaging to good relations between citizens and the 
state. The costs are not borne equally and fall most heavily on the poor through the 
impact on the quality and accessibility of public services (NPC, 2014:25–26). The poor 
are the most affected by corruption and corrupt activities “as it effectively subsidises 
criminal elites with the public and private sector” (Van Vuuren, 2006:1). 
2.4 DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS AND MANIFESTATIONS OF CORRUPTION  
The complex nature of corruption is best explicated by Serfontein (2015:1) who states: 
“Corruption as a constant global phenomenon, has become more complex and intense 
as competition for resources also increase.” The following authors (sources) were 
deliberately quoted verbatim to buttress how differently corruption is understood. 
According to KPMG (2016:7), “corruption is pervasive in both developing and 
advanced economies. However, there exists no globally agreed-upon definition of 
corruption with lay persons using the terms interchangeably with transgressions 
including lobbying, bribery, fraud, collusion and theft”. Stapenhurst et al., (2006:xi) hold 
that “[i]t is a disease that threatens the hope and aspirations of the poor for a better 
future for themselves and their children. Corruption drains finances that could possibly 
have assisted with educational programs for poor children.”  Doig (2014:672) provides 
an operational definition of corruption by stating that “[i]t involves the acceptance of an 
offer or reward in favour of acting or not acting, in favour of the giver; corruptly awarded 
contracts may also cause financial loss or poor quality of service to the electorate”. As 
indicated by Khan, Khan, and Ahmed (2012:36), corruption “…is the root cause of 
under-development and poverty”.  
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The words “fraud and corruption” have been widely and loosely used by scholars 
around the world. According to Apolloni and Mushagalusa (2013:8–9, 11): 
fraud is an economic crime that involves some kind of trickery, 
swindle or deceit. It involves a manipulation or distortion of 
information, facts and expertise by public officials positioned 
between politicians and citizens who seek to make a private 
profit, whereas, corruption is a pervasive and enduring fact in 
some societies that it has become an important aspect of the 
cultural norms and practices … corruption comes from a Latin 
word “corrumpere” which means to break something and 
during the action of corruption, the law, legal rule, a moral 
norm and in the worst situations communities and human 
personalities are broken. 
 Khan et al., (2012:36–37) assert that corruption “is universal and can lead to the 
destruction of democracy, violation of human rights, the collapse of markets, lower 
quality of life and an increased threat to social welfare. Corruption fuels the growth of 
good governance and further corruption.” 
There are various definitions of corruption. Many scholars across the globe point out 
that corruption has to do with the “abuse of power”. According to Corruption Watch 
(2015:16); Liu (2016:171–172); the NPC (2014:25) and the National Development 
Plan 2030 (NDP); Newburn (2015:3); KPMG (2016:7); and Serfontein (2015:2), 
corruption is the “misuse of official position for personal gain.” Another definition is of 
corruption relates to abuse of public office for private ends (Bhorat et al., 2017:4). 
According to the PCCA Act, the definition of corruption includes any “gratification” that 
would induce either public or private actors to act in an improper manner during the 
performance of their duties “which then undermines growth and development by 
diverting resources away from development programmes. Its effects are particularly 
harmful to developing countries and for achieving good governance” (RSA, 2009:3). 
However, according to Walton (2015:15), “there is, however, concern that the 
definition fails to recognise the cultural, economic and social factors that frame 
transactions labelled as corrupt.” Walton (2015:15) also defines corruption as “the 
abuse of public office for private gain.” Nonetheless, according to Lascoumes and 
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Tomescu-Hatto (2008:25), “corruption remains normative and therefore, it is not 
surprising that it remains a matter of considerable dispute and that there is little 
agreement on how to define it.” 
Khan et al., (2012:40) identify various types of corruption, which are:  
[T]ransactive and extortive corruption, the former being an agreement 
between a donor and recipient pursued by them for mutual benefit and 
the latter entailing some form of coercion to avoid the infliction of harm 
on the donor; investive corruption, involving the offer of benefit without 
immediate link but in anticipation of a future gain in which a favor may 
be required; nepotic corruption concerning favors to friends and 
relatives in appointment to public office; autogenic corruption takes 
place when a single individual earns profit from inside knowledge of a 
policy outcome; supportive corruption, making reference to the 
protection or strengthening of existing corruption often through the use 
of intrigue or violence; exploitative corruption, where the public servant 
exploits the helpless poor servant; and collusive corruption where the 
citizen corrupts the public servant by a bribe because he gets 
financially and beneficially, better benefits. This sort of corruption 
depends on black money.  
It is submitted that the categorisations by Khan et al., (2012:40) of corruption 
essentially depict different manifestations of the form and shape corruption and corrupt 
activities can take. Another phenomenon which is on the rise in the public and private 
sector is sex for contracts corruption, where older men and women press young men 
and women for sexual favours in exchange for contracts. This form of corruption is 
intricate to investigate, as there is no hard evidence unless the victim comes forward.  
The following categorisation of corruption by Walton (2015) is also instructive for this 
study, particularly when understood in the context of state capture as discussed in 
paragraph 2.5: 
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2.4.1 THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC OFFICE AND THE ABUSE OF POWER  
According to the NDP 2030 (2015:446–451), public officials and elected 
representatives have the duty to administer public resources on behalf of the citizens 
and society “in an efficient, transparent and accountable fashion” and not for personal 
gain. However, this is not always the case and many have fallen into the trap of corrupt 
administration of public resources and the abuse of public office. The World Bank 
Report (2017:77) makes the observation that “corruption has been defined as the use 
of public office for private gain.” The understanding of corruption as an abuse of public 
office for personal or private gain finds support in much academic literature and in the 
policy documents of development organisations. What is common in many of the 
definitions of corruption as an abuse of public office is the “focus on those working for 
the state. They link corruption to public officials acting out of private regard. The public 
office definition relates to the division between the public and private spheres: when 
the public and private spheres mix, corruption ensues” (Walton, 2015:16–18). This 
definition has been proposed for further modification by Disch, Vigeland, Sundet, and 
Gibson (2009:11), who says it must also refer to “[t]he abuse of entrusted authority for 
illicit gain.” According to Disch et al., (2009), such an expanded definition “captures 
the complex and often highly political nature of corruption” and is wide enough to 
“cover all transactions between actors in state and non-state spheres where the 
structural or positional relation between the parties may influence the outcome but can 
still take account of non-transactional corruption like forgery” (Disch et al., 2009:11). 
The downside of the definition of corruption as the abuse of public office, which I agree 
with, is that it oversimplifies the complexities of state-society relations in developing 
countries, particularly those with weak state institutions. Admittedly, it is commendable 
that the definition highlights how corrupt activities and corrupt conduct lead those who 
are entrusted with public office to deviate from their official obligations to act ethically 
and responsibility in the public interest. Corrupt activities conceptually have a broad 
definition and include behaviour, according to Khan et al., (2012:38), such as “bribery 
(use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism 
(bestowal of patronage by reason of relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (public resources for private-regarding uses)” that negatively impact 
the public welfare.  
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Another shortfall of the abuse of power definition is that although it broadens the 
meaning of corruption. As put by Walton, the definition or rather the understanding in 
this sense “still exclude[s] much morally dubious (or corrupt) behaviour. Like the public 
office definition, the abuse of power definition includes reference to ‘personal gain” 
(Walton, 2015:16–18). 
A view by Ades and Tella (1996) in trying to understand the causes of corruption and 
dealing with theories on the consequences of corruption is that one of the many 
approaches employed to combat corruption of bureaucrats must be incentives. This, 
they argue, may include providing them with wages that will disengage them from 
corrupt activities. Unfortunately, this view seems to suggest that public service is a 
business opportunity. It is submitted that those entering the public service should not 
have as their priority the need to be rich. 
2.4.2 CORRUPTION AS INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL DECAY 
Corruption has a corrosive effect on the ethics and morals of the actors. U-Myint (2000) 
in Khan et al. (2012:45) also agrees that corruption on a grand scale has the negative 
impact of social decay. So serious is this effect that the Free State High Court in 
Nakedi v S (A173/2016) [2018] ZAFSHC 36 (29 March 2018), para 83, said that “[o]ver 
and above the seriousness of the offence, the appellant’s moral blameworthiness in 
the circumstances must also be taken into account.” Thus, Walton (2015:16–18) refers 
to corruption as “a form of individual or institutional decay”. Also, that the people or 
institutions need to wield any power. Furthermore, there need not be any personal 
gain. Central in this definition is that it focuses on the “moral atrophy of individuals and 
institutions” (Walton, 2015:16–18). This resonates with the definition by Peter and 
Masabo (2009:50) of corruption as “an act or conduct of dishonesty which is intended 
to implicitly influence, deviate from and alter the just behaviour and accepted societal 
propriety in order to satisfy one’s selfish and parochial interests.” Newburn (2015:3) is 
of the opinion that “corruption is fundamentally an ethical issue. It is important to note 
that the NPC (2014:26) has asserted that “corruption is not only an institutional 
problem but also a moral and political one.” In his observation, Van Vuuren (2013:20–
26) is of the opinion that “corruption is no longer a crime which needs to be curbed, 
but it has become a crucial area of contestation in the criminalisation of politics. 
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Corruption is a fertiliser that enables renewed abuse of power and stolen opportunities, 
and largely cyclical in nature.”  
2.5 CORRUPTION AND STATE CAPTURE PRACTICES 
2.5.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND STATE CAPTURE  
State capture in essence is corruption undergird by a symbiotic relationship between 
those in government and private business. It relates to the influence exerted by private 
business on the affairs of the state (Shai, 2017:71) in order to promote personal private 
economic interest (Tudoroiu, 2013). A slightly different take by Disch et al., (2009:10) 
is that “state capture coexists with the conventional (and opposite) view of corruption 
in which public officials extort or otherwise exploit the private sector for private ends.” 
It is submitted that this view is better understood from the point of the magnitude of 
state capture, its complexities and the ramifications it has. Bhorat et al., (2017:4–5) 
posit that it has far more devastating consequences than common corruption in that it 
is a 
systemic thread that is akin to a silent coup, which is a political project 
that is given a cover of legitimacy by the vision of radical economic 
transformation. The focus is not on small-scale looting, but on 
accessing and redirecting rents away from their intended targets to 
private hands and this requires high-level political protection including 
law enforcement agencies. 
The researcher agrees with Bhorat et al., (2017) that this sort of corruption is 
tantamount to a coup d’état, “an aberration in governance” (Dassah, 2018). The 
capturers will do their best to influence the government machinery as it relates to 
policies and advantages, amongst other things, for their personal gain through rent-
seeking. As correctly observed by Maharaj (2017), state capture is “a bane to the ruling 
party”. To use the words of Maharaj (2017), state capture has turned South Africa into 
a “shadow state”. “The almost daily disclosures about the shenanigans of the ANC 
politicians and their redeployed government bureaucrats reveal that this beloved 
rainbow nation is being dismantled for capture and sale with huge discounts for buyers 
located in Saxonworld,” observes Maharaj (2017). Like a government arising out of a 
coup d’état, a captured state suffers from legitimacy challenges and is afflicted by 
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personal gratification to the exclusion of the broader society through weakened 
institutions and weakened public officials (Funke & Solomon, 2002:2). Even the ANC 
has expressed concerns that “[t]his sort of corruption needs to be exposed and swift 
action taken regardless of the seniority of the people involved” (ANC National 
Conference Discussion Document, 2017:4).  
It is perhaps apposite to refresh memories with reference to the 2016 State Capture 
Report by the former Public Protector Advocate Thuli Madonsela. The crux of the 
report has been succinctly summarised by Wolf (2017:2) as follows: 
Allegations of corruption, irregularity and personal enrichment are 
widespread and run deep: that is the over-riding message contained 
in the 350-plus pages of the State of Capture report. The report 
documents the involvement of the Gupta family in the appointment 
and dismissal of ministers and directors of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) resulting in the improper and corrupt award of state contracts 
and benefits to the Gupta family’s business empire. Members of 
cabinet, a former cabinet minister and other persons testified that the 
Gupta family offered bribes and/or posts in exchange for certain 
benefits. The president and/or his family members were either 
present or facilitated the meetings. 
State capture is example of government and public officials behaving badly and not 
setting an exemplary tone as representatives of the state by obeying the laws against 
corruption and corrupt practices. The importance of government and its employees 
observing the law was succinctly expressed by the Constitutional Court in Mohamed 
v President of RSA 2001 (3) SA 893 CC as follows: 
[68] [S]outh Africa is a young democracy still finding its way to full 
compliance with the values and ideals enshrined in the Constitution. It 
is therefore important that the State lead by example. This principle 
cannot be put better than in the celebrated words of Justice Brandeis in 
Olmstead et al. v United States: ‘In a government of laws, existence of 
the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law 
scrupulously. ... Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For 
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good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. … If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  
It has been contended by Shai (2017:65) that the concept of state capture “has been 
used (and abused) by both scholars and philosophers to explain the configuration of 
the relations between the state and other stakeholders in several countries including 
South Africa, the United States of America (USA) and Britain, inter alia” due to the 
fluidity of its understanding. (For related studies, see Kebede; Hellman, Jones & 
Kaufmann, 2003). Others understand the concept from a political perspective 
(Labuschagne, 2017; Abby, 2013). But what is discernible from these studies, despite 
their differences, is that state capture is corruption and/or corrupt practice (Fazekas & 
Toth, 2016; Wolf, 2017). 
It is submitted that the government and its employees allowed corruption and corrupt 
practices to multiply and to build resistance against good governance intervention 
during state capture. Less or no regard was given to the existing anti-corruption 
framework and strategies. 
2.6 ORGNISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND COMBATTING CORRUPTION 
The effectiveness of the South African anti-corruption structures depends in part on 
the organisational effectiveness of the criminal justice system. In their book Criminal 
Justice Organizations: Administration and Management (2015), Stojkovic, Kalinich 
and Klofas dedicate a very important chapter to organisational effectiveness (Stojkovic 
et al., 2015:381) which, it is submitted, is important in understanding the legislative 
and institutional effectiveness (or not) of South Africa’s law enforcement agencies. 
There are several theories or models for effectiveness. For the purposes of this study, 
the focus is on the degree of congruence between organisational goals and some 
observed outcomes. Effectiveness can be affected by several issues and/or 
challenges. Communication in organisations is a problem, particularly when 
undertaken by individuals or agencies with different views on how crime and offenders 
must be dealt with (Stojkovic et al., 2015:107). This has been a problem in South Africa 
often aggravated by the multiple networks of intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies. As highlighted by Stojkovic et al., (2015:111), role conflict has been at the 
heart of ineffectiveness of, between and among South African corruption agencies. 
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This challenge has been more pronounced between the SAPS and the Independent 
Police Investigation Directorate (IPID), which have different powers and obligations to 
investigate corruption. A typical example is the case heard on 21 June 2018 in the 
North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria in which the court ruled in favour of the IPID 
stopping SAPS members from interfering into the work of the IPID. The court held that: 
No member of the SAPSs may oversee or conduct an investigation, or 
render assistance with an investigation, in respect of a matter 
concerning a member of the [IPID] in which he or she has personal 
interest or a financial interest or any other interest which might preclude 
him or her from exercising or performing his or her powers, duties and 
functions in an objective manner.  
The crux of the matter was that SAPS members with financial or other interests in the 
investigation of IPID must recuse themselves from the investigation. In this case 
members of the SAPS in the North West, themselves subject to the investigation 
relating to corrupt activities, wanted to conduct an investigation against three members 
of the IPID who were investigating them (Chabalala, 2018). The IPID Act, for example, 
encourages organisational effectiveness by organs of the state to assist it in 
performing its functions effectively (Janse van Rensburg, 2018). 
The conflicting roles of these criminal justice agencies and the perceptions of their 
respective practitioners has a history of creating a climate or general perception that 
one of these agencies is committed to protecting perpetrators of corruption from 
prosecution. For example, in the case against former Acting Commissioner of Police 
Lieutenant-General Khomotso Phahlane, McBride alleged that he enjoyed full political 
protection by the Minister of Police. The whole incident, it has been argued, was a 
“massive political rupture between the SAPS, the Hawks and the Minister of Police on 
the one hand, and those seeking to expose alleged corruption and abuse of state 
power on the other” (Hoffman, 2017).  
The organisational effectiveness of such agencies and structures created after 
independence and change of government are bound to suffer challenges with regard 
their effectiveness. According to Alfiler (1979), the Philippines is one country that 
experienced serious tensions between anti-corruption agencies immediately after 
53 
 
independence. The agencies were ineffective and plagued by instability. Abuse of 
public office and bureaucratic corruption in the Philippines from 1946 to 1979 
characterised the anti-corruption agencies. So did using political influence and rent-
seeking by those in a position of power for private gain (Alfiler, 1979). It is submitted 
that the state capture in South Africa and other reported incidents of corruption mirror 
the situation in the Philippines at the time; a period characterised by shades of 
organisational ineffectiveness. 
2.7 ACCOUNTABILITY 
According to Thornhill (2011:80), “South Africa’s Constitution, 1996 is a prime example 
of the state’s commitment to democratic ideals, transparent and accountable public 
administration which is a requirement for a democratic government.” He further 
submits that “public accountability is deemed to be an inherent requirement in any 
political, administrative and managerial action in the public sector” (Thornhill, 
2011:80). Girma (2012:1) posits that parliamentary oversight is “…of paramount 
importance as accountability.”  It is the primary means of holding accountable those 
occupying public office and entrusted with enormous powers to exercise during their 
tenure in that public office (Madue, 2012:47. See also Green, 2016:2). Moreover, in 
South Africa, parliamentary oversight is constitutionally mandated (Nyathela & 
Makhado, 2014:41; Legislative Sector, South Africa, 2012:8). Armstrong (2005:1–2) is 
of the view that “transparency without accountability is meaningless and makes a 
mockery of sound public administration”.  
Accountability depends on transparency or having the necessary information. 
Whereas, transparency and accountability without integrity may end up not serving the 
interests of the public. This could be directly translated into ethics infrastructure or 
national integrity system. The Constitution in chapter 10 section 195(1) (f) (g) makes 
provision for a public administration that is accountable and transparent by being 
responsive to the public (Constitution, 1996). This view is supported by the South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA) (2011:10–11) calling for a 
responsive, accountable and transparent public administration. “Accountability has 
become a symbol of good governance in both public and private institutions which 
refers to institutionalised practices of giving account on how assigned responsibilities 
have been carried out” (Oversight and Accountability Model of the South African 
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Parliament, 2009). “And answerability for failing to meet stated performance 
objectives” (Armstrong, 2005:1).  
As already stated, in South African, oversight and accountability are functions of 
legislature mandated by the Constitution “to scrutinise and oversee executive action 
of any organ of state. It entails informal, formal, watchful, strategic and structured 
scrutiny by legislature and Parliament with regards to the implementation of laws, 
budgets, and strict observance of statutes and the Constitution” (Legislative Sector, 
South Africa, 2012:8).  As a concept, accountability has been used in many different 
ways (Madue, 2012:48).  It has been regarded as a part of the “social contract between 
citizens and the state which key to wellbeing and progressive change” (Green, 
2016:2).  
In his paper, Jelmin (2012:5&7) refers to two types of accountability. Vertical 
accountability and horizontal accountability. Jelmin (2012:5) points out that “the most 
important type of vertical accountability in a representative democracy is elections with 
which voters are able to reward or punish the elected representatives by voting for a 
particular party or individual; this is often seen as the cornerstone of representative 
democracy”.  With horizontal accountability, “checks and balances are put in place for 
government institutions to hold each other accountable and ensure that none stands 
above the rule of law or intrudes on the rights and privileges of another. Horizontal 
accountability also includes political oversight and judicial and administrative 
accountability (Jelmin, 2012:10–11). De Jager (2009:16) agrees that “horizontal 
accountability is an affirming of constitutionalism and the rule of law, effectively 
ensuring that no one is above the law. It affirms the need for separation of powers of 
the state.”  
Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2002) in Malapane (2016:135–136) state that “for Parliament 
to effectively hold the Executive accountable, it firstly needs to understand the 
significance of its roles, assuming that Parliament and Members of Parliament (MPs) 
know and understand the importance of their roles … which is law-making, conducting 
oversight over the executive, facilitating public participation and ensuring that 
government delivers to the needs of the community as mandated”. Sections 56(b), 
69(b) and 115(b) of the South African Constitution makes further provision for 
parliament, the legislature or parliamentary committees to ensure adequate 
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accountability. Disch et al., (2009:11) observes that the only way to “achieve a high 
standard of integrity and accountability” is when the country has “a well-functioning 
judicial system of courts, laws, police and public prosecutors.” 
2.8    APPROPRIATE AND DETTERENT PUNISHMENT FOR CORRUPTION 
Discussed in depth in Chapter 5 the court in Phillips v The State was dissatisfied with 
the sentenced imposed by the trial court for corruption, advising that PRECCA does 
not limit the penal discretion of the sentencing court and that sentences imposed by 
the courts must be appropriate to the offence of corruption. The question is, how do 
we do that?   
The UN Anti-Corruption Convention, for example, gives little sanctions and 
sentencing guidelines for corruption offences save to say that a number of 
consideration are found in the different Articles of the Convention. Article 12(1) 
provides that “each State Party shall take measures, in accordance with … its 
domestic law … to provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative 
or criminal penalties” in cases of defilement of corruption prevention standards and 
offences in the private sector.   Article 30(1) provides that “each State Party shall 
make the commission of [corruption] offences … liable to sanctions that take into 
account the gravity of that offence.”  Article 30(7) goes further to state that those 
convicted of corruption whilst holding public office must be disqualified from holding 
such public office. However, Article 37(2) allows mitigation in sentence or immunity 
from prosecution should the accused persons provide “substantial cooperation” with 
the investigators or the prosecutors. Most importantly, Article 30(10) in my view calls 
for individualisation of the punishment by requiring that the State Parties should seek 
to promote the reintegration of convicted persons into society. 
A rather harsh approach taken against corruption in sanctioning and sentencing of 
offenders was agreed to by parties at the 27th of January 1999 Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption hosted by the Council of Europe, European Treaties, in 
Strasbourg, France. It was resolved under article 19 of the Convention that when 
considering sentences for corruption and corrupt practices, each Party must impose “. 
. . effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and measures, including . . . 
penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition.”  In terms 
of the Convention, it is important that convicted persons are “..subject to effective, 
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proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary 
sanctions” (Article 19(2)). In addition, to ensure that convicted persons do not benefit 
from illegal activities or proceeds thereof by confiscating “…the instrumentalities and 
proceeds (or the equivalent value thereof) of criminal offenses involving corruption” 
(Article 19(3)). Notable, and perhaps interesting for jurisprudence in a country like 
South Africa were foreign born citizens like the Gupta family are accused of grand 
corruption during the time of former President Jacob Zuma, is that the Convention 
goes to the extreme of proposing extradition for corruption offences. It is submitted 
that confiscation of the proceeds of crime and extradition of foreign nationals 
suspected of corrupt activities in South Africa will send a strong message of zero 
tolerance of corruption in South Africa. 
According to Condrey (2008:2), taking into account the seriousness of the corruption 
offence in question remains important, even with the intention of sending a strong 
message of deterrence. Indeed, the issues of appropriate and deterrent sentence for 
corruption is critical to the jurisprudence on combatting corruption.  A specific-
minimum penal sanction for corruption has been rejected in Indonesia though. The 
argument is that such an approach from the “aspect of ontology essentially the 
opposite of the value of justice oriented on the basic idea of the balance of quality 
criminal offenses committed with the severity of penal as a form of protection of the 
public interest as well as acts of corruption and corruption victim” (Parman et al., 
2014:33).  
Condrey (2008:2) reveals that in France, under Article 432 of the Criminal Code, 
corruption may be punished by amongst other “deprivation of civil, civic and family 
rights” and “disqualification from holding public office or carrying the professional or 
societal activity within which the criminal act was committed”. Condrey further 
postulates that in Northern Ireland sentencing in generally left to the discretionary 
powers of the judges to determine an appropriate sentence, which they must exercise 
within the confines of statute on maximum penalties. Also, that the regime of principles 
of sentencing have been. However, through case law, general principles of sentencing 
have been developed and adopted through case law. For example, the courts will 
always consider the proportionality between seriousness of the offence and the 
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personal circumstances of the offender; and that the plea of guilty ordinarily secures 
a reduce sentence (Condrey, 2008:8. see also Machin, 2005).  
The United States is one of the jurisdictions with a well-established regime and clear 
sentencing rules and guidelines, which at federal government level are developed by 
the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC).  Condrey (2008:10) reports that 
United States Code 18 U.S.C requires that that sentencing in federal must “[r]eflect 
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just    
punishment for the offense…” In relation to the offence of corruption, violation of the 
FCPA in criminal cases may lead to a sentence of a fine up to $2,000,000 (for a legal 
person) or a sentence of $100,000 and up to 5 years in prison for a natural person. 
Comparatively, the provisions of the U.S. Code § 3571 provides for fines of up to 
$250,000 for an individual, $500,000 for an organization, or twice the gross monetary 
gain for the defendant or loss to the victim (Condrey 2015:11).   In Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the 
time that a defendant may be incarcerated above the statutory maximum must be 
determined by a jury. The Supreme Court in Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 
S. Ct. 2344 (2012), followed its advise in Apprendi V new Jersey by applying to the 
case some facts that would increase the defendant’s criminal fine above the level 
otherwise set by statute.  
Forfeiture of the proceeds of corruption can take pace in both criminal convictions 
against the person (in personam) and civil proceedings against the property (in rem). 
(Basdeo, 2013:228fn58 and 230). At federal government level criminal confiscation or 
forfeiture takes place pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as an 
element of sentenced following a conviction based on the plea of guilty. This was 
demonstrated in Libretti V United States 516 U.S. 29 [1995] at 31, when the court 
sanctioned a forfeiture order against the accused in addition to the sentence of 
imprisonment and financial penalties. The accused was in this case ruled to have 
waived his right to trial by jury pursuant to section 31(e) of the Federal Rules, which 
could have ruled on the forfeitability of the property bin question. The United States 
Supreme Court in the case of United States v Bajakajian 524 U.S 321 [1998), at 325, 
held as the reason behind in rem forfeitures the fact that such property is the 
“instrumentality” of a crime.  
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In Bajakajian, the accused was charged with, inter alia, attempting to leave the United 
States without reporting, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A), that he was 
transporting more than $10,000 in currency, after customs inspectors found the 
respondent and his family preparing to board an international flight carrying $357,144, 
he. The Government also sought forfeiture of the $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 982(a)(1), which provides that a person convicted of wilfully violating §5316 shall 
forfeit “any property involved in such an offense.” Respondent pleaded guilty to the 
failure to report and elected to have a bench trial on the forfeiture. The District Court 
found, among other things, that the entire $357,144 was subject to forfeiture because 
it was “involved in” the offense, that the funds were not connected to any other crime, 
and that respondent was transporting the money to repay a lawful debt. Concluding 
that full forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the offense in question and would 
therefore violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the court 
ordered forfeiture of $15,000, in addition to three years’ probation and the maximum 
fine of $5,000 under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding 
that a forfeiture must fulfil two conditions to satisfy the Clause: The property forfeited 
must be an “instrumentality” of the crime committed, and the property’s value must be 
proportional to its owner’s culpability. The court determined that respondent’s currency 
was not an “instrumentality” of the crime of failure to report, which involves the 
withholding of information rather than the possession or transportation of money; that, 
therefore, §982(a)(1) could never satisfy the Clause in a currency forfeiture case; that 
it was unnecessary to apply the “proportionality” prong of the test; and that the Clause 
did not permit forfeiture of any of the unreported currency, but that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to set the $15,000 forfeiture aside because respondent had not cross-
appealed to challenge it. 
In South Africa criminal forfeiture is dealt with in the provisions of POCA, which is 
discussed in details in Chapter 4.3.3 infra. Chapter 6 of POCA specifically deals with 
instrumentality of crime or proceeds of crime forfeiture (Basdeo, 2013:233). 
The sentencing guidelines, which are treated by sentencing courts as advisory, rather 
than mandatory following the 2005 the US Supreme Court in US v Booker that held 
mandatory Guidelines to be in violation of the US Constitution, are generally 
considered as a measure to bring uniformity for similar cases under similar 
circumstances. The US Federal Sentencing Guidelines are presented in a table 
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depicting the levels of the sentence to be imposed based on the severity of the offence 
and circumstances thereof (See Title 18 of U.S.C § 3553). Specific to corruption in 
public office or by persons holding public office Chapter 2 of the Guidelines §2C1.1 
calls for a 4-level consideration of the following factors (Unknown 2018:653 - 658):   
(1) If the offense involved more than one bribe or extortion, increase 
by 2 levels;  
(2) If the value of the payment, the benefit received or to be received 
in return for the payment, the value of anything obtained or to be 
obtained by a public official or others acting with a public official, 
or the loss to the government from the offense, whichever is 
greatest, exceeded $5,000, increase by the number of levels 
from the table in §2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) 
corresponding to that amount. 
(3) If the offense involved an elected public official or any public 
official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position, 
increase by 4 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 
18, increase to level 18. 
(4) If the defendant was a public official who facilitated (A) entry into 
the United States for a person, a vehicle, or cargo; (B) the 
obtaining of a passport or a document relating to naturalization, 
citizenship, legal entry, or legal resident status; or (C) the 
obtaining of a government identification document, increase by 2 
levels.13 (Guidelines Manual (2014), § 2C1.1(b)):  
The following cases demonstrate the application of the United States Federal 
Guidelines: 
a) In United States of America v Bridget McCafferty, 2012 US Lexis 11247 
(6th Cir 2012):   a former judge, was convicted of 10 counts of making 
false statements to FBI agents arising out of a corruption investigation 
of another public official. The offense level was 6, with its corresponding 
guideline range for sentencing from 0-6 months. The district court 
60 
 
applied a 5-level adjustment moving the range to 8-14 months and 
sentenced McCafferty to 14 months. The upward departure and 
ultimate sentence were both upheld on appeal, with the court stating: 
“For a sitting judge to knowingly lie to FBI agents after she had 
unethically steered negotiations in a case to benefit her associates is a 
shock to our system of justice and the rule of law. 
 
b) United States of America v Richard G Renzi, 769 F (3d) 731 (9th Cir 
2014): The case involved the trial and sentencing of a former Arizona 
Congressman in respect to a $200,000 bribe payment (resulting in a 10-
level enhancement). Renzi was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment 
and his friend and business partner was sentenced to 18 months 
imprisonment. In affirming the sentences, the Court noted the 
substantial power granted to Renzi, stating “The Constitution and our 
citizenry entrust Congressmen with immense power. Former 
Congressman Renzi abused the trust of this Nation, and for doing so, 
he was convicted by a jury of his peers”. 
The Canada Criminal Code states that proportionality is the “fundamental” sentencing 
principle “(Sec 718.1).  A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence 
and degree of responsibility of the offender. The sentencing guidelines are more 
pronounces and enlightening in the context of South Africa with regard to corruption 
of the likes of Bosasa and other companies. On the sentencing Principles for 
Corporations and Other Organizations, section 718.21 of the Criminal Code requires 
the consideration of the following factors: 
(a) any advantage realized by the organization as a result of the 
offence; 
(b) the degree of planning involved in carrying out the offence 
and the duration and complexity of the offence; 
(c) whether the organization has attempted to conceal its assets, 
or convert them, in order to show that it is not about to pay a 
fine or make restitution; 
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(d) the impact that the sentence would have on the economic 
viability of the organization and the continued employment of 
its employees; 
(e) the cost to the public authorities of the investigation and 
prosecution of the offence; 
(f) any regulatory penalty imposed on the organization or one of 
its representatives in respect of conduct that formed the 
basis of the offence; 
(g) whether the organization was – or any of its representatives 
who were involved in the commission of the offence were – 
convicted of a similar offence or sanctioned by a regulatory 
body for similar conduct; 
(h) any penalty imposed by the organization on a representative 
for their role in the commission of the offence; 
(i) any restitution that the organization is ordered to make or any 
amount that the organization has paid to a victim of the 
offence; and 
(j) any measures that the organization has taken to reduce the 
likelihood of it committing a subsequent offence. 
Case law in Canada calls for a custodial sentence, even where there are significant 
mitigating factors, in cases of breach of trust by a public official as was the case in  R 
v. MacInnis (1991), 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 332 (S.C.), R v. Macaluso, 2006 QCCS 2301 
and R v. Gonsalves-Barriero, [2012] O.J. No. 4369 (Ct. J.). 
It is submitted, however, that the maximum of 5 years imprisonment sentence for 
bribery and other corruption offences committed by government officials and 
employees under sections 121-125 of the Criminal Code is rather a slap on the wrist 
and does not fully appreciate the seriousness of the crime of corruption, aggravated 
by the fact that the offender abused the public office or the position of trust. Typical 
example is the case of a two year sentence in R v Murray, 2010 NLTD 44 for the 
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“offender was sentenced to a two-year penitentiary term followed by a two-year 
probation order as well as an order of restitution. Murray was the Director of Financial 
Services for the House of Assembly in Newfoundland and Labrador. Using this 
position, Murray falsified expense claims. An agreed statement of facts provided that 
Murray received close to $400,000, which went directly to feeding a $500 a day 
gambling addiction” (2018:697) is in my view travesty of justice. The same can be said 
with the case of R v Gyles, [2003] OJ No 6249 when the Ontario Superior Court 
“imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment for municipal corruption and a 
concurrent sentence of two-and-a-half years for breach of trust.” (2018:697) 
It is submitted that the discussion herein revealed the varied manner in which the issue 
of corruption is handled, particularly the punishment meted out. However, the 
sentencing principle of proportionality of the sentence, individualisation of the 
determination of the appropriate sentence and deterrence in the interest of the society 
is observed by many jurisdictions; or the equivalents of these principles. It is submitted, 
however, that in respect to corruption in South Africa case law and literature review 
leans towards the imposition of hefty sentences. For instance, other than the concern  
in Phillips v The State for PRECCA related sentencing other court such as Famanda 
v State (930/2017) [2018] ZASCA 139 (SCA). In casu, Nicholls ACJ although 
ultimately setting  aside the order of court a quo to refuse leave to appeal and 
substituted it with an order grating “leave o appeal against the sentence imposed by 
the Regional Court, Johannesburg to the Gauteng Local Division of the High Court, 
Johannesburg” (at para 17) expressed the following sentiments (at para 11) about 
corruption: 
There can be no doubt that the trial court was deeply concerned, and 
quite correctly so, that the image of the National Prosecuting Authority 
had been tarnished and the administration of justice had been brought 
into disrepute, by the appellant’s actions. The crime induced a ‘sense of 
revulsion’ particularly because it had been committed in the court precinct 
which should be a symbol of justice. Instead the appellant made a 
mockery of the criminal justice system. (Researcher’s own emphasis) 
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In South Africa, the Criminal law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 makes provisions for 
minimum sentences in sexual cases and certain serious offences such as armed 
robbery. However, the constitutionality of the Act was tested in a few cases. Stegam J 
in S v Mofokeng 1990 (1) SACR 502 (W) was highly critical of the Act, labelling a 
restriction of the discretionary powers of the courts and the muddling of separation of 
powers, an unjust legislation that offends against the sense of justice. Similarly, Davis 
J in S v Jansen 1999 (2) SACR 368 (C) at 373G-H, (See: 3) moaned that minimum 
sentences disregard all individual characteristics and grossly offends against the 
accused right to dignity. However, the constitutionality of the legislation was confirmed 
by the Constitutional Court in three case. In S v Dukaza, S v Tilly, S v Tshilo 2000(2) 
SACR 443(CC) the Constitutional Court declined to confirm the constitutional invalidity 
by the High Court of section 52 of the Act. According to Ackerman J, held that the 
provisions did not prevent a court considering any relevant factor to arrive to its 
decision on the correct sentence (at 446F, 448B-F, 449-A-C). In S v Dodo 2001 (5) 
BCLR 423 (CC) at 441 the Constitutional Court declared section 51 constitutional and 
not amounting to creating an environment of the courts to impose cruel, inhumane and 
degrading punishment contrary to the provisions of section 12 (1)(c ) of the 
Constitution. The court in S v Dodo further ruled that the Act does not infringe upon the 
separation of powers, as was argued in S v Jansen. Also, than the sentencing 
discretion of the courts is not unfettered. But, insisted that there is still an obligation of 
the courts to consider the individual circumstances of the case. 
In Famanda v State  the appellant who was a prosecutor with the NPA, was convicted 
of corruption in contravention of s 9(1)(a) of PRECCA, together with following an 
undercover operation carried out at the Randburg Magistrate’s Court for suspected 
corrupt activities involving magistrates, prosecutors and court orderlies in that court. 
The fact are that appellant and the other two accused received between R3500 and 
R800 to release police undercover agent arrested on a fictitious charge and detained 
in the court cells at the Randburg Magistrate Court (para 6). Accused 1 was sentenced 
to 15 years imprisonment and appellant and accused 2 were each sentenced to 10 
years imprisonment in terms of the minimum sentencing legislation. Section 51(2) of 
the Criminal law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
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It is submitted that Nicholls ACJ, however, may have nullified the impact of his 
observation against the repulsive nature of corruption when he appeared to condone 
what he considered less serious corruption to allow the opportunity for the appellant 
to taper with the sentence imposed by the Regional court. The objectionable statement 
of the judge, at para 12, reads: 
As reprehensible as the appellant’s conduct was, it cannot be ignored 
that the amount involved was R3500.  Of this, it is unclear how much the 
appellant personally benefitted. I cannot agree with the view of the trial 
court that ‘corruption is corruption’ irrespective of the amount involved 
and it is the criminal intent that is punishable. Logic dictates that 
corruption involving millions of rand should be viewed in a more serious 
light than that involving a few thousand rand. That there are degrees of 
fraud and corruption, depending on the amounts involved, is a distinction 
acknowledged in the Act itself. In my view the appellant has a reasonable 
prospect of showing that the trial court misdirected itself in this regard or 
that the sentence was startlingly inappropriate. (Researcher’s own 
emphasis) 
2.9     ANTI-CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT 
The book by Huberts L and Hoekstra A (eds.) Integrity management in the public 
sector The Dutch approach 2016 is by far the most comprehensive and insightful 
academic publication issues of integrity management, the contents of which are also 
relevant to the subject of this study.   It is submitted that the different contributions in 
this book put into a proper and thoughtful perspective the issue of governance, anti-
corruption and integrity management in the public service. Thus, the researcher will 
be forgiven for referring to quite often in this section. The Dutch Integrity Management 
System, which has been in place since the 1990 to addresses issues including integrity 
violations and related integrity policies (Hoekstra & Zweegers, 2016:9). Moreover, the 
Dutch has introduced the ‘Model Approach for Basic Integrity Standards for Public 
Administration and the Police Force (commonly referred to as Basic Standards). The 
Basic Standards sets up an integrated approach in issues dealing with integrity for 
whole public administration.  
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The following are set out as the seven principles of integrity infrastructure in the 
Netherlands: 
The Seven Elements of the Integrity Infrastructure 
Commitment and Vision Integrity policies can only succeed if the top of the organisation is 
willing to promote them and to provide sufficient resources for them. 
Additionally, it is necessary that the top develop a clear vision on 
integrity management: why do we want to pay attention to integrity, 
how do we define it, what strategy do we follow, what is our 
ambition? 
Values and Standards Public sector values and standards constitute the underlying basis 
for integrity policies. It is therefore important to establish the 
organisational values and standards and then to document them in 
a code of conduct. This will make it clear what the organisation and 
the employees represent and what they can be held  accountable 
for. 
Rules and Procedures Values should be supported by a clear set of organisational rules 
and procedures. These are often summarised as internal 
administration and control systems. Examples are: work processes, 
the ‘four-eyes’ principle, separation of duties, and job-rotation 
procedures.   
HRM Policies and Culture Integrity is also an important subject for HR and should, for 
example, be part of recruitment, selection, screening and exit 
policies. In addition,  introductory  meetings, internal courses and 
staff meetings seem natural occasions on which to raise employee 
awareness and to improve the  organisational culture. 
Incidents and Enforcements Investigating and sanctioning unethical behaviour is important. It 
gives a signal that integrity is highly valued and reduces the risk of 
future breaches. Provisions aimed at reporting and enforcement 
(such as reporting hotlines, integrity advisers, and investigation 
protocols) are important integrity elements. 
Monitoring and Reporting Monitoring integrity policies and programmes is necessary in order 
to be able to evaluate and to improve the functioning of the integrity 
policies. Evaluations  provide information about the implementation 
and effective-ness of the integrity policies. 
Organising and Embedding The above integrity activities should be firmly embedded within the 
organisation. An integrity officer is the person appointed to develop 
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the integrity management system for the organisation, to coordinate 
all integrity activities and actors and to advise the line management. 
This  officer should draft an integrity plan/document which should 
cover all  issues of this kind. 
Table 3: The Seven Elements of the Integrity Infrastructure (Taken verbatim from Hoekstra A and 
Zweegers M. The Dutch National Integrity Office Supporting public integrity in Huberts L and Hoekstra A (eds.) 
Integrity management in the public sector The Dutch approach. 2016. BIOS: The Hague) 
In South Africa the Public Sector Integrity Management Framework was put in place 
to promote ethical conduct and augment the integrity management methods and 
standards in the public service (Kekae, 2017:15-16). Hoekstra and Zweegers 
(2016:67) have their fingers on the right spot with their observation that often times 
integrity systems are fragmented. Comparatively, the integrity management 
environment in the Netherlands is set up differently and uniquely from its South African 
counterpart. Noteworthy is that at places of employment in the public sector have 
confidential integrity councilors are established as a reporting centres whose duty is 
to take report incidents of undesirable employment and integrity matters “to the 
competent authority” for further handling. (Belling & Fenne, 2016:66). It is submitted 
that this has traces of whistleblowing regime in South Africa. An interesting 
observation is that there exist in the Netherlands several external integrity incidents 
reporting organisations. Also, that the country has an integrity investigation Council 
instead of a National Agency (Groot, 2016:75). This election to have a Council and not 
a national integrity investigation Agency has been explained by Groot (2016:75) as 
stemming from the fears that a central approach may be the efficacy of the Agency 
may be interfered with by the central govern, seeking to repress key investigations. 
Hoenderkamp (2016) explains the existence of integrity monitoring in the public sector. 
This monitoring mechanism is aimed at addressing criminality and similar violation by 
calling for “matters such as government decisions, their implementation and the 
distribution of public funds take place fairly, transparently and in accordance with the 
principles of a state under the rule of law.” This public integrity monitoring system, in 
the researcher’s view, enhance greatly the eradication of criminal activities such as 
corruption and corrupt activities.  An important factor to take note of, which touches in 
part concerns addressed in recommendation 7.5.1; 7.5.2, 7.5.4, and 7.511 in Chapter 
7 of this study regarding the autonomy and impartiality of the South Africa anti-
corruption agencies, is the independence the Rijksrecherche enjoys when 
67 
 
investigating integrity matters in serious offences involving abuse of public office. The 
position as it stands currently in Netherlands is that the Rijksrecherche will take over 
once the integrity report reveals criminal wrongdoing, because it is a specialised and 
independent criminal investigation body dealing with matters of integrity. The 
Rijksrecherche enjoys the distinction that it “does not operate under the direct control 
of the minister who holds political responsibility for it. The Rijksrecherche operates 
under the authority and management of the Board of Procurators General, the highest 
authority of the Public Prosecution Service” (Hoenderkamp, 2016:92). Therefore, a 
clear separation of powers is created between the executive and the Judiciary 
because the Rijksrecherche is considered integral part of the Judiciary. 
2.10 SUMMARY 
From the analyses in Chapter 2, it is clear that corruption has been the subject of a 
significant amount of theorising and empirical research for decades. There are 
competing definitions all over the world, which can be found in various disciplines. It 
clear that there is no single uniform definition of corruption as has been discussed and 
described by scholars. Furthermore, there are jurisdictions that have been able to deal 
effectively with corruption, and notable amongst these is Botswana. The corrosive 
effects of corruption as identified by the different scholars have been highlighted, so 
were the gaps in the management of corruption.  Relevant to the South African context 
corruption is a bane, a cancer that eats up the society and have the macro-economic, 
macro-political and macro-social impact on the citizenry and on the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions. Scandals reported in the different public protector reports bore 
evidence of how serious the problem of corruption is in South Africa.   
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CHAPTER 3 
ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CORRUPTION AND CORRUPT PRACTICES IN 
GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC SERVICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Scandals involving public officials have captured world attention 
these days, on the threshold of a new millennium. Precipitated by 
events such as “sweetheart deal” privatisation, the diversion of aid, 
widespread public sector patronage, “crony capitalism”, campaign 
financing abuses, people are debating outright corruption and 
unprofessional behaviour in government. If they are not talking 
about actual criminal or immoral acts, they are condemning 
lacklustre performance in the public sector. In its discussions, the 
public does not distinguish among those in government, whether 
they are elected political leaders or career public servants. In public 
perception, all are tainted by the same brush of guilt or indolence 
(UN, 1997). 
It is reported that South Africa appears to be reaching a state of crisis, at the heart of 
which is the shortage of good leaders – in particular, ethical leaders – who place 
service to the nation ahead of power and self-enrichment. Nothing less than ethical 
leadership is expected from struggle veterans and other leaders to tackle the triple 
challenges of unemployment, inequality and poverty (Reddy, 2018). Making reference 
to Hanekom et al. (1990), Puiu (2015:605) identifies the seven most common unethical 
problems in public sector, namely: bribery, nepotism and theft; conflict of interest; 
misuse of insider knowledge; use and abuse of confidential information for personal 
purposes; public responsibility and accountability; corruption; and the influence of 
interest and pressure groups. Corruption is the greatest challenge that cannot be 
addressed without reference to ethics. Ethical scandals are said to be commonplace 
in the world today (Agbim, 2018:20), from the Enron scandal in the US to state capture 
in South Africa. The current preoccupation with state capture and the myriad of 
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corruption scandals in South Africa involving public and government officials have 
brought to question issues of ethics and governance. It is also eroded public trust in 
the government. The state capture scandal has been followed by other serious 
corruption revelations such as those in the VBS Mutual Bank – The Great Bank Heist 
report released on 10 October 2018, authored by Advocate T. Motau. The report 
revealed a flagrant disregard of the relevant mutualisation rules by the bank 
management and several officials from specific municipalities that are fingered in 
involvement in corrupt practices. According to the report, an amount of almost R2bn 
was looted from the VBS Mutual Bank, and an “amount of R1.894m was gratuitously 
received from VBS by some 53 persons of interest, both natural and juristic, over the 
period 1 March 2015 to 17 June 2018” (Motau, 2018). 
 
South Africa has another opportunity to seriously introspect and to consider the 
unavoidable paradigm shift of integrating ethical leadership and trust in governance 
and in the appointment of public office bearers. Ethical leadership and a governance 
and corporate culture that appreciates ethics will go a long way to curb corrupt 
practices in South Africa. As noted by Naidoo (2012:26), there still exists a gap 
“between ethical leadership, corruption and governance” despite the existence of 
some research on corruption and leadership and how the two affect governance. 
According to Cheteni and Shindika (2017:3), a great deal of research has particularly 
focused on ethics and neglected to pay attention to ethical leadership. It is for this 
reason that a number of African countries have witnessed severe maladministration 
of funds and corruption. There is thus a need for studies on corruption and corrupt 
practices to also address ethical leadership.  
3.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND CORRUPTION 
What is the relationship between corruption and ethics? Whitton (2001:3) makes the 
interesting observation that “[e]thical conduct and corruption in the public sector are 
the two sides of the one coin,” in particular: 
To the extent that an organisation succeeds in enhancing its own ethical 
climate internally, and that which it operates in externally, (for example, 
by including suppliers and contractors within the scope of an ethics 
program), it reduces the acceptability of corruption. Conversely, control 
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opportunities for corruption and you make room for ethical practices to 
become established. 
In an eloquently written article entitled Ethics and accountability in South African 
municipalities: The struggle against corruption, Pillay (2016) addressed the 
relationships between ethics, accountability and corruption. Interestingly, he uses as 
his case study corruption in municipalities in South Africa, a lack of ethics and 
accountability amongst municipal leaders are behind their corruption prone weak 
management. In the final submission, Pillay (2016:125) contends the “success or 
failure of ethics and accountability as the foundation of the perpetual struggle against 
corruption”.  Kekae (2017:111) wrote extensively on the role of corruption in combating 
fraud and corruption, quoting several notable scholars in public administration 
including Brytting, Monogue and Morino (2012) Manyaka and Sebola (2013).  He 
acknowledged that “a high standard of professional ethics has become an integral 
matter for governments globally because they are highly concerned about the high 
levels of corruption in their public service.” (Kekae, 2017:111).  Kekae (2017:111) 
further proposed the formulation of a Statement of Ethics to “provide guidelines for 
expected behaviour and should include inputs from all employees”. Kekae (2017) 
made reference to such a need to promote ethical behaviour and professionalism in 
terms of section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
The fourth democratic general elections in 2009, where the ANC took 65.9 per cent of 
the nearly 18 million votes cast, saw the birth and rise of the now controversial and 
highly conflicted corruption scandals. Jacob Zuma as the country’s president with 277 
votes won out of the 400 seats of the National Assembly. However, in the 2014 fifth 
democratic elections, the ANC saw a decline in national votes from 65.9 per cent in 
the 2009 elections to 62.15 per cent, with Jacob Zuma being sworn in for a second 
term. In the same year the president was implicated in corruption scandals, which later 
saw the South African SCAs ordering the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to 
release spy tapes related to corruption against President Zuma (South Africa History 
Online, 2018).  
According to Booysen (2013:31), the sense of achievement of the 1994 transition into 
a constitutional and democratic country, the euphoria and idealism amongst South 
Africans, have now diminished. South Africans have become nostalgic and are now 
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longing for the days of “Mandela democracy”. Booysen (2013:31) wrote, “[t]he contrast 
between the Mandela era and the current leadership feeds dissatisfaction with the 
current government”.  The central question has been: how do we have a president 
(someone whose name looms large in the state capture allegations that are being 
investigated by the Zondo Commission) in office or in leadership, a leader who has 
been followed by many corruption cases and scandals in one of the most powerful 
positions in the country (that of being head of the Executive – the president). Someone 
whose personality negatively impacts the politics of the country and who allegedly has 
unwarranted or conflicted personal relationships with people (such as the Gupta and 
the Watson families) who are pillaging government resources? 
What kind of an ethical leader does South Africa need and with what credentials? 
Former president Nelson Mandela was known to be an ethical, thought and 
reconciliatory leader, whereas his predecessor, former president Thabo Mbeki, is 
known more as an intellectual. Cheteni and Shindika (2017) attribute this to what we 
now see as state capture in South Africa, which implicated former President Jacob 
Zuma, the national executive and directors and deputy directors of SOEs. “This 
decadent ethical leadership dilemma in public entities needs to be urgently and 
adequately addressed” (Cheteni & Shindika 2017:3). Brown et al. (2005), cited by 
Cheteni and Shindika (2017:5), say in order for leaders to be perceived as ethical and 
be able to influence ethics-related outcomes, their subordinates must perceive them 
as attractive, credible and legitimate. Gildenhuys (2004:6) observes that as a public 
servant, serving the people requires complete and careful attention and dedicated 
loyalty to the democratic principles and fundamental human rights as enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
3.3 RELEVANT THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS  
3.3.1 SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 
As noted by Agbim (2018:24) the Social Learning Theory (SLT), proposed by Bandura 
in 1977, stands for the proposition that “individuals learn standards of behavior: (a) 
vicariously (i.e., by watching others); (b) through direct modeling; and (c) by verbal 
persuasion”. Used in the context of ethical leadership perspective, the view is that the 
efficacy of members of any organisation will be influenced by how morally and ethically 
their leaders conduct themselves.  
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The latter will be taken as role models on why and how not to get involved in corruption 
and corrupt practices (Agbim, 2018:24). Related to SLT is the Social Cognitive Theory 
(SCT) which holds that people are driven not by inner forces, but by external factors 
(Bandura, 1986). This behavioural change model is undergirded by the argument of 
reciprocal determinism, in terms of which human functioning is explained by a triadic 
interaction of behaviour, personal and environmental factors. The latter are considered 
to be situational influences, and in the context of ethical leadership it may be said that 
ethical leaders will positively influence their subordinates and others in the 
organisation to work towards being incorruptible. The generally agreed variables of 
the STC are: Self-efficacy – a judgment of one’s ability to perform the behaviour; and 
Outcome Expectations – a judgment of the likely consequences a behaviour will 
produce. The importance of the following expectations (i.e. expectancies) may also 
drive behaviour: Self-Control – the ability of an individual to control their behaviours; 
Reinforcements – something that increases or decreases the likelihood a behaviour 
will continue; Emotional Coping – the ability of an individual to cope with emotional 
stimuli; Observational Learning – the acquisition of behaviours by observing actions 
and outcomes of others’ behaviour.  
3.3.2 STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
The findings of a damning report into the failure of VBS Mutual Bank and the acts of 
corruption by those who had a fiduciary obligation towards the ordinary stakeholders 
in the bank better demonstrates what, according to the Stakeholder Theory (ST) 
proposed by R. E. Freeman in 1984, should not have happened if the leaders had 
observed governance and business ethics against corruption. According to the ST, 
those having the governance and oversight responsibility for an organisation have a 
duty to always act in the best interest of the stakeholders (Agbim, 2018:24). Likewise, 
their actions directly and indirectly affecting the organisation must not affect the 
interests of stakeholders in any form or shape. Did the officials and the board of 
governors at VBS Mutual Bank act in the best interest of its stakeholders? According 
to the findings published in VBS Mutual Bank – The Great Bank Heist report, they did 
not. Called the “a theory of organizational management and ethics” the ST advances 
the argument that ethical leaders are selfless and they will always put the interest of 
those they serve, or rather those they lead, instead of their own (Caldwell, Karri & 
Vollmar, 2006:213).  
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An ethical leader will be conscious of the debilitating consequences of corruption and 
related practices, will avoid involvement in corrupt conduct at all costs and will not 
harm the interest of stakeholders.  
3.4 FORMS OF LEADERSHIP 
3.4.1 ETHICAL LEADERSHIP  
Naidoo says the following on the need for ethical leadership (Naidoo, 2012:26): 
[S]uccess in eradicating corruption depends on the promotion of good 
governance. However, success in promoting good governance 
requires effective leadership. Leadership in this regard can be in the 
form of exemplary moral and ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is 
needed to resist the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, as well 
as potential interference and to protect the anti-corruption agencies’ 
operational independence, thus enabling good governance.  
Ethical leadership is a part of the broader field of leadership that touches upon several 
theoretical bases of leadership (Okagbue, 2012:20). According to Agbim (2018:23), 
“[e]thical leadership is the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through 
personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct 
to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement and decision-making.” A 
study conducted on ethical leadership in the context of corporate governance identified 
certain attributes of ethical leadership, which included accountability – including ethical 
decision-making and responsiveness – by acting immediately to solve dilemmas; 
integrity – entailing honesty in disclosure of information to board members and 
shareholders; fairness; transparency and disclosure; and responsibility (Othman & 
Rahman, 2014:366). 
Mendonca (2001:267) notes the urgent need for ethical leadership “in organizations 
and in society if we truly want to achieve the common good of human welfare at 
personal, organizational, and societal levels”. Though the sustenance of ethical 
leadership has been questioned, the argument is that for any organisation to succeed 
it must espouse ethical leadership (Mendonca, 2012:63–64). This view reflects the 
calls for moral and ethical leadership in South Africa. The almost daily exposure of 
corruption and related scandals in the South African government and public service 
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have been blamed on the low moral compass of public officials and the “the outcome 
of the negligence of ethics and practice by organizational leadership” (see Mendonca, 
2012). The view expressed is that ethical leaders will not hesitate to condemn acts of 
corruption, such as the Great Bank Heist in South Africa, for the sake of good 
governance (Mendonca, 2012:112).  
Table 3: Criteria of leadership qualities in relation to corporate governance 
Governance Leadership response 
▪ Dispersion of power  
▪ Accountability  
▪ Openness  
▪ Integrity  
▪ Honesty  
▪ Objectivity  
▪ Selflessness  
▪ Fair rewards  
▪ Look to long term  
▪ Empower widely  
▪ Give and obtain commitment 
▪ Communicate freely 
▪ Set an example 
▪ Set and monitor standards 
rigorously  
▪ Establish checks and balances 
▪ Use servant-leader approach  
▪ Motivate by opportunity rather 
than just money  
▪ Think and act strategically 
Source: Davies (2006:41)  
Othman and Rahman (2014:367) opine that ethical leadership attributes aligns to 
and/or requires a “servant leader” type of leadership style because servant leaders, 
as perceived by their study subjects, “are leaders that are perceived as supporting 
ethical leadership in guiding a corporation towards corporate governance practices.” 
Servant leadership as related to ethical leadership resonates well with the widely held 
view of former President Mandela as a “servant leader” whose moral and ethical 
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compass was impeccable in the way he led South Africa as the first president of the 
democratic South Africa. Former President Zuma is thus often juxtaposed with the late 
President Mandela in discussions on state capture and corruption and allegations of 
corrupt practices against him. 
For the purposes of this study, ethical leadership is demonstrated by integrity, 
competence, responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. It therefore 
includes anticipating and preventing, or at least avoiding, the negative consequences 
of corruption and corrupt practices in the public sector and government in general. The 
most compelling summary of ethical leadership as a component of curbing corruption 
and corrupt practices is given by Naidoo (2012:28), who notes that it is “crucial that 
management creates an organisational culture of openness and transparency in which 
unethical conduct will become visible and in which employees and managers call one 
another to account”. This can be achieved by, amongst other things, a comprehensive 
programme governing and effectively implementing an ethical climate and acting as 
the foundation of an institutional or organisational culture that anchored in ethical 
behaviour (Naidoo, 2012).  
According to Van Aswegen and Engelbrecht (2009:228) ethical leadership 
“demonstrates the will and ability to strategically position, design, and sustain an 
organisation successfully, to develop employee competence and to direct human and 
organisational energy in pursuit of performance and achievement that stand the ethical 
test of effectiveness and efficiency”. Being an ethical leader is about being both a 
moral person and a moral manager (Van Den Akker et al.,; Heres, Lasthuizen & Six, 
2009). Ethical leaders increase awareness of what is right, good and important, and 
raise up followers up into leaders who go beyond their self-interest for the good of the 
organisation. The moral part of ethical leadership can be viewed as the personal traits 
and characteristics of a leader, such as honesty, trustworthiness and integrity, and the 
moral nature of that leader’s conduct. Van Aswegen and Engelbrecht (2009, referring 
to Palanski and Yammarino (2007)), classify the various meanings of integrity into five 
general categories, namely: integrity as wholeness; integrity as consistency between 
words and actions; integrity as consistency in adversity; integrity as being true to 
oneself; and integrity as moral or ethical behaviour.  
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3.4.2 SERVANT LEADERSHIP 
Okagbue (2012:43–47) points to the concept of servant leadership presented by 
Greenleaf in 1977 as a leadership approach that regards leaders first as servants of 
the people they lead. In particular, servant leaders prioritise service for the common 
good of all members of the organisation, instead of self-enrichment. As Okagbue 
(2012) correctly posits, the concept of servant leadership with its ethical considerations 
“makes sense in the public sector where public office holders hold their positions in 
trust for public.” The number of corruption and self-enrichment scandals that have 
besieged the South African public service and government makes one ask whether 
individuals who are entrusted with public offices and public service in South Africa do 
have the ethical and moral fortitude to serve the needs of the people by putting the 
people’s interests first. 
Greenleaf’s concept of leadership draws a distinction between two leaders, namely 
the leader first and the servant first. Greenleaf asserts that leader-first people are “into 
leadership because of their hunger for power or for other material and personal gain. 
Conversely, the latter are those who have the natural disposition that they want to 
serve others … Servant-leaders are committed to serving the needs and well-being of 
their followers, so that the latter come first before the leaders; the servant-leader is 
more concerned about public interest than self-interest” (Okagbue, 2012:44). 
The essence of servant leadership was also encapsulated in the 1997 UN Report 
(1997:9), which states: 
With the advent of the modern state, government officials have been 
and are seen as stewards of public resources and guardians of a 
special trust that the citizenry has placed in them. In return for this 
public confidence, they are expected to put the public interest above 
self-interest. Thus the most commonly accepted definition of 
corruption is some variation of the notion, “the abuse of public office 
for private gain.” It has been noted that “government ethics provides 
the preconditions for the making of good public policy. 
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In South Africa, the late struggle icon and Nobel Peace Prize winner, former president 
Nelson Mandela, was highly regarded as a servant leader because of the humility and 
“people first” posture that he embodied. Unfortunately, his ethical and moralistic public 
service qualities have not been replicated in the public service today. The public space 
is replete with cases of leaders and public servants in all levels of government 
embroiled in corruption and related practices. There is a serious lack of public service 
ethics articulation.  
3.4.3 THOUGHT LEADERSHIP 
Smith (2014:2) asserts that thought leadership creates trust, credibility and visibility 
that will lead to exponential growth. It is not about being known but rather being known 
to make a difference. Gumede (2017:77) points to the situation the African content is 
faced with, which is weak leadership infused with the challenges of massive corruption 
scandals. He points out that, because there are political and institutional weaknesses 
in the African continent, inevitably so, effective leadership is what the continent 
requires. He argues, “The African continent is in need of thought leadership that is 
capable of being critical and conscious … Africa needs a third liberation, the context 
of which must include freedom from the hegemony of imported knowledge, freedom 
from subservience to logic of global capitalism, freedom from the slavery of fake values 
and cultures, and freedom from the visionless and kleptocratic political elites” Gumede 
(2017:77). 
In a business context, Van Halderen, Kettler-Paddock and Badings (2013:7) define 
thought leadership as an action promoting thought-provoking viewpoints the reframe 
the way customers think about key issues with the purpose of helping them towards 
new insights and solutions. However, in the context of good governance, according to 
the Institute of Company Secretaries of India (2018:5), thought leaders are the leaders 
of informed opinion and the go-to people in their areas of expertise that are often 
rewarded. They are mostly trusted sources who are able to move and inspire people 
with innovative ideas, able to turn these ideas into reality and show how to replicate 
their success. It is further appropriate to contest that the fast-changing contemporary 
world requires thought leadership under the following objectives (Institute of Company 
Secretaries of India 2018:7):  
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a) To provide expert and proficient set of knowledge; 
b) To achieve the directed goals and purposes with precision and 
in time-bound manner; 
c) To create a graph of probable opportunities and challenges in 
the targeted venture; 
d) To find out and decide the mechanism to resolve the 
prospective challenges; 
e) To create a roadmap of success of the targeted goals; 
f) To have an impactful and inclusive growth as well as success 
of a venture; 
g) To have the most targeted and achievable means to achieve 
the goals even in the changing and contemporary leadership of 
the globe. 
3.5   CORRUPTION AND THE TELEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF UTILITARIANISM 
AND EGOISM 
There are studies that address the ethical dimensions of corruption, but the question 
is: Can corruption ever be regarded as ethical? Napal (2006:5) points to relativism and 
societal values prevailing at a given time to address the question of why acts of 
corruption are accepted in some jurisdictions “and justified either on the basis of the 
gains they bring to the individual who offered the bribe or undertake to seek the 
particular favour.” Normative ethics literature distinguishes between decision-makers 
who consider some corrupt and questionable practices as not unethical and those that 
regard them as not particularly ethical.  
The theoretical underpinnings of these two extremes can be explained with reference 
to two teleological principles or consequential theories of utilitarianism and egoism. 
According to Napal (2006:6), “[b]oth are founded on consequences, that is, any act or 
decision is justified on the basis of its consequences”. According to utilitarianism, 
founded on the concept of utility maximisation, an ethical choice or decision must be 
made taking into account the conduct, practice or decision that “yields maximum utility 
or least harm” (Napal, 2006:6, referring to Adams & Maine, 1998; see also Okagbue, 
2012:46–49). On the other hand, the theory of egoism stems from the view that human 
beings are naturally aggressive and selfish, and that egoists make decisions or 
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conduct themselves in a manner that maximises their own self-interests. In the context 
of this study, it would mean that public officials will engage in acts of corruption and 
corrupt practices because of their preoccupation with personal financial gain over 
ethics and public good. That is, they would act only in a way that contributes best to 
their self-interest. Napal (2006) posits that the “general belief is that the egoist is 
intrinsically unethical. An egoist would focus on short-term goals oriented and make 
the most of any opportunity they avail of, as long as they derive a benefit from it.” 
It is submitted that in South Africa moral duty, constitutional duty and relativism are 
the dimensions that militate against corruption having any justification. Corruption has 
a considerable impact on ethical thinking in the South African context. A number of 
reasons can be advanced for this other than the corrosive nature of corruption and 
corrupt practices. Moral regeneration and ethical leadership are regarded as key 
needs in South Africa. In terms of consequentialism, the morality of any action by 
public officials is judged entirely by its consequences, and for this reason some 
government ministers have fallen on the state capture sword because of the role they 
played in the whole saga, and/or because of their failure to disclose their dealings with 
the Gupta family. Consider the following in the South African context: would you have 
judged the Russian nuclear deal right or wrong, if it succeeded? What would have 
made the actions of the role players in the nuclear deal moral or immoral? Would it 
have been the untold financial suffering of the country that would have resulted from 
the nuclear deal?  
3.6 ETHICAL GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC TRUST AND CORRUPT ACTIVITIES 
Instructive in this study is the view by Vigoda-Gadot (2000) that to understand the 
relationship between ethical governance and public trust one has to also focus the 
following facets: (1) a focused examination of human and social elements; (2) a 
productive dimension of innovation and creativity; and (3) a normative aspect of 
morality and ethics. 
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Figure 2: Trust and ethical governance in an anti-corruption context 
Source: Author 
According to Igbim (2018:23), “trust and commitment are positive externalities that are 
associated with ethical leadership”. Importantly, an expectation of trust is that those 
bestowed with certain powers and responsibility should not act opportunistically, for 
instance by abusing their access to business and financial opportunities by directing 
these opportunities to themselves or to their friends and next of kin. A typical example 
is allegations that the former Minister of Finance Mr Nene might have used his 
influence to sway the PIC to give a financial loan to a consortium that included his son. 
3.7 SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL LEADERSHIP 
In her research paper Creating a new ethical culture in the South African local 
government, in conceptualising ethics, as derived from the Greek term “ethos”, 
Matsiliza (2013:109) defines ethics as a moral system of a particular school of thought 
that is characterised by a spirit of culture, inner disposition or morality. Along with 
ethics comes appropriate and socially acceptable behaviour and conduct, responds 
Sebola (2014:297). Ethical leadership, as observed by Cheteni and Shindika (2017:3), 
has proved to have considerable benefits for both organisations and businesses. This 
is so because particularly in countries where relatively higher cases of corruption have 
been recorded, ethical leadership has proven to be an important pillar of successful 
organisational operations. However, it should be noted, according to the authors most 
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studies on ethics in the African context focus mainly on the private sector and neglect 
to give attention to the public sector as well.  
The King IV Code is important as it also calls for ethical leadership. Not only does the 
code seek to promote corporate governance as integral to running an organisation 
(governing body). It also seeks to deliver governance outcomes such as ethical 
culture, good performance, effective control and legitimacy. Ethical leadership as 
encapsulated in the King IV report is characterised by the principles of integrity, 
competence, responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency, taking into 
account the consequences of an organisation’s activities and outputs on the economy, 
society, the environment and the capital that it uses and affects (King IV, 2016:20).  
 
These values espoused in the King IV Code resonate well with section 195 of the 
Constitution, which makes provision for the public administration to be governed by 
democratic principles and values. South Africa, given its history, is in dire need of 
incorruptible ethical and thought leaders. In particular, section 195(1)(a) of the 
Constitution states that “a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and 
maintained” in public administration generally. Furthermore, section 20(t) of the Public 
Service Act of 1994 implores employees appointed in terms of the Public Service Act 
to be accountable and to comply with the prescribed code of conduct by promoting 
exemplary conduct.  
At political level, the apartheid era system was displaced to bring South Africa to where 
it is today, 24 years into a state with a constitutional democracy, “enhanced by the 
establishment of key institutions that support democracy, ethics and governance 
measures particularly in the public sector, namely the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) mandated to promote a high standard of professional ethics and a Public 
Protector to investigate any improper or dishonest act, omissions or offences referred 
to in the Prevention and Combatting of Corruption Act” (Cheteni & Shindika, 2017:5).  
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3.8 ETHICS MANAGEMENT AND ETHICAL GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP: 
PERSPECTIVE FROM REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
Ethical leadership is crucial for good governance. The public interest would be difficult 
to protect without ethics in government. There is growing interest in public service 
ethics (Barberis, 2001) both on the national and international levels to ensure good 
governance. For example, some international bodies like the UN, the World Bank, the 
OECD, the AU and Transparency International have emphasised the importance of 
ethical practice among government officials and have linked ethical leadership with 
good governance (Okechukwu, 2012:4). 
One of the known initiatives by the UN adopted by the General Assembly to encourage 
government ethics and fight corruption is the Action against Corruption (A/RES/51/59) 
which is associated with the UN International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, 
adopted in 1996. The UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions (A/RES/51/191) adopted in 1996; the International 
Cooperation against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions 
(A/RES/52/87) of 1998; and the Public Administration and Development Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/50/225) were also designed to instil anti-
corruption in the public service (United Nations, 1997:997; Sibanda, 2005, 2006). The 
UN also promotes public service professionalism and ethics through its Programme in 
Public Administration and Finance (United Nations, 1997:13).  
The African Ministers of Civil Service had a meeting held in Rabat, Morocco from 13–
15 December 1998, which was jointly organised by the African Training and Research 
Centre in Administration for Development and the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs. It discussed at length issues around public service in Africa, in particular 
challenges of professionalism and ethics. The result was what is commonly known as 
Rabat Declaration, wherein these ministers agreed that each country take “the 
necessary measures to regenerate professionalism and promote ethics in its public 
administration” through a range of activities designed to foster effective, efficient and 
ethical workings of a professional civil service and human resources development 
within the African context. These and similar initiatives stress the need for an ethical 
and morally conscious public service which avoids ills such as corruption and related 
practices. 
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3.9 ETHICS LAWS, EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
The UN report on Professionalism and ethics in the public service: Issues and 
practices in selected regions stresses the importance of ethics education and training 
in public service. In particular, it states that ethical education must and should be part 
of all educational systems at all levels of public service. As correctly pointed out by 
Puiu (2015:606), “it is important that those managing public institutions are familiar 
with all … potential dilemmas and also with the instruments, mechanisms and tools 
they can use in order to prevent or fight against these ethical issues when they 
appear”. This knowledge is part of sound ethics management, which by extension is 
the requirement for ethical governance and leadership. In South Africa, the National 
School of Government was officially unveiled on 22 October 2013, with the mandate 
to deliver a theoretical and practical approach to public administration management. 
The rationale behind the National School of Government is that “high-quality 
education, training and development that provide values, skills and knowledge for 
entry, in service and career progression purposes is arguably the most realistic and 
viable option for public servants” (Minister Lindiwe Sisulu). 
The National School of Government is governed by a council that reports and is 
accountable to the Minister of Public Service and Administration. Key among the 
functions of the council is to be a custodian of governance and determination of policy, 
norms and standards on education, training and professional development within the 
public service. The professional development of public servants is critical if South 
Africa is to truly realise the constitutional mandate and expectation that civil servants 
and public officials must “maintain and strengthen the public’s trust and confidence in 
government, by demonstrating the highest standards of professional competence, 
efficiency and effectiveness, upholding the Constitution and the laws, and seeking to 
advance the public good at all times”. An important observation by Whitton (2001:3) is 
that codes of ethics and conduct are necessary in the public service. However, for 
these codes to be effective they must be “supported by a range of other mechanisms, 
training, and leadership by managers and political leaders alike”. For example, the 
report that little or no training is provided to local government officials in Nigeria has 
not helped the country’s notoriety for its ethical misconduct and corruption 
(Okechukwu, 2012:86–87). 
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3.10   SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of ethical leadership and an important framework 
to help prevent and combat corruption together with all its manifestations in the South 
African government and public sector in general. It is clear that South Africa, as it 
aspires to move forward and create more opportunities for young leaders to come 
through the ranks, that the country’s political arena is in dire need of leaders who align 
themselves with the principles of good governance and accountability. Such leaders 
will have the country’s best interests at heart when dealing with the scourge of 
corruption, which has had a negative impact on the economy of South Africa and 
potential investment by neighbouring countries. For this country to be able to move 
forward, it requires ethical and thought leaders who will uphold and respect their 
constitutional mandate without fear or favour and implement the principles of good 
governance. 
South Africa (in both the public and private sectors) is perceived as a country without 
consistent management. To guard against this, it is of paramount importance that 
people are held accountable for their actions irrespective of their position in 
government. It goes without saying that ethics training coupled with the indoctrination 
of ethical conduct and behaviour in the public service should help public servants 
understand the role, values and importance of ethical leadership within the public 
service. It is clear that the lack of understanding of, first, the Batho Pele principles, and 
second the concepts of ethics and ethical leadership, has had a negative impact on 
service delivery in South Africa since the Zuma administration took over in 2009. 
Ethics and ethics in leadership should be seen to be the responsibility not only of public 
servants at lower levels in government, but of the entire public service (national and 
provincial governments) including the executive and political parties. 
From the onset, and if South Africa and South African public servants and officials are 
to truly realise and carry out their constitutional mandate and expectations from the 
public, it is critical for them (public servants and officials) to take cognisance of the 
professional development of the public service, ethics, ethical leadership and 
governance in order to “maintain and strengthen the public’s trust and confidence in 
government, through demonstrating the highest standards of professional 
competence, efficiency and effectiveness, upholding the imperatives of the 
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Constitution and laws governing the public service, and seeking to advance the public 
good at all times”. As outlined by Gildenhuys, “ethics have various interconnections 
with other branches of philosophy, for example, metaphysics (the theoretical 
philosophy of being and knowing – the philosophy of mind), realism (the study of 
reality) and epistemology (the study of knowledge). This may be seen in such 
questions as whether there is any real difference between right and wrong and, if there 
is, whether it can be known” (Gildenhuys, 2004:15). 
Serious cases of unethical conduct and leadership have been highlighted by the media 
all over the world, including the current State Capture Commission (Zondo 
Commission). Such conduct has had a serious and negative impact on the current 
ANC national and provincial government and has brought some State-Owned Entities 
(SOEs) to the point of bankruptcy due to corruption, maladministration and the abuse 
of power by senior government officials. In order for the South African government to 
regain the trust of the public, public servants, local and foreign investors, it is of critical 
importance that leaders who know and understand ethics, ethical leadership and 
thought leadership be appointed in senior government positions. Such leaders must 
further be willing to promote and uphold the ethos of ethical leadership, accountability, 
integrity and corporate governance in an effort to gain cooperation from public 
servants. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 ANTI-CORRUPTION NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Societies and communities depend on the existence of an effective and efficient legal 
system and appropriate regulatory frameworks to ensure that everyone acts in an 
acceptable manner and that law and order prevail (Joubert, 2015:1). Furthermore, the 
legal system must be consistent with the South African Constitution. Thus, section 2 
of the Constitution states that it is the supreme law of the country and that any other 
laws or conduct inconsistent with it are invalid. In terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit and objectives of 
the Bill of Rights when interpreting legislation. Within the area of criminal justice 
system certain sets of rules and laws must be in place to control and combat social ills 
such as corruption. The laws, to borrow from Joubert (2015:1), must indicate which 
rules are “prescribed for human conduct.” As former President Nelson Mandela once 
said, there must be “a structural exercise of rule as opposed to the idiosyncratic will of 
kings and princes” (quoted by Davie, 2013:9).  
The nature, origins and historical foundations of the South African legal system have 
been extensively discussed by several authors (Sibanda, 2008:331–33; Lewis, 
2005:12; Du Toit, 2014:278; Mireku, n.d.:215; Schoeman-Malan, 2007:108) and the 
matter is not dealt with in detail here. The South African legal system is part of the 
Anglo-American family of laws, also known as common law, which exists in countries 
like Australia, England and Wales, Ghana, Liberia, New Zealand, the US, and 
Zimbabwe (Sibanda, 2008:331). It is a mixed legal system “which came about as a 
result of the accidental history of the country and its constituent parts. Roman–Dutch 
law in the seventeenth century was brought by the Dutch East India Company 
colonists in 1653” (Lewis, 2005:12). It is based on a mixture of civil law (Roman–Dutch) 
and English Common Law principles. Pienaar (2012:153) argues that the third element 
of this mixture, namely indigenous or customary law, “does not always receive the 
same attention.” This is true, but customary law is gradually taking its rightful spot as 
one of the constitutionally guaranteed legal systems. Notable sources of the law in 
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South Africa include the Constitution, legislation, customary law, common law, case 
law and international law (Sibanda, 2008:332).  
This chapter addresses normative anti-corruption frameworks both nationally and 
internationally. It is important because they guide how corruption and corrupt practices 
must be dealt with, with some specifically enacted to deal with corruption. Normative 
frameworks are essential in shaping governance structures and environments 
specifically enacted to deal with corruption (Van Vuuren, 2016:1). As was succinctly 
stated by the World Bank (World Bank Report, 2017:83). 
In modern states, law serves three critical governance roles. Firstly, it is 
through law and legal institutions that states seek to order the behavior 
of individuals and organizations so economic and social policies are 
converted into outcomes. Secondly, law defines the structure of 
government by ordering power – that is, establishing and distributing 
authority and power among government actors and between state and 
citizens. And thirdly, law serves to order contestation by providing the 
substantive and procedural tools needed to promote accountability, 
resolve disputes peacefully and change the rules. The rule of law is the 
very basis of good governance needed to realise full social and 
economic potential. 
4.2 INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS 
South Africa is party or signatory to a number of regional and international instruments 
or conventions that seek to combat corruption and corrupt activities (Pereira et al., 
2012:15): the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN Anti-Corruption 
Convention); the African Union Convention Against Corruption (AU Anti-Corruption 
Convention); the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Protocol Against Corruption (SADC Anti-Corruption 
protocol) which is discussed below. 
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4.2.2 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
The UN Anti-Corruption Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
2003. Sibanda (2005) notes that the UN’s efforts to combat bribery date back to the 
failed 1975 attempt to enact the UN Measures against Corrupt Practices of 
Transnational and Other Corporations. At the time such an attempt was doomed to fail 
due to political, legal and practical problems (Sibanda, 2005:7). Likewise, the UN failed 
to enact the International Agreement on Illicit Payments. Both these attempts were 
directed at setting up measures to deal with corruption and corrupt practices, 
particularly on international platforms.  
South Africa signed the Convention in 2003, and ratified it the following year, 2004. 
The purposes of the convention are: a) promoting and strengthening measures to 
prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively; b) promoting, 
facilitating and supporting international cooperation and technical assistance in the 
prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery; and c) 
promoting integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public 
property. 
 
The key pillars of this convention are: prevention through effective and coordinated 
anti-corruption policies; establishment of independent anti-corruption bodies; ensuring 
competitive and fair public procurement; existence of an independent judiciary; and 
fair and transparent private-sector relations (articles 4–14); criminalisation, which 
requires state parties to prosecute an array of offences including mandatory offences 
such as bribery, embezzlement, money laundering, obstruction of justice, and other 
criminal offences such as passive bribery, trading in influence or influence trading, 
abuse of office or function (articles 15–42); international co-operation, which entails 
parties having in place mutual assistance procedures and measures as in an ordinary 
criminal justice environment, such as extradition; mutual legal assistance in 
investigations, prosecution and legal proceedings (articles 43–50); and assets 
recovery, which is central to the convention (articles 51–59). The idea behind asset 
forfeiture and recovery is that no one can benefit or profit from criminal acts such as 
embezzlement of public funds. To this end state parties must require their financial 
institutions to be vigilant. 
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In South Africa there are a number of legislative provisions that enable the country to 
meet its obligations pursuant to the provisions of the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. 
There is, for example, section 4 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 of 
1998 (POCA) which criminalises wilful blindness to crime or knowingly dealing in 
property or forming part of the proceeds of unlawful activities; and concealing or 
disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the property or its 
ownership. Furthermore, section 5 of POCA criminalises obtaining the proceeds of 
unlawful activities, or agreeing with others to retain or control for oneself or on behalf 
of others the proceeds of unlawful activities, or facilitating such related prohibited 
conduct.  
One criticism is that the UN leaves room for state parties to adjust their anti-corruption 
measures or regimes to their national need (Pereira et al., 2012:16–17). In an ideal 
world one would require deviation from internationally agreed undertakings. But one 
can also not ignore the fact that different countries have different social, political and 
developmental conditions and needs. Fostering a one-size-fits-all approach may not 
be a productive way to help fight corruption.  
As a state party to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention, South Africa can be said to 
have in place all the required legislative and institutional environments. What must be 
considered is the efficacy of these anti-corruption structures. 
 4.2.3 The African Union Convention against Corruption 
The African Union (AU) is the successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
The AU adopted its Anti-Corruption Convention at the 2nd Ordinary Session of its 
General Assembly in Maputo, Mozambique, on 11 July 2003 through Decision 
Assembly/AU/Dec. 22 (II). It is the first region-wide agreement anti-corruption 
instrument adopted by the AU (Olaniyan, 2004) that South Africa has signed (Rity, 
2003:10). In terms of article 2.1 the Convention was created to “promote and 
strengthen” the development by African states of mechanisms necessary to “prevent, 
detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private 
sector”. (See also Snider & Kidane, 2007:639). According to Sibanda (2005), the 
convention has a much wider application to acts or conduct that can be considered to 
amount to corruption and to related corrupt practices. However, this wider application 
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has been criticised by Schroth (2005:32) as sometimes over-reaching. He particularly 
laments Article 13 as creating excessive jurisdiction claims “far beyond what is normal 
and customary” (Schroth, 2005:33). At issue is the deeming provision of article 13, 
which gives the legislator of a state party discretionary powers to deem certain theft 
or illicit enrichment occurring in other countries to affect the country’s vital interests, 
and to punish them. 
Certain provisions of the AU Convention that are not expressly included in other 
conventions are worth noting. For instance, the convention expressly addressed as 
mandatory offences acts such as passive bribery of foreign and international public 
officials; active and passive bribery in the private sector; trading in influence; 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property in the private sector; 
and illicit enrichment. In addition, there is the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt 
Activities Amendment Bill (PRECCA) Bill (B) – PRECCA17 – that generally 
criminalises corruption. Section 23 of PRECCA fills the gap in legislation regarding 
illicit enrichment by empowering the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP) to petition the judge for lifestyle investigation on the grounds that a person: 
(a) maintains a standard of living above that which is commensurate with his or her 
present or past known sources of income or assets; (b) is in control or possession of 
pecuniary resources or property not proportionate to his or her present or past known 
sources of income or assets; (c) maintains such a standard of living through the 
commission of corrupt activities or illegal activities; and (d) such investigation is likely 
to reveal relevant information of suspected unlawful activity. 
Article 10 of the AU Convention deals with the corrupt funding of political parties. In 
the context of South Africa this may be highly important because of the high-level 
corruption and corrupt practices that involve political parties and figures. South Africa 
is currently in the process of legislating the regulation of political funding to repeal the 
Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of 1997. The Political Party 
Funding Bill was introduced in parliament in 2017 and the expectation is that it will be 
enacted into law by the end of 2019. The introductory statement of the Bill states as 
its purpose: 
To provide for, and regulate, the public and private funding of political 
parties, in particular: the establishment and management of Funds to 
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fund represented political parties sufficiently; to prohibit certain 
donations made directly to political parties; to regulate disclosure of 
donations accepted; to determine the duties of political parties in respect 
of funding; to provide for powers and duties of the Commission; to 
provide for administrative fines; to create offences and penalties; to 
repeal the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act, 1997 and 
provide for transitional matters; and to provide for related matters. 
Once enacted, this Bill will be one of the best additions to PRECCA’s efforts to combat 
political corruption and corrupt practices associated with activities of political parties, 
including electioneering. It is noteworthy that the AU Convention calls for the 
establishment of an anti-corruption agency pursuant to Article 5(3) of the convention 
(Pereira et al., 2012:15; RSA, 2025:3). Anti-corruption agencies have proved to be 
important in countries like Hong Kong and Singapore, because when properly 
constituted they enable setting up independent and effective corruption-fighting 
bodies. 
Article 11 addresses private sector corruption by calling on state parties to “adopt 
legislative and other measures to prevent and combat acts of corruption and related 
offences committed in and by agents of the private sector” (article 11.1); to “establish 
mechanisms to encourage participation by the private sector in the fight against unfair 
competition, respect of the tender procedures and property rights” (article 11.2); and 
to adopt such measures as may be necessary to discourage “paying bribes to win 
tenders” (article 11.3).  
For a country like South Africa, the above provisions are very significant because they 
entail that corruption, whether public or private, must be dealt with. But some 
commentators argue that article 4 may be too strong a regulation, particularly with 
respect to article 11.1 which requires state parties to legislate against all the same 
acts in the private sector as in the public sector (Schroth, 2005:32). It must be said, 
too, that there are some identifiable weaknesses (Sibanda, 2007). Schroth (2005) is 
generally critical of the text of the convention. The researcher does not entirely agree 
with him, as some of the criticisms ignore the essence of this convention. It is 
submitted that legislating the same acts should be understood with regard to the fact 
that certain necessary qualifications will have to be made, given the differences 
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between the public and private sectors. A notable observation by Ogundokun 
(2005:34) is that “legal and institutional mechanisms as prescribed by the AU 
Convention may not necessarily suffice in combating corruption in Africa especially 
cases of systemic corruption.” This is partly true when one considers what countries 
like Botswana, Singapore and Hong Kong had to do beyond legislating to combat 
corruption. Suggested as part of ensuring the efficacy of an anti-corruption regime is 
recourse to social empowerment strategies and taking varied approaches such as the 
human-rights approach to fighting corruption and canvassing the human right to be 
free from corruption (Ogundokun, 2005). 
4.2.4 THE SADC PROTOCOL AGAINST CORRUPTION 
The SADC Anti-Corruption Protocol was adopted as a sub-regional anti-corruption 
treaty in Africa by the 14 SADC heads of state and government at their August 2001 
summit held in Malawi. The protocol was ratified by South Africa in 2003 (Rity, 2003:9). 
The SADC Anti-Corruption Protocol focuses on prevention of corruption-related 
offences. It aims at establishing anti-corruption mechanisms on the national level and, 
on the other hand, through its provisions, promotes international co-operation between 
its signatories. The stated purpose of the protocol is: (a) to promote the development 
of anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level; (b) to promote cooperation in the 
fight against corruption by state parties; and (c) to harmonise anti-corruption national 
legislation in the region. Furthermore, the protocol requires signatories to take certain 
preventative measures, including developing a code of conduct for public officials; 
ensuring transparency in public procurement of goods and services; allowing easy 
access to public information; guaranteeing the protection of whistle-blowers; 
establishing anti-corruption agencies; developing a proper accountability and controls 
system; educating the public and making it aware of the ills of corruption; and taking 
a zero-tolerance approach to corruption. Much of the content of the purpose statement 
of the protocol and the stated preventative measures are covered in the AU Anti-
Corruption Convention, the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention and the UN Anti-
Corruption Convention. In fact, it can be argued that there is a lot of duplication. 
Article 4(1)(g) encourages states to maintain and strengthen institutions responsible 
for implementing mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating 
corruption. The SADC Protocol makes no provision for sanctions against member 
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states in cases where there is non-compliance. One concern about the implementation 
of the obligations emanating from the protocol is that the committee of the state parties 
responsible for reviewing country submissions on their anti-corruption measures “is 
rather tasked with reactive instead of active powers” (Pereira et al., 2012:16). 
4.2.5 THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
As a regional body, the OECD was established in 1961 “to promote policies that will 
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world” (OECD, 
2015). It seeks to promote beneficial economic relations among member states and 
deal with any impediments to such relations. Corruption and corrupt practices, and 
unfair trading environments, are some of the impediments the OECD deals with under 
its structure and mandate.  
The OECD is one of the organisations that has a strong drive and initiative towards 
combatting corruption and bribery. In May 1994 members of the OECD called for all 
countries “to introduce effective measures to deter, prevent, and combat bribery of 
foreign public officials in international business transactions” (Sibanda, 2005:7–8; 
OECD Anti-Corruption Convention, articles 1 and 2). Eventually, the OECD signed 
and adopted the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention on 17 December 1997 (Sibanda, 
2005; Corr & Lawler, 1999; George, Lacey & Birmele, 2000; Gantz, 1998; Earle, 1998). 
Compared to the UN, which failed in its first two attempts to introduce an anti-
corruption and anti-illicit payments instruments, the OECD set the tone for the “first 
successful international or cross-continent commitment to specifically deal with bribery 
of foreign public officials in the conducting of multinational business transactions” 
(Sibanda, 2005:8) with strong and effective sanctions. Pereira et al. (2012:16) writes 
that the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention and the regime it introduces are central to 
international business transactions: “most of its Member States are home to big 
international companies that could potentially be a source of bribe money.”  
In 2007 South Africa acceded to and ratified the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention. 
This came as no surprise because South Africa has always wanted to be one of the 
first African or non-European countries to join the OECD Convention, as is reported 
by Sibanda (2005:2). The convention is primarily focused on criminalising bribery of 
foreign public officials in international business transactions (OECD Anti-Corruption 
Convention, article 1).  
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It was therefore important for South Africa as a member of the OECD to put in place 
legislative measures, such as PRECCA to ensure that none of their nationals or 
companies registered in their territory could bribe foreign public officials and stay 
unpunished. It was also important to put in place an effective and efficient national 
anti-corruption legal framework. 
4.3 DOMESTIC FRAMEWORKS  
4.3.1 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA OF 1996  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 is often “hailed as one of the 
most progressive in the entire world. It provides the state with a progressive framework 
for the realisation of both political and socioeconomic rights” (Landsberg et al., 
2006:6). Not only does the Constitution regulate the organisation and structure of 
South Africa, how the country should be governed, how laws should be promulgated 
and enacted (Joubert, 2015:4). It is also the supreme law of the land. Thus, in terms 
of section 2 of the Constitution, all other laws are subject to the Constitution. Any law 
found to be inconsistent with the Constitution shall be declared invalid. Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution is the Bill of Rights, section 39(2), which calls for every court, tribunal 
or forum to promote the spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting 
legislation.  
There are other provisions of the Constitution that are relevant in the fight against 
corruption and that must be taken into account when corruption offences or persons 
suspected of corruption are investigated and prosecuted. For instance, in terms of 
section 35(5) of the Constitution, 1996, evidence obtained in a manner that violates 
any right under the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence 
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
Also, as law enforcement agencies pursue corruption offences, they must be mindful 
that even those suspected of corruption and corrupt practices have an inherent dignity 
and the right to have their dignity respected and protected (section 10 of the 
Constitution). Furthermore, section 12 reminds us of the freedom and security of 
persons. This provision is important and must be read with the provision of section 35 
of the Constitution that details how a person arrested for allegedly committing an 
offence, such as an offence of corruption, must be treated. This includes the right to 
fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent of corruption or corrupt activities until 
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found guilty. The courts have addressed many of the provisions related to section 35. 
For instance, the phrase “detained” in section 35 was interpreted by the court in S v 
Melani 1996 (1) SACR 335 (E) at 348 (i) to mean that a person is entitled to legal 
representation from the moment of arrest. This information should be imparted to any 
arrested person as soon as possible after his or her arrest and certainly prior to the 
person being invited or requested to participate in any proceedings in which he or she 
may by word or deed incriminate him- or herself (see also S v Marx and Another 1996 
(2) SACR 140 (W) at 148f – i). It is therefore clear that state organs, such as the police 
should warn the suspect of his or her right to legal representation immediately upon 
arrest or at any other stage that his or her cooperation in the investigative process is 
requested. But what is the position with private forensic auditors or private persons?  
Procedural justice provisions are entrenched in the Constitution and must be 
respected in corruption cases. In S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W) in the 
Witwatersrand Local Division, Satchwell J held that a suspect who becomes an 
accused is entitled to the fair pre-trial procedures. This view was also followed by the 
Cape Provincial Division in S v Orrie and Another 2005 (1) SACR 63 (C). The 
requirement that a suspect is entitled to be informed of his or her constitutional rights, 
despite the fact that he or she is not an arrested, detained or accused person, was not 
followed in a number of other High Court judgments, such as S v Ndlovu 1997 (12) 
BCLR 1785 (N). Here it was held by the Natal Provincial Division that as the appellant 
in that case made a statement before he had been arrested or detained, it was not 
necessary to warn him of his constitutional rights. 
Likewise, in S v Van der Merwe 1998 (1) SACR 194 (O) the Free State High Court 
held that there was nothing in the Interim Constitution 1993 that placed an obligation 
on a police official to warn a suspect of his or her constitutional rights before his or her 
arrest or detention. In this matter the accused was charged with murder. The 
investigating officer testified that he had encountered the accused at the crime scene. 
He asked the accused for an explanation, whereupon the accused handed him a 
firearm and made an exculpatory report about the events leading to the death of the 
deceased. 
Before the accused provided the report, the investigating officer had not realised that 
he was talking to a possible suspect, and he therefore gave the accused no caution 
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whatsoever. However, after he had heard the accused’s report he cautioned him in 
terms of the Judges’ Rules, and arrested him. At no stage was the accused advised 
of his rights in terms of the Interim Constitution, 1993.  
At his trial his lawyers argued that his statement is not admissible in evidence as his 
constitutional rights had not been explained to him before he made the incriminating 
statement. The accused objected to the admissibility of the evidence as to what he 
had told the investigating officer. The court held that it had the discretion to admit 
evidence about the accused’s report. Factors that played a role in that regard included 
that the investigating officer had been bona fide unaware that the accused was a 
suspect when he asked him for an explanation, and no pressure or influence had 
accordingly been exercised on the accused to impart information. The court therefore 
allowed the statement as evidence against him. The Natal Provincial Division in S v 
Langa 1996 (2) SACR 153 (N) also declined to follow the Sebejan decision. Since then 
court jurisprudence has changed and investigating officers and/or law enforcement 
officers must not take chances when it comes to suspects’ procedural rights. 
In the case of S v Mthethwa 2004 (1) SACR 449 (E), an Eastern Cape High Court 
decision, the learned judge agreed with the Ndlovu, Langa and Van der Merwe 
judgements above, namely that the provisions of section 35 of the Constitution are not 
applicable to suspects, but ruled that is not the end of the matter. In this case the 
accused had been questioned and made a statement before the police had apprised 
him of his right to remain silent. At that stage he had neither been arrested nor was he 
an accused person. The accused was, however, clearly a suspect.  
The right to privacy, which is contained in section 14 of the Constitution, is also 
important for law enforcement agencies to consider in their corruption investigations. 
One of the most frequent attacks against the admissibility of otherwise relevant 
evidence is based on the allegation that a suspect’s right to privacy has been infringed. 
This is especially so in the context of searches and seizures of a suspect’s property, 
the interception of his or her communications and in the context of an interview. 
Section 14 reads as follows: 
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have – 
(a) their person or home searched; 
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(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed. 
4.3.2 THE PREVENTION AND COMBATTING OF CORRUPT ACTIVITIES ACT (PRECCA) 
In one of the first pieces of writing comprehensively analysing the provisions of 
PRECCA after its enactment in 2004, Sibanda (2005) concludes by stating: 
The PCCAA is the most important anti-corrupt activities legislation to 
date. The Act signals an aggressive South African stance and a desire 
‘to unbundle the crime of corruption in terms of which, in addition to the 
creation of a general, broad and all-encompassing offence of corruption, 
various specific activities are criminalized’. The PCCAA is of such 
significance that it is expected to translate into tangible form efforts and 
developments in the prevention and combating of corrupt activities. 
Furthermore, for the first time in 46 years of anti-corruption legislation 
history, the PCCAA has introduced the offence of bribery of foreign 
public officials. The purpose of these developments and changes is 
clearly to bring the African anti-corruption policy into line with 
international developments, such as those of the OECD and the UN. 
PRECCA became South Africa’s comprehensive and internationally comparable 
national legislation to address corruption, modelled partly on the OECD Anti-Corruption 
Convention (Sibanda, 2005:2). It consolidates much of South Africa’s anti-corruption 
legislation. In particular, PRECCA is an “extensively reconsidered version of the 
Prevention of Corruption Bill 19 of 2002” (Sibanda, 2005:2fn1) which the government 
sought to introduce at the time. PRECCA provides for, among other things, the 
strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption and corrupt activities; for 
the offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt activities; for investigative 
measures in respect of corruption and related corrupt activities; for the establishment 
and endorsement of a register in order to place certain restrictions on persons and 
enterprises convicted of corrupt activities relating to tenders and contracts; for placing 
a duty on certain persons holding a position of authority to report certain corrupt 
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transactions; and for extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of the offence of corruption 
and offences relating to corrupt activities. 
One of the key essential features of PRECCA is authorising the NDP to investigate 
unexplained wealth of individuals and/or property suspected to be the proceeds of 
crime or criminal activities, and forfeiture thereof; the creation of a Register for Tender 
Defaulters by the Minister of Finance; requiring, as a duty, that any person who holds 
a position of authority and becomes aware of corrupt activities must report them; and 
granting the courts extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of corruption offences such as 
where the crime of corruption is committed by a South African citizen (Madonsela, 
2010:4–5). 
Furthermore, one of the highlights and the defining characteristics of PRECCA is that 
it attempts for the first time in the history of South Africa to deal with bribery of foreign 
public officials, following in the footsteps of the OECD Convention. One can even find 
functional similarity between the preamble of the OECD Convention and of PRECCA. 
In this regard Sibanda (2005:3) notes: 
 
In terms similar to those employed in the preamble to the OECD 
Convention, the preamble to the PCCAA acknowledges, amongst 
others, that corruption, bribery and related offences endanger the 
stability and security of societies, undermine the values of democracy 
and morality, jeopardize free trade and the credibility of governments 
and provide a breeding ground for organized crime; it also states that 
there are links between corruption and other forms of crime, in particular 
organized and economic crime. The Corruption Act of 1992 only applied 
to acts committed locally and to the bribery of South African public 
officials. The Act contained no express prohibition on bribery committed 
abroad or the bribing of foreign public officials. 
 
Recently a Bill was introduced to bring in some amendments to the PRECCA Act of 
2004 – the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Amendment Bill (PRECCA 
Bill(B) –PRECCA 17). According to its introductory statement the Bill is intended to 
deal with passive corruption in respect of foreign public officials; to extend the offence 
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of unacceptable conduct relating to ordinary witnesses to include whistle-blowers and 
members of the accounting profession; to increase the monetary sanctions provided 
for in the Act; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Importantly, the Bill 
introduces the offence of giving a bribe as a direct passive and active offence. A 
person who is compelled to give a bribe will escape criminal liability, if he or she reports 
the matter to law enforcement authorities within seven days. A number of provisions 
that were found lacking or not expressly stated in PRECCA are included in the Bill. 
For instance, a bribe to a public servant is dealt with more specifically. Something that 
will enhance the credibility of fighting public corruption is that the Bill introduces powers 
and procedures for the attachment and forfeiture of property of public servants 
accused of corruption. 
 
With regards to the punishment of corruption, the Bill makes certain important 
amendments to PRECCA, including increasing the quantum of fines for convicted 
persons. For instance, section 5 of the Bill states that “Section 26 of the principal Act 
is hereby amended – (ii) in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a regional court, 
to a fine not exceeding R50 m, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 18 years 
or to both a fine and such imprisonment; or (iii) in the case of a sentence to be imposed 
by a magistrate’s court, to a not exceeding R10 m fine or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding five years or to both a fine and such imprisonment”. 
 
The Bill goes on to state “(i) in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a High Court 
or a regional court, to a fine not exceeding R30 m or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 10 years or to both a fine and such imprisonment; or (ii) in the case of a 
sentence to be imposed by a magistrate’s court, to a fine not exceeding R10 m or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or to both a fine and such 
imprisonment; or (c) section 28(6)(b), or 34(6) or (7)(b) is liable to a fine [of R250 000] 
not exceeding R5 m or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or to 
both a fine and such imprisonment.” 
This section further states that “(b) In sentencing a corporate body, the court must 
ensure that the fine imposed properly reflects the seriousness of the offence, the 
amount of the gratification paid, the benefit derived and the annual turnover of the 
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corporate body, including that of any associated entities for the period preceding the 
offence”.  
As far back as 2016 in Phillips v The State (370/2016) [2016] ZASCA 187 (1 December 
2016) the SCA addressed the appropriateness of sentences in corruption cases. In 
this case the appellant, a constable in the SAPS, was convicted in the Pretoria regional 
court of soliciting and accepting a bribe of R900 in contravention of s 4(1)(a)(i)(aa) 
read with sections 1, 2, 4(2), 24, 25 and 26(1)(a) of PRECCA. A sentence of seven 
years’ imprisonment was imposed with two years conditionally suspended for five 
years. Still, the appellant appealed against this sentence. In considering the issue of 
the sentence, the judge referred to other cases. In particular, the court at para 13 cited 
S v Narker & Another 1975 (1) SA 583 (A) Holmes JA (Muller JA and Corbett JA 
concurring), which observed at 586B “Bribery is a corrupt and ugly offence striking 
cancerously at the roots of justice and integrity, and it is calculated to deprive society 
of a fair administration. In general, courts view it with abhorrence.” The court in Phillips 
v The State, para 14, also quoted with approval S v Mahlangu, which at para 26 holds: 
Corruption has plagued the moral fibre of our society to an extent that, 
to some, it is a way of life. There is a very loud outcry from all corners 
of society against corruption which nowadays seems fashionable. Some 
even go as far as stating that corruption is rendering the State 
dysfunctional. It is the courts that must implement the penalties imposed 
by the legislature. It is also the courts that must ensure that justice is not 
only done, but also seen to be done. The trial court considered all the 
aggravating and mitigating factors and came to the conclusion that an 
effective imprisonment of four years was appropriate. In the 
circumstances of this case, the researcher agrees. 
With respect to the sentence of the appellant, the court in Phillips v The State found 
the sentence disappointing and not appropriate the offence committed. Zondi JA, at 
para 14, stated as follows to demonstrate disapproval of the sentence of seven years 
with two years suspended for five years. 
In the present case the appellant’s conduct was egregious. He 
manufactured a case against the complainant for the purposes of 
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soliciting a bribe. The appellant used threats to inspire fear in the 
complainant’s mind in order to induce the complainant to pay him R900. 
He abused his position as a public officer and, as if this was not enough, 
he pleaded not guilty and advanced a defence which he knew was 
hopeless. He showed no remorse. The appellant violated the 
complainant’s constitutional right to freedom and security under s 12(1) 
and the right to have his inherent dignity respected and protected under 
s 10. In the circumstances, having regard to the serious nature of the 
offence, direct imprisonment was called for. There is also no merit in the 
appellant’s submission that if the State had intended to argue for a 
heavy sentence it should have charged him with extortion which is more 
serious than corruption. 
In summary, the court in Phillips v The State ruled that PRECCA does not limit the 
penal discretion of the sentencing court. However, the sentence must be appropriate 
to the offence. In this casu the offence, contravening section 4(1)(a)(i)(aa) of 
PRECCA, was serious. Thus, the court found that the trial court having regard to all 
relevant considerations constitutes a misdirection, warranting interference with the 
sentence imposed. 
 4.3.3 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998 (POCA) 
POCA is the predecessor of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 and the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996, which dealt with civil forfeiture and criminal 
forfeiture of proceeds of crime respectively. POCA provides measures for law 
enforcement agencies and the NPA to combat organised crime and money laundering. 
It is submitted that the fact that corruption in South Africa has now become a 
sophisticated and very well organised crime, with corrupt benefits laundered through 
different channels, makes POCA one of the central legislation in the arsenal of anti-
corruption agencies.  The primary feature of POCA is to provide for the recovery of the 
proceeds of unlawful activity. Chapter 5 provides for freezing and confiscating the 
value of benefit derived from crime in cases where the accused is convicted of an 
offence. Chapter 6 focuses on property that has been used either to commit an offence 
or that constitutes the proceeds of crime. It provides for freezing and forfeiture of 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime through a process that is not dependent on a 
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prosecution. Thus, POCA ensures that nobody benefits from criminality or ill-gotten 
benefits as has been determined by several Constitutional Court cases (See, for 
example: S v Shaik and Others 2008 (8) BCLR 834 (CC);  Fraser v ABSA Bank Ltd 
(National Director of Public Prosecutions as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (3) BCLR 219 (CC); 
Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (2) BCLR 140 (CC); National 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and Others 2003 (5) 
BCLR 476 (CC); and Phillips and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
2006 (2) BCLR 274 (CC)). Section 71 of POCA empowers the National Director to 
request information from government departments and statutory bodies in respect of 
investigations relevant to this Act without having to issue subpoenas (Madonsela, 
2010:6). To surmise, POCA is relevant in prosecuting or fighting corruption because it 
enables the authorities to confiscate benefits of corruption, even in non-conviction 
cases (Basdeo, 2013:231). 
The enactment of POCA in 1998 was influenced by the United States Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) - 981(a)(1)(C) of 18 USC 1996 (as 
amended by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000),  and the United Kingdom 
Criminal Justice Act of  1998 (Basdeo, 2014:1058) as the main South African 
legislation dedicated combat organised crime (Goga, 2014:68). Similar legislation 
appears in other jurisdictions, and comparator jurisdictions. For instance, In Botswana, 
assets forfeiture and/or recovery Proceeds of Serious Crime Act 19 of 1990.  Forfeiture 
is also part of the criminal law in Hong Kong (Young & Stone, 2006), and in Singapore 
in conjunction with assets recovery done primarily in terms of the Mutual Assistance  
in Criminal Matters Act  (MACMA), section 29 -32 (Wei, 2016:10) 
POCA has been hailed for  providing, inter alia, “a range of crippling fines and for orders 
such as confiscation and forfeiture” (Nel, 2003:97). POCA has not been free from 
criticism, some considered to have the blunting effect on its prevention power, though. 
Goga (2014:63) notes that POCA is conspicuously lacking in a clear definition of 
organised crime; and compensated for this omission with a listing of “criminal activities 
that would be covered by the law, as well as offering fairly broad traits of membership 
to a criminal group”. One of the sternest criticism of POCA to date was by former deputy 
commissioner of the SAPS, advocate Godfrey Lebeya, who in his PhD thesis on 
organised crime definitions, states that “The POCA is not a model of legislative 
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coherence; it is a legislation that may be described as half-baked, which requires 
immediate return to the legislative oven.” (Lebeya, 2012:119). It is submitted that it is 
not always easy to define organised crime in exact terms the same way it may not be 
possible to provide an exhaustive list of what constituted criminal activities for the 
purposes of organised crime.  
The constitutional validity of POCA has been tested in several cases. Notable is the 
case of Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate, were the 
respondent’s counsel argued against the restraint provisions of section 25 and 26 of 
POCA. The argument made was that the provisions were unconstitutional on the 
grounds of violation of the right to privacy and the right not to be deprived of 
property. Unfortunately, the argument was rejected by Van Zyl J  who considered the 
restraint and confiscation provisions necessary evils, that are “both equitable and 
morally justified” (Bathgate, para 25. See also Nel, 2003).  In NDPP v Byriacou 2003 
(2) SACR 524 (SAC), at 532 – 534, the Supreme Court of Appeal said that granting by 
the courts of restraint orders is a matter of discretion, which must be “sparingly 
exercised” in “clearest of cases” where its factors favouring its granting “substantially 
outweigh the considerations against”. But, in NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 (1) SACR 530 
(SCA), at 532, it was held by the same court that the court should not frustrate the 
provisions on restraint order readily refusing to grant such an order under the guise of 
exercising its discretion. It is submitted that South African case law on restrain orders 
and forfeiture order in general is still under continuing construction, and that the law in 
this area may not be said to be saddled as yet. In fact, the interpretation of and 
relationship between POCA and the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act 
75 of 1996 (ICCMA) dealing with restraint orders in criminal matters has been a subject 
of a court challenged. (See also Savoi and Others v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Another [2014] ZACC 5). Criminal assets forfeiture orders remain 
constitutional dilemmas as pointed out by legal scholars, sometime raising a “serious 
impasse between public interest and constitutional rights”, as pointed out by Basdeo 
(2014:1048). 
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The courts, as in NDPP v Geyser 2008 ZASCA 15 [25 March 2008], para 19, confirmed 
that POCA can be used in serious crimes that are not ‘organised” crimes. In the context 
of anti-corruption activities, it would mean POCA assets forfeiture orders can be used 
against people who benefitted from corruption. 
4.3.4 The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 (CPA) 
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) regulates matters relating to criminal 
proceedings in a court of law and contains various provisions relating to the powers, 
duties and functions of members of the prosecuting authority in 145 provisions. These 
include provisions relating to the power to search and seize, withdraw a charge and 
stop a prosecution, the attendance of witnesses in court, the issuing of summonses, 
admission of guilt, bail, the release of an accused person, summary trials, the charge, 
the plea, jurisdiction, preparatory examinations, trial before different courts, conduct 
of proceedings, witnesses, evidence, competent verdicts, previous convictions, 
sentence, reviews and appeals, and victim compensation. Therefore, the CPA 
constitutes one of the critical general pieces of legislation with respect to the anti-
corruption measures as far as procedural matters are concerned. For example, a 
search related to the alleged offence of corruption may be conducted pursuant to 
section 20 of the CPA, which prescribes a search by virtue of a search warrant. 
Though essentially a procedures legislation, CPA co-exist with and supplants 
corruption and organised crime legislation. In NDPP v Byriacou 2003 (2) SACR 524 
(SAC), at 530, for example, the respondent convicted on 102 counts of receiving stolen 
property and sentence to 15 years imprisonment was ordered to return property to the 
value of approximately R4.5 million to its rightful owners pursuant to section 34(1)(a) 
of the CPA. It is submitted that section 34(1)(a) of the CPA is akin to a residual assets 
recovery provision secondary to the relevant forfeiture provisions of POCA. Therefore, 
a person convicted of corruption and organised crime can be deprived of the proceeds 
of his/her criminal conduct through PRECCA, POCA or the CPA depending on the 
circumstances of each case. 
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 4.3.5 The Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 (PDA) and the Witness Protection 
Act of 1998 (WPA) 
The Protected Disclosure Act No. 26 of 2000 (PDA) is important in protecting whistle-
blowers from any undue repercussions as a result of the disclosure. When the PDA 
was introduced in 2000 South Africa became one of the first countries in the world to 
introduce comprehensive workplace whistle-blower protection legislation (Sibanda, 
2003). The PDA has been used mainly in employment contexts to encourage and 
support those making disclosures in the workplace (Madonsela, 2010:6). Vettori 
(2009:291) also submits that PDA is an “indirect means of monitoring employer 
obligations”. This view stems from the fact that employers will always be worry of being 
reported from violating their obligations in the workplace. However, this study does not 
concentrate on the PDA. Through whistle-blowing unlawful activities or misconduct 
are exposed, even those that happens behind closed doors such as corruption in a 
society or organisation. Thus, whistle-blowing is important in the fight against 
corruption. The provisions of both PDA and PRECCA assist in satisfying the country’s 
obligation to protect whistle-blowers under the national and regional conventions. The 
UN Anti-Corruption Convention, for example, articles 33 and 38, require member 
states to have in their anti-corruption instruments legal protection against any 
unjustified treatment of any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds acts of corruption.  
On 31 July 2017, President Jacob Zuma assented to the Protected Disclosures 
Amendment Act No 5 of 2017 (the PDA Amendment). The PDA Act brings about 
numerous changes to the Protected Disclosures Act, No 26 of 2000 (the PDA). In 
particular, it is stated in the Act that its purpose is to: 
To amend the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000, so as to extend the 
application of the Act to any person who works or worked for the State or 
another person or who in any manner assists or assisted in carrying on 
or conducting the business of an employer or client as an independent 
contractor, consultant, agent or person rendering services to a client 
while being employed by a temporary employment service; to regulate 
joint liability of employers and their clients; to introduce a duty to inform 
employees or workers who have disclosed information regarding 
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unlawful or irregular conduct; to provide for immunity against civil and 
criminal liability flowing from a disclosure of information which shows or 
tends to show that a criminal offence has been committed, is being 
committed or is reasonably likely to be committed; to create an offence 
for the disclosure of false information; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith. 
The PDA Amendment Act brings changes in a form of new provisions extends addition 
key obligations on whistle-blowers and employers alike.  In terms of section 1(d) of the 
new PDA Amendment, for example, a “occupational detriment” for whistleblowing now 
include a person being subjected to a civil claim “for the alleged breach confidentiality 
agreement arising out of the disclosure of a criminal offence or information which 
shows or tends to show that a substantial contravention or failure to comply with the 
law has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur.” A newly created provision, section 
3A, is that an employer and its client are jointly and severally liable for those instances 
where the employer “under the express or implied authority or with the knowledge of 
a client” subjects an employee or worker to an occupational detriment.” Thus, an 
employer who subject an employee to an occupational detriment for disclosure of a 
known corrupt activity will be liable to such an employee.  It is submitted that the PDA 
Amendment enhances the anti-corruption efforts because it introduced a new 
obligation on employers to take or authorize appropriate internal action after receiving 
and dealing with information about improprieties. Corrupt practices may be one such 
impropriety. Furthermore, the PDA Amendment strengthens openness and 
accountability without fear of reprisals or occupational detriment.  
In 2015, the Deputy Public Protector, Advocate K Malunga, published a report 2015 
that collated whistle-blowing protections contained in various pieces of legislation.  He 
noted that in addition to the PDA, there are provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, PRECCA, the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA), 
Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011, Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998, and 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. More related to the PDA and 
PRECCA on the protection of whistle-blowers is the Witness Protection Act No. 112 
of 1998. The Act “encourages state witnesses to give evidence in trial proceedings 
and commissions of enquiry by providing them with protection” (Madonsela, 2010:7).  
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4.3.6 The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 (PAIA) 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (PAIA)  is highly regarded 
as promoting transparency “by giving effect to the Constitutional right of access to any 
information held by the state and information held by any other person that is required 
for the exercise or protection of any rights” (Madonsela, 2010:6–7). Kekae (2017:77) 
remarks that PAIA puts “into practice the constitutional right of access to information 
that is in the possession of the State and any information that another person is in 
possession of and may be required for the exercise or protection of any rights.” 
According to its preamble it was enacted: 
to give effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held 
by the State and any information that is held by another person and that 
is required for the exercise or protection of any rights; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith. 
The preamble of PAIA and its provisions has been explicated further in the Manual on 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (see generally Kekae (2017:77). 
  4.3.7 THE PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT (2000) (PAJA) 
Section 33(1) of the Constitution guarantees everyone “the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.” A dismissal from service 
recommendation by IPID, for example, of a member of the SAPS following alleged 
criminal misconduct will qualify as an administrative action. Section 33(3) requested 
the enactment of national legislation to give effect to this right, which came in the form 
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice ACT (PAJA).  Peekhaus (2014:570) regards 
section 33 of the Constitution as a “specifically articulated constitutional right of access 
to information places South Africa among a minority of countries globally that attribute 
such a fundamental level of importance to this right”. Currie and Klaaren (2002) hails 
PAJA as one of the most important pieces of legislation enacted in South Africa, with 
far reaching implications.  The broad scope of PAJA and section 33 of the Constitution 
with regard to just administrative action has been attributed “an underlying belief in the 
critical lynchpin role this right plays in advancing the civil, political, and socio-economic 
rights contained in the Constitution’s extensive Bill of Rights,” says Peekhaus 
(2014:570-571).   
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The PAJA promotes transparency in administrative decisions requiring “administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, and the right to written reasons 
where one’s rights have been adversely affected by administrative action” (Madonsela 
2010:7). It is submitted that PAJA assures accountability and transparency needed in 
the fight against corruption. Its purpose is stated in the preamble as: 
To give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair and to the right to written reasons for 
administrative action as contemplated in section 33 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; and to provide for matters 
incidental thereto. 
PAJA has far reaching consequences in the realm of administrative justice. To start 
with, it fosters administration effectiveness and accountability. Also, promotes law and 
order by providing for a scheme of reviewing administrative decisions made by public 
officials. Kekae (2017:78) posits that PAJA “together with the 1996 Constitution … 
embraces the “Batho Pele” (People First) principles and promotes South Africans 
citizens‘ rights to justice administration.”  Relevant to this study is what Ngcobo J said 
regarding the right to access to information in in Brümmer v Minister for Social 
Development and Others, stating that (para 62-63):  
The importance of this right too, in a country which is founded on values 
of accountability, responsiveness and openness, cannot be gainsaid. 
To give effect to these founding values, the public must have access to 
information held by the state. Indeed one of the basic values and 
principles governing public administration is transparency. And the 
Constitution demands that transparency “must be fostered by providing 
the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.” Apart from 
this, access to information is fundamental to the realisation of the rights 
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 
PAJA was tested in President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G 
Media Limited 2011 (2) SA 1 (SCA) case, which was about appeal to access a report 
in the possession of the President of the Republic. The respondent, Mail and Guardian 
has sought access to the report since 2008 using internal remedies to no avail.  
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M and G had to resort to the courts and   the North Gauteng High Court granted the 
order under PAJA compelling the President to disclose the report. The leave to appeal 
the High Court decision was denied by the Supreme Court of Appeal. Relentless was 
the Office of the Presidency that it mounted an appeal to the Constitutional Court, and 
the latter referred the case back to the court of first instance (Peekhaus, 2014:570), 
which ordered that the report be released. In the words of the Court, at para 132, in 
the “circumstances the Court should not hesitate to let the Constitution and the statute 
take effect. The report should be released.” Public interest consideration were critical 
in the court coming to its decision. In particular, Cameron J (Jafta J, Nkabinde J and 
Van der Westhuizen J concurring) stated the public should never “fear that courts may 
assist in suppressing information to which the Constitution says they are entitled (at 
para 130). Judge Cameron further said that “[t]o give secret judicial examination of 
disputed records a central place in deciding claims to exemption, instead of enforcing 
the burden government rightly bears to justify withholding information, is in the 
researcher’s view a grave error” (at para 31).  
4.3.8 The Public Finance Management Act of 1999 (PFMA) 
The Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999 (PFMA), supported by regulations, 
promotes the effective and efficient use of resources by departments and 
constitutional institutions. The PFMA is central to the strategy on improving financial 
management in the public service. Also, it advances a healthy organisation 
sustainability “through effective and efficient use of limited resources” (Xhati, 2016:7). 
In part, the PFMA places certain duties and responsibilities on executive officials in 
charge of state finance. The Act sets out clear procedures with regard the effective 
and efficient management of assets, liabilities and expenditure of the State (Kekae, 
2017:73). The preamble of the PFMA states as its purpose: 
To regulate financial management in the national government and 
provincial governments; to ensure that all revenue, expenditure, assets 
and liabilities of those governments are managed efficiently and 
effectively; to provide for the responsibilities of persons entrusted with 
financial management in those governments; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith. 
110 
 
The Act consists of 95 sections, of which some provisions are particularly relevant to 
this study. For instance, accounting officers of these institutions are required to 
maintain inter alia “effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk 
management and internal control; a system of internal audit under the control and 
direction of an audit committee; and an appropriate provisioning and procurement 
system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective” 
(Madonsela, 2010:7). 
A view is that PFMA can also serve as an accountability yardstick because it requires 
public officials to exhibit openness and transparency in their activities (Kekae, 
2017:75).  The sound financial management principles of the PFMA has been 
replicated at municipal level through the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 
(MFMA). Kekae (2017:75) posits that “Managers must be accountable and be able to 
manage finances within the set financial management framework.” Mathebula 
(2014:936) made a good observation that notwithstanding the good intentions 
underlying PFMA, “a democratic South Africa’s financial management continues to be 
embedded with corruption, fraud and theft”.  In the realm of financial mismanagement 
and corruption, Mathebula (2014:940) makes reference to the wastage of public 
resources and finances in the Nkandla corruption scandal. While the good intention of 
ensuring that public money is safeguarded against corruption and other malpractices, 
it should sadly be announced that both the PFMA and the MFMA have failed to be 
deterrents, particularly failing to act as a preventative tool against corruption and 
thiefdom (Mathebula, 2014:942). Unfortunately, the VBS Scandal has revealed a 
flagrant violation of PFMA provisions and dictates. 
4.3.9 Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 (FICA) 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act No. 38 of 2001 (FICA) was enacted specifically 
to: 
establish a Financial Intelligence Centre and a Money Laundering 
Advisory Council in order to combat money laundering activities and the 
financing of terrorist and related activities; to impose certain duties on 
institutions and other persons who might be used for money laundering 
purposes and the financing of terrorist and related activities; to amend 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998, and the Promotion of 
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Access to Information Act, 2000; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith. 
Section 1(1) defines what money laundering is and section 29 obliges authorities to 
follow and report suspicious and unusual transactions. In terms of section 1(1), money-
laundering defined as: 
an activity which has or is likely to have the effect of concealing or 
disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities or any interest which anyone has in such 
proceeds, and includes any activity which constitutes an offence in terms 
of section 64 of this Act or section 4, 5 or 6 of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act. 
It is submitted that FICA further assist not only in identifying the proceeds of unlawful 
activities, and acting as a disincentive for money-laundering activities (Hannman & 
Koen, 2017:107), as has been exposed in the Bosasa scandal at the Zondo State 
Capture Commission hearings. It helps in the control of corruption and corrupt 
activities through information exchange amongst relevant bodies both nationally and 
internationally. “Corruption and money-laundering are a related and self-reinforcing 
phenomenon”, highlighted Ahlers (2013:30) quoting the World Bank. Another 
important role of FICA is that its explicit reference to POCA means that even 
professions such as the legal professions are directly affected as corrupt individuals 
often lauder their money using the services of lawyers. FICA obliges institutions to 
exercise accountability and oversight by establishing and verifying the identity “of a 
client before concluding a single transaction with such client and to further keep a 
record of such identity for a period of at least five years” (Madonsela, 2010:7–8). A 
more telling account has been presented by Ahlers (2013), writing on FICA and 
politically exposed individuals. 
4.3.10 Public Administration Management Act of 2014 (PAMA) 
The Public Administration Management Act (PAMA) Bill was passed into law 
Parliament in March 2014.  The Act is intended to promote the basic values and 
principles governing the public administration covered in section 195 (1) of the 
Constitution.  
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The values and principles, which are applicable to administration in every sphere of 
government, organs of the state and public enterprises according to section 195(2), 
are stated as follows in section 195(1) of the Constitution: 
(1) Public administration must be governed by the democratic values 
and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following 
principles:  
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and 
maintained.  
(b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be 
promoted.  
(c)  Public administration must be development-oriented. 
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without 
bias.  
(e) People's needs must be responded to, and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making.  
(f)  Public administration must be accountable.  
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, 
accessible and accurate information.  
(h) Good human-resource management and career-development 
practices, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated.  
(i)  Public administration must be broadly representative of the South 
African people, with employment and personnel management 
practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to 
redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation. 
 
Section 3 of PAMA makes provisions relevant to good governance and administration 
free from corruption by stating as its objects the promotion and giving effect to the 
values and principles in section 195(1) of the Constitution; and facilitating the 
eradication and prevention of unethical practices in the public administration. 
Moreover, section 15. (1) of PAMA establishes the Public Administration Ethics, 
Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit. Section 15(4)(a) to (f) by tasking 
the Unit to further the crusade for clean and good administration (Kekae, 2017:91-92) 
through declaring as the Unit’s function: 
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(a) To provide technical assistance and support to institutions in all 
spheres of government regarding the management of ethics, 
integrity and disciplinary matters relating to misconduct in the public 
administration;  
(b)  to develop the norms and standards on integrity, ethics, conduct 
and discipline in the public administration;  
(c)  to build capacity within institutions to initiate and institute disciplinary 
proceedings into misconduct;  
(d)  to strengthen government oversight of ethics, integrity and 
discipline, and where necessary, in cases where systemic 
weaknesses are identified, to intervene;  
(e) to promote and enhance good ethics and integrity within the public 
administration; and  
(f) to cooperate with other institutions and organs of state to fulfill its 
functions under this section  
4.3.11 National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) 
As discussed in Chapter 1.1, corruption has many ills and effects on the socio-political 
economy of the country. The National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) was introduced 
to address several concerns that impact on the economy and corruption is one such 
concern (Kekae, 2017:96). NDP is simply a long terms development plan for South 
Africa, focusing of several key areas and collaboratively developed under the 
leadership of the National Planning Commission.  In Chapter 14 of the NDP, corruption 
is listed as one of the key goals. The summary of the key goals on corruption are listed 
verbatim as follows (NDP p.445). 
Corruption undermines good governance, which includes sound 
institutions and the effective operation of government in South Africa. 
The country needs an anti-corruption system that makes public 
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servants accountable, protects whistle-blowers and closely monitors 
procurement.  
These efforts to eradicate corruption need to include the private sector 
and individuals by increasing public awareness and improving access 
to information.  
A strategy is needed to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, 
through improving the quality of judges and scaling up judicial training. 
The NDP calls for a multi-prong approach to eradicate corruption. Suggested as also 
important in this approach is the creation of a corruption intelligence centre (CIC). It is 
submitted that the essence of the proposal for the establishment of the CIC is in part 
addressed in some of the researcher’s recommendation discussed in the final chapter 
of this study. In particular, the researcher’s recommendation on the establishment of 
the anti-corruption commission (ACC).  
The focus on corruption eradication is that corruption tears the core of good 
governance and leads to a public service that is accountable. Thus the NDP identifies 
the following focus areas as the country moves towards the path of accountability and 
zero-tolerance to corruption in the public service, namely: “ building a resilient anti-
corruption system;  strengthening accountability and responsibility of public servants; 
creating an open, responsive and accountable public service; and strengthening 
judicial governance and the rule of law” (Kekae, 2017:96).  Functional effectiveness 
and independence of anti-corruption bodies are key to any efforts by any authority 
serious about fighting corruption. It was therefore a relief that the 2011 NDP stated as 
indispensable to a well-functioning anti-corruption system “adequate resources and 
staff with relevant skills and knowledge, exceptional legislative powers, information 
sharing that is of high level and well-coordinated, and functional independence.” 
(Kekae, 2017:104).” 
To surmise, the relevance of NDP 2030 to this study is that its vision speaks firms to 
the need to combat corruption and to tally eradicate it. This the vision proclaims that: 
Our vision for 2030 is a South Africa that has zero tolerance for 
corruption. In 2030, South Africa will be a society in which citizens do 
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not offer bribes and have the confidence and knowledge to hold public 
and private officials to account, and in which leaders have integrity and 
high ethical standards. Anticorruption agencies should have the 
resources, independence from political influence, and powers to 
investigate corruption, and their investigations should be acted upon. 
(NDP, p.447). 
4.3.12 Public Sector Integrity Management Framework, 2013  (PSIMF) 
Public sector integrity management framework (PSIMF) is aptly titled given integrity 
as the centrepiece public sector management, and should find resonance with many 
international and regional frameworks on corruption and good governance. For 
instance, the importance and centrality of integrity as a foundation of good governance 
has been acknowledged by the OECD (Kekae, 2017:97). In Africa, integrity in public 
service and good governance finds exposition in several continental and regional 
instruments. The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and 
Administration, which was adopted by the African Union in 2011 and received in 
last signature in 2018 seeks, amongst others, to promote moral values as inherent 
attributes of public service agents; and also calls on state parties to combat 
corruption. With respect to corruption, the PSIMF stated that   “promoting integrity 
and combating corruption in the public service established the ground for the private 
sector and is important to upholding trust in government” and that there must be a 
commitment to recourse to “ethical and anti-corruption methods” (Kekae, 2017:97). 
Kekae (2017) notes as some of the key consideration in the PSIMF information 
sharing, constant and effective monitoring, and the system undergird by integrity 
systems and independence (Kekae, 2017:98).  It is therefore submitted that the PSIMF 
is very relevant to this study as it highlight what is relevant and important in the fight 
against corruption, particularly the independence and integrity of the public service 
office and of the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. 
4.3.13 The National Prosecuting Authority Act (NPA) 
This section must be read with Chapter 5.2.1 of this study discussing in depth the 
NPA, its powers and functions. In here it suffices to express that the introductory  
statement of the NPA Act holds that the purpose of the Act is to “regulate matters 
incidental to the establishment by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
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1996, of a single national prosecuting authority; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith”. Furthermore, the Preamble of the NPA Act stated the following ideals and 
intentions related to and/or associated with the NPA Act: 
WHEREAS section 179 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 …, provides for the establishment of a single national 
prosecuting authority in the Republic structured in terms of an Act of 
Parliament; the appointment by the President of a National Director of 
Public Prosecutions as head of the national prosecuting authority; the 
appointment of Directors of Public Prosecutions and prosecutors as 
determined by an Act of Parliament;  
AND WHEREAS the Constitution provides that the Cabinet member 
responsible for the administration of justice must exercise final 
responsibility over the prosecuting authority;  
AND WHEREAS the Constitution provides that national legislation must 
ensure that the Directors of Public Prosecutions are appropriately 
qualified and are responsible for prosecutions in specific jurisdictions;  
AND WHEREAS the Constitution provides that national legislation must 
ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without 
fear, favour or prejudice;  
AND WHEREAS the Constitution provides that the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions must determine, with the concurrence of the 
Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice, and after 
consulting the Directors of Public Prosecutions, prosecution policy 
which must be observed in the prosecution process;  
AND WHEREAS the Constitution provides that the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions may intervene in the prosecution process when 
policy directives are not being complied with, and may review a decision 
to prosecute or not to prosecute;  
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AND WHEREAS the Constitution provides that the prosecuting 
authority has the power to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the 
state, and to carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting 
criminal proceedings;  
AND WHEREAS the Constitution provides that all other matters 
concerning the prosecuting authority must be determined by national 
legislation. 
It is clear from the above restatement of the preamble to the NPA Act that the NPA 
plays a very important and central role in crime prosecution in South Africa. This role 
is confirmed in section 179(2) of the Constitution according to which the NPA is 
empowered to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry out 
any necessary functions incidental thereto. Corruption being one of the offences within 
the jurisdiction of the NPA to prosecute. Section 179(4) of the Constitution further 
requires that in doing so, the NPA must “act without fear or favour or prejudice.” This 
is an important constitutional mandate that cannot be over-emphasised. At the helm 
of the NPA is the NDPP. The NDPP was established pursuant to section 32(2) of the 
NPA Act. According to section 179(5) (a) of the Constitution, the NDPP is entrusted 
with determining prosecution policy and issuing policy directives to drive the 
prosecution processes.  
According to section 11(1) of the NPA Act, the president, after consultation with the 
minister and the NDPP, may appoint a maximum of four persons as Deputy Directors 
of National Public Prosecution (DNDPPs). The DNDPPs are subject to the control, 
direction and oversight of the NDPP and are also empowered to assign specified 
functions and powers to the DNDPPs. In terms of section 13(1) of the NPA Act, the 
president may, after consultation with the minister and the NDPP, also appoint 
Directors of Public Prosecution (DPPs) to different seats of the high courts, bestowing 
on them powers within those prosecutorial jurisdictions as part of discharging 
performance of the constitutional mandate and obligations of the NPA. This can be a 
differentiated appointment, with some powers and/or offences excluded from the 
jurisdiction of some DPPs. 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
 
It was revealed in this chapter that the seriousness with which the country wants to 
tackle the scourge of corruption included the enactment of a host of laws and policies, 
some like the PRECCA and POCA, being of international standards and modelled on 
equivalents of other jurisdictions. Chapter 4, Anti-corruption normative framework, 
dealt with the current normative anti-corruption frameworks both nationally and 
internationally. The NPA is highlighted as key in the delimitation of the national 
prosecuting authority of the country in compliance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Also addressed is the anti-corruption mandates under both international 
and regional conventions and treaties.  Notable, with regard to the UN Anti-Corruption 
Convention and the AU Anti-Corruption Convention requiring states to have in place 
an effective and coordinated anti-corruption policies implemented by independent 
anti-corruption bodies and the independent judiciary (Pereira et al., 2012).  
 
From a country perspective, it was clear that the NDP 2030 was intended to set a 
country of a path of straight and narrow with regard to corruption. It is submitted, and 
based on the above discussions, that South Africa could do much better in its fight 
against corruption if only the aspirations in the NDP 2030 could be followed alongside 
the currently impressive normative framework. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES AND 
RELATED INSTITUTIONS 
  5.1 Introduction 
As noted in Section 2.6 the effectiveness of the South African anti-corruption 
structures depends in part on the organisational effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system. It is therefore important to have in place strategies and structures that 
promote such effectiveness. Some of the structures are outside the criminal justice 
system and located in other spheres such as the government. This chapter deals with 
anti-corruption structures and strategies to determine how effective they have been 
in fighting corruption. Like the US, South Africa has a multi-agency model in the fight 
against corruption and related activities. 
Currently, anti-corruption structures or those in some form having the ability to be 
involved in combating corruption can be divided into three: State institutions 
supporting constitutional democracy; criminal justice agencies; and other bodies. 
Notable constitutional  democracy bodies for the purposes of this study, or what are 
often referred to as Chapter 9 institutions: the Office of the Public Protector; the Office 
of the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA); and the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC). Those forming part of the criminal justice agencies and law 
enforcement in general include the Judiciary; NPA; the SAPS Commercial Crime 
Unit; the SAPS ACU; the Hawks; the SIU; the Independent Police Investigative 
Directorate (IPID); and the FIC. Although not established to deal specifically with 
corruption and related activities or criminal conducts only, the Judiciary (courts) 
deserve mention as one of the institutions in the forefront of the fight against 
corruption. The third group of related anti-corruption agencies includes the 
Presidential Commissions; Department of Public Service and Administration; the 
National Intelligence Agency; the South African Revenue Service (SARS); and the 
National Anti-Corruption Forum. In this group only the Office of the Presidency; 
Presidential commissions and the parliamentary portfolio committees will be 
addressed in this study. 
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5.2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 
5.2.1 NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY 
In terms of section 179(2) of the Constitution, the NPA is empowered to institute 
criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry out any necessary functions 
incidental thereto. In doing so, it must act without fear or favour as proclaimed by 
section 179(4) of the Constitution. This is an important constitutional mandate that 
cannot be over-emphasised. At the helm of the NPA is the NDPP. The NDPP was 
established pursuant to section 32(2) of the NPA Act. According to section 179(5) of 
the Constitution, the NDPP is entrusted with determining prosecution policy and 
issuing policy directives to drive the prosecution processes. According to section 11 
of the NPA Act, the president, after consultation with the minister and the NDPP, may 
appoint a maximum of four persons as Deputy Directors of National Public Prosecution 
(DNDPPs). The DNDPPs are subject to the control, direction and oversight of the 
NDPP and are also empowered to assign specified functions and powers to the 
DNDPPs. 
In terms of section 13(1) of the NPA Act, the president may, after consultation with the 
minister and the NDPP, also appoint Directors of Public Prosecution (DPPs) to 
different seats of the high courts, bestowing on them powers within those prosecutorial 
jurisdictions as part of discharging performance of the constitutional mandate and 
obligations of the NPA. This can be a differentiated appointment, with some powers 
and/or offences excluded from the jurisdiction of some DPPs. 
Clearly, the NPA and NDPP occupy a very important place in the South African 
criminal justice system and equally in the fight against corruption and corrupt activities. 
As observed by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Mr M 
Masutha, “the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) … [is] an important component of 
the Justice Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster” which “strives to implement 
its mandate within a coordinated approach together with all other components of the 
criminal justice value chain” (Annual Report National Director of Public Prosecutions 
2017/18:17). It executes this duty in a holistic and co-ordinated manner, working 
together with other law enforcement agencies and agencies or units, such as the 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI), the SAPS, the Anti-Corruption 
Task Team (ACTT), chaired by the Head of the DPCI, the SIU, the Specialised 
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Commercial Crime Unit (SCCU), the FIC, the SARS, the State Security Agency (SSA), 
IPID, the AFU and the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC). 
The role and the importance of the NPA and the NDPP is better explicated by the SCA 
in Democratic Alliance v The President of the RSA & Others (263/11) [2011] ZASCA 
241; 2012 (1) SA 417 (SCA); [2012] 1 All SA 243 (SCA); 2013 (3) BCLR 291 (SCA) (1 
December 2011) which stated: 
[57] In order to fully appreciate the importance of the NPA and the NDPP 
in our constitutional democracy it is necessary, first, to bear in mind that 
the Constitution empowers those who govern and imposes limits on 
their power and, second, to consider the wider constitutional scheme in 
which both the institution and the individual are dealt with. A good 
starting place is an examination of the founding provisions of the 
Constitution. Section l(c) of the Constitution states that the Republic of 
South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded, among other 
values, on the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. Section 
l(d), commits government to democracy and to accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. Section 2 of the Constitution reaffirms 
that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and that law or 
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and that the obligations imposed 
by it must be fulfilled. Thus, every citizen and every arm of government 
ought rightly to be concerned about constitutionalism and its 
preservation. 
In terms of the NPA Act, section 20(1)(c) the NPA has the power to institute criminal 
proceedings on behalf of the state and to carry out any necessary functions incidental 
to instituting criminal proceedings. This includes discontinuing criminal proceedings. 
Similar powers are included in the CPA. The powers of the NDPP were reaffirmed and 
crystallised by the Constitutional Court in Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 
and Others 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC); 2012 (12) BCLR 1297 (CC). According to the court 
the powers of the NDPP must be understood with regard to the provisions of section 
179(2) of the Constitution. An important observation by the court that is relevant to the 
fight against corruption is that “the people employed by the prosecuting authority must 
themselves be people of integrity who will act without fear, favour or prejudice” 
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(Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA and Others, para 72). The court 
emphasised that “dishonesty is inconsistent with the hallmarks of conscientiousness 
and integrity that are essential prerequisites to the proper execution of the 
responsibilities of a National Director” (Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 
and Others, para 49).  
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court in Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 
and Others, para 49, held that the president as the appointing authority of the NDPPA 
must ensure that – 
(a) the prosecuting authority performs its functions honestly and 
without fear, favour or prejudice; 
(b) decisions to institute criminal prosecution are taken honestly, fairly 
and without fear, favour or prejudice; 
(c) prosecution policy is determined honestly and is appropriate to the 
needs of our country; 
(d) the criminal justice system insofar as it concerns prosecutions is 
fairly administered; 
(e) any improper interference, hindrance or obstruction of the 
prosecuting authority by any organ of state is not tolerated; and 
(f) all Directors of Public Prosecutions carry out their functions 
honestly and fairly. 
The NPA also has an international footprint through several activities, including being 
part of the delegation that represents South Africa at the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) and the OECD. In my view NPA participation in the OECD is crucial and 
relevant given the fact that the OECD is one of the few regional organisations that 
effectively combat corruption and from which best practices can be learnt by the NPA. 
It is the OECD that led the crusade against transnational corruption when it adopted 
the Convention on the Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (Sibanda, 2005). Equally important is the involvement of the 
NPA in the operations of the FATF, which is an inter-governmental body responsible 
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for setting international standards and promoting regulatory and enforcement 
measures to combat white-collar crimes threatening the stability and the integrity of 
the international financial system (Annual Report: National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 2017/18:19). 
In the fight against corruption the NPA, for example, in 2017/2018 was successful in 
convicting 213 government officials of corruption and 37 other persons of corruption 
or related activities (see Annual Report National Director of Public Prosecutions, 
2017/18:19).  
However, the institutional foundation and the credibility of the NPA have been 
questioned in several cases. One such case is Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and 
Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the 
Advancement of the South African Constitution v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others [2018] 1 All SA 471 (GP). The case involved the validity of the 
appointment of Advocate Shaun Abrahams as the NDPP. Ruling that Adv. Abrahams 
must vacate his office, Judge President Mlambo also stated that former President Jacob 
Zuma was conflicted in appointing the NDPP.  
The centrality of former President Jacob Zuma in the NDPP as an establishment 
designed to fight corruption has been a thorny issue in South Africa. A view expressed 
has been that the former president has abused his powers to appoint or remove an 
NDPP in breach his duties under section 96(2)(b) of the Constitution. Section 96(2) 
prohibits the president from putting himself in a situation that will render him conflicted, 
particularly with regard to his official responsibilities and his private interests. The view 
was that the former president was attempting to ensure that those appointed as NDPP 
are sympathetic to his corruption case woes.  
The issue of the conflicted former President Zuma in the matter was confirmed by the 
court, which further stated that in a rights-based order it is fundamental that a conflicted 
person cannot act; to act despite a conflict is self-evidently to pervert the rights being 
exercised as well as the rights of those affected. Section 96(2)(b) makes that clearly 
beyond the pale. If conflicted, the individual simply cannot act, is “unable” to act, whether 
section 90 was there or not (Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the Advancement of the South 
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African Constitution v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] 1 
All SA 471 (GP), para 112). “President Zuma would be clearly conflicted in having to 
appoint a NDPP, given the background to which we have referred, particularly the 
ever-present spectre of the many criminal charges against him that have not gone 
away,” the court held (Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] 1 All SA 
471 (GP). para 113).  
Contentious in the Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others was the 14 May 
2015 settlement agreement concluded between President Jacob Zuma, the Minister of 
Justice Michael Masutha and the former NDPP Mxolisi Nxasana for the latter to vacate 
office in terms of section 12(8)(a)(ii) of the NPA Act. It was the contention of Corruption 
Watch and Freedom Under Law that the settlement agreement and the decision to 
authorise such agreement were corruptly sanctioned, unlawful and unconstitutional, and 
invalid. This contention was supported by Judge President Mlambo, who stated that Mr 
Nxasana “was persuaded to vacate the office by the unlawful payment of an amount 
of money substantially greater than that permitted by law …” Important to note is that 
the settlement agreement for the payment of R17.3 m to Mr Nxasana so that he would 
abandon his court action against the president and the minister challenging his 
suspension contravened National Prosecuting Act No. 32 of 1998 and the Public Finance 
Management Act No.1 of 1999. 
The above cases portray the NPA as an institution that is crippled by corrupt influences 
and thus its ability to help fight corruption and corrupt activities is severely compromised. 
Furthermore, all the issues around the NPA, particularly with respect to prosecuting high-
profile cases, suggest that it is operationally inefficient and ineffective in combatting 
corruption according to its statutory and constitutional mandates respectively. A case in 
point is the 2007 prosecution debacle at the centre of which was former president Zuma. 
As succinctly put in Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, para 20: 
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at the end of that year, on 18 December 2007, Mr Zuma was elected as 
President of the African National Congress. Thereafter, the Acting NDPP, 
Advocate Mpshe, indicted Mr Zuma on 18 counts of racketeering, 
corruption, money laundering, tax evasion and fraud. On 12 September 
2008 Nicholson J set aside that decision on the basis that it was tainted 
by political interference. On 4 November 2008 the enquiry into Advocate 
Pikoli’s fitness to hold office, chaired by Dr Frene Ginwala, recommended 
that Adv. Pikoli’s suspension be uplifted. However, on 8 December 2008, 
Advocate Pikoli was removed from office by President Motlanthe. 
It is interesting to note that in the confirmation appeal case in Corruption Watch NPC 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] ZACC 23, 
at para 6, the Constitutional Court noted with approval the observation of the High 
Court that the history of the NPA, including the case in question, “has been one of 
paralysing instability”. Political wrangling, infighting and challenges influence 
operations at the NPA. Also, it put in question the credibility of those appointed to head 
the NPA and their ability to fight corruption without fear and favour. The High Court in 
Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others; Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution v President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others found the conduct and independence of 
Adv. Abrahams problematic in that “… as in the President’s and the NPA’s appeal to 
the SCA – Adv. Abrahams has associated himself, inconsistent with the imperative of 
prosecutorial independence, on all material issues with the position of the President.” 
The court gave as an example of this association that runs counter to the 
independence of the NPA and the NDPP his arguments on the vacancy issue, the 
conflict issue, and remedies. This court said of the NPA’s independence “[t]here is … 
a constitutional guarantee of independence, and any legislation or executive action 
inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional control by the courts.”  
In fact, Section 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act prohibits any improper interference with or 
hindering or obstruction of the NPA including any of its members “in the exercise, 
carrying out or performance of its, his or her powers, duties and functions.” The 
Constitutional Court in Corruption Watch NPC and Others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others [2018] ZACC 23, para 21, stated that the list of what may 
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constitute improper interference is not exhaustive and may take several forms 
including intimidation, promises or inducements, and corruptly bearing influence on 
the decision-making powers or the functioning of the NPA. It is important that the NPA 
executes its mandate independently, even in terms of the Constitution (Selabe, 
2015:31). 
Talking about the independence of the NPA, the Constitutional Court in Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), 
at para 146, stated that “[t]here is … a constitutional guarantee of independence, and 
any legislation or executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to 
constitutional control by the courts”. It is submitted that this independence is not only 
important to the organisational effectiveness of the NPA, it is crucial to ensuring that 
initiatives and efforts to combat corruption and related activities advance the goals of 
a well-functioning criminal justice system (see also Corruption Watch NPC and Others 
v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] ZACC 23, para 20). The 
Constitutional Court put it in clear and simple terms in Corruption Watch NPC and 
Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] ZACC 23, at 
para 19: 
The reason why this guarantee of independence exists is not far to 
seek. The NPA plays a pivotal role in the administration of criminal 
justice. With a malleable, corrupt or dysfunctional prosecuting 
authority, many criminals – especially those holding positions of 
influence – will rarely, if ever, answer for their criminal deeds. Equally, 
functionaries within that prosecuting authority may – as CASAC 
submitted – “be pressured … into pursuing prosecutions to advance a 
political agenda”. All this is antithetical to the rule of law, a founding 
value of the Republic. Also, malleability, corruption and 
dysfunctionality are at odds with the constitutional injunction of 
prosecuting without fear, favour or prejudice. They are thus at variance 
with the constitutional requirement of the independence of the NPA. 
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The NPA participates in the ACTT, which was set up to focus on fast-tracking the 
investigation and prosecution of serious corruption cases, and to increase success in 
fighting and preventing corruption in South Africa. The following were noteworthy 
finalisations through the work of the ACTT by the SCCU: in State v Samuel Mzukisi 
Banzana, the accused was charged with four counts of corruption in contravention of 
Section 12 of PCCA Act in that he requested and was paid “gratifications in order for 
contractors to be awarded construction contracts to the value of R41 174 000”. The 
accused was subsequently convicted as charged and received a sentence of 12 years’ 
imprisonment. Furthermore, a confiscation order to the amount of R351 000 was 
obtained (Annual Report National Director of Public Prosecutions 2017/18, at 55). In 
State v Johannes Hermanus Engelbrecht the accused was charged with and convicted 
of 16 counts of fraud, and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment (Annual Report 
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2017/18, at 52). 
Comparatively, the Constitution of Uganda contains one of the clearest and most 
substantive provisions on the country’s national prosecution authority, addressing the 
qualification and independence of the authority in no uncertain terms. Whereas the 
Constitution of South Africa addresses prosecutorial authority in what I consider to be 
very cryptic terms. It is submitted further amendments to the NPA Act can benefit from 
modelling some of the provisions on the provisions of the Ugandan Constitution. 
Sections 258, 259, 260, 261, 262 and 263 of the Ugandan Constitution provide, for 
example, as follows: 
258 Establishment and functions of National Prosecuting Authority 
 There is a National Prosecuting Authority which is responsible for 
instituting and undertaking criminal prosecutions on behalf of the State 
and discharging any functions that are necessary or incidental to such 
prosecutions. 
259 Prosecutor-General and other officers 
(1) There is a Prosecutor-General who is the head of the National 
Prosecuting Authority. 
(2) The office of the Prosecutor-General is a public office but does not 
form part of the Civil Service. 
(3) The Prosecutor-General is appointed by the President on the advice 
of the Judicial Service Commission following the procedure for the 
appointment of a judge. 
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(4) The Prosecutor-General must be a person qualified for appointment 
as a judge of the Supreme Court. 
(5) The term of office of the Prosecutor-General is a period of six years 
and is renewable for one further such term. 
(6) Before taking office, the Prosecutor-General must take, before the 
President or a person authorised by the President, the oath of office 
in the form set out in the Third Schedule. 
(7) The provisions relating to the removal of a judge from office apply to 
the removal of the Prosecutor-General from office. 
(8) The conditions of service of the Prosecutor-General, including his or 
her remuneration, must be provided for in an Act of Parliament, but 
the remuneration must not be reduced during the Prosecutor-
General’s tenure of office. 
(9) The remuneration of the Prosecutor-General is a charge on the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
(10) An Act of Parliament must provide for the appointment of a board 
to employ persons to assist the Prosecutor-General in the exercise 
of his or her functions, and must also provide— 
(a) for the qualifications of those persons;  
(b) for the conditions of service, conduct and discipline of those 
persons; 
(c) that in exercising their functions, those persons must be 
independent and impartial and subject only to the law and to the 
direction and control of the Prosecutor-General; 
(d) for the structure and organisation of the National Prosecuting 
Authority; and 
(e) generally, for the efficient performance and well-being of the 
National Prosecuting Authority. 
(11) The Prosecutor-General may direct the Commissioner-General of 
Police to investigate and report to him or her on anything which, in 
the Prosecutor-General’s opinion, relates to an offence or alleged 
or suspected offence, and the Commissioner-General of Police 
must comply with that direction 
 
260 Independence of Prosecutor-General 
(1)  Subject to this Constitution, the Prosecutor-General— 
(a) is independent and is not subject to the direction or control of 
anyone; and 
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(b) must exercise his or her functions impartially and without fear, 
favour, prejudice or bias. 
(2) The Prosecutor-General must formulate and publicly disclose the 
general principles by which he or she decides whether and how to 
institute and conduct criminal proceedings. 
 
261 Conduct of officers of National Prosecuting Authority 
(1) The Prosecutor-General and officers of the National Prosecuting 
Authority must act in accordance with this Constitution and the law. 
(2) No officer of the National Prosecuting Authority may, in the exercise 
of his or her functions— 
(a) act in a partisan manner; 
(b) further the interests of any political party or cause; 
(c) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or 
(d) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person. 
(3) Officers of the National Prosecuting Authority must not be active 
members or office bearers of any political party or organisation. 
(4) An Act of Parliament may make further provision to ensure the political 
neutrality of officers of the National Prosecuting Authority. 
 
 5.2.2 SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE 
5.2.2.1 Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) 
A study by Meyer, Steyn and Gopal (2013) perceptively posits that the SAPS lacks 
integrity and is corrupt from within. This was as a result of the many media reports on 
the engagement of members of the SAPS in corruption and corrupt activities, and the 
responses of the participants in their study, which used a questionnaire to extract data. 
But this should not be seen as stating that there are no measures to combat corruption 
within the ranks of the SAPS. The first ACU of the SAPS was formed in 1996. It 
provided the public with access to date “on organisational action against corrupt 
members” (Faul, 2008:22). The ACU was closed in 2002 but not before it was 
instrumental in the charge and conviction of the head of KwaZulu-Natal’s organised 
crime unit for corruption (Faul, 2008). At its peak in 2002, 1 048 SAPS members were 
arrested and charged with corruption. The closure of ACU was part of restricting anti-
corruption efforts within the SAPS. Faul (2008:22) argues that “despite difficulties in 
comparison it seems clear that the organised crime unit, with its broad and busy 
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mandate, has been unable to replicate the ACU’s success in the sphere of SAPS 
corruption”. The ACU, led by the National Police Commissioner, provided members of 
the public with data regarding SAPS members arrested, under trial and/or convicted 
for corruption.  
5.2.2.2 Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) 
The DPCI, commonly referred to as the Hawks, is part of the SAPS whose mandate 
is to focus on serious organised crime, serious corruption and serious commercial 
crime. It was established in 2009 with the mandate to fight “priority crimes”, including 
corruption and organised crime (Kinnes & Newham, 2012). The DPCI is a successor 
to the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), then commonly known as the 
Scorpions that was established in 2001, and which fell under the ambit of the NPA. 
The Scorpions were touted as one of the most visible and specialised units established 
after 1994 notwithstanding the many complaints against it. Goga (2014:67-68) support 
his view on the scorpions by referring to it high conviction rate that included cases 
such as terror activities of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), and 
investigation of corruption around the arms deal that led to the arrest and conviction 
of Shabir Shaik. Interestingly, the Scorpions were disbanded following a decision by 
the ruling ANC. During its 2007 Polokwane National Conference the scandals 
besieged former president of the country Jacob Zuma was elected president of the 
party. Some may argue that the decision to disband the Scorpions was designed to 
protect Zuma from investigation and prosecution on allegations of corruption.  
The Hawks manages, prevents, investigates and combats serious offences, serious 
organised crime, serious commercial crime and serious corruption (Madonsela, 
2010:9; Corruption Watch, 2017). The location of the Hawks within the SAPS has been 
a contentious issue. Even the Constitutional Court in Glenister II, para 64, questioned 
the Hawks’ continued existence within the SAPS, particularly with respect to its 
independence. The court held, at para 64, that it was: 
[p]ermissible to locate anti-corruption agencies within existing 
structures such as the NPA and the SAPS. However, the 
independence of the law enforcement bodies that are institutionally 
placed within existing structures in the form of specialised departments 
or units requires special attention. The centralised and the hierarchical 
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nature of their structures and the fact that they report at the final level 
to a Cabinet minister, as in the case of the police and the NPA, present 
a risk of interference. The risk of undue interference is even higher 
when members of the unit lack autonomous decision-making powers 
and where their superiors have discretion to interfere in a particular 
case. What is required are legal mechanisms that will limit the 
possibility of abuse of the chain of command and hierarchical structure 
or interference in the operational decisions involving commencement, 
continuation and termination of criminal investigations and 
prosecutions. 
Again, in Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2014] ZACC 
32 (Glenister III), at para 32, the Constitutional Court stated that “[t]he overriding 
consideration is whether the DPCI legislation has inbuilt autonomy-protecting features 
to enable its members to carry out their duties without any inhibitions or fear of 
reprisals.” With regard to the ills of corruption the court said, at para 220: 
Corruption threatens the very existence of our constitutional democracy. 
Effective laws and institutions to combat corruption are therefore 
absolutely essential. It is the task of the courts – and this Court in 
particular – to ensure that legal mechanisms against corruption are as 
trustworthy and tight as possible, within the demands and parameters 
of the Constitution. 
It was following this judgment that the SAPS Amendment Bill (Bill 7 of 20120) was 
tabled in parliament in March 2012 to retain the DPCI as a directorate of the SAPS, 
whilst at the same time addressing concerns raised by the Constitutional Court in 
Glenister II. In terms of the proposed provisions of the Bill, the Minister of Police was 
empowered to appoint the head of the DPCI instead of the National Police 
Commissioner. The powers and independence of the DPCI head were also revised. 
For instance, the head of the DPCI could second staff from other departments without 
interference by the National Commissioner. Also, the head of the DPCI and not the 
National Commissioner was empowered to accept cases referred by provincial 
commissioners or the National Commissioner for investigation in terms of section 17D. 
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Perhaps an important development was that the Bill empowered the head of the DPCI 
“to overrule a decision by the National Commissioner should a dispute arise about 
which cases fall within the remit of the DPCI” (Kinnes & Newham, 2012:30). It must be 
argued, however, that the fact that under the Bill the budget of the DPCI was to be 
determined by the National Commissioner went against efforts to ensure the 
independence of the DPCI. The National Commissioner could easily render the DPCI 
less effective by restricting its funds.  
 5.2.3 SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT (SIU) 
The Special Investigating Unit (SIU)  in terms of the Special Investigating Units and 
Special Tribunals Act No 74 of 1996 (SIU Act) to investigating, amongst others, public 
administration corruption and to help protect the interests of the public regarding public 
moneys and property (Goga, 2014:67). It investigates matters from a civil perspective 
and institutes civil action in the Special Tribunal. The importance of the SIU conducting 
its investigations from the civil law perspective is to ensure that compensatory awards 
are given (Camerer, 1999:5).  
The powers of the SIU are extensive and include the power to investigate, to summon 
and interrogate persons, and the power to search for and seize evidence that may be 
relevant to its investigations. In terms of section 2 of the SIU Act, the SIU undertakes 
these investigations as long as they have been proclaimed in the Government Gazette 
along with its terms of reference, and can be amended by the president at any time 
(Section 2 (4) of the SIU Act). The SIU Act also determines which offences can be 
investigated by the SIU, upon request of the president. These, according to section 
2(2) of the SIU Act, are: 
i. Serious maladministration in connection with the affairs of any State 
institution; 
ii. Improper or unlawful conduct by employees of any State institution; 
iii. Unlawful appropriation or expenditure of public money or property; 
iv. Unlawful, irregular or unapproved acquisitive act, transaction, 
measure or practice having a bearing upon State property; 
v. Intentional or negligent loss of public money or damage to public 
property; 
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vi. Corruption-related offences contained in Chapter 2 of the Prevention 
and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004:32; 
vii. Unlawful or improper conduct by any person which has caused or 
may cause serious harm to the interests of the public or any category 
thereof. 
The SIU operates with the referral system. It must, as soon as practicable after it has 
obtained evidence referred to in sub-section (1) (d) of the SIU Act, inform the relevant 
prosecuting authority thereof, whereupon such evidence must be dealt with in a 
manner that best serves the interests of the public (see Section 4 (2) of the SIU Act).  
It would appear that the SIU is one of the busiest anti-corruption agencies in South 
Africa, with creditable results. In his report before the Portfolio Committee for Justice 
and Constitutional Development in October 2011, the then head of the SIU, Willie 
Hofmeyr, revealed that corruption involving government procurement “was costing 
South Africa as much as R30 bn each year” (Kinnes & Newham, 2012:34) and that 
about 588 procurement contracts to the value of R9.1 bn and 360 conflict-of-interest 
matters to the value of R3.4 bn were being investigated by the SIU. Alarmingly, he 
noted that these investigations concerned public corruption only and did not include 
private-sector corruption. The magnitude of public-sector corruption investigation by 
the SIU was staggering and paints a picture of the public sector flooded with 
corruption.  
A point of concern, however, is that the SIU works on a system of referral as it relies 
on a presidential proclamation to institute investigations.  An impression is that the SIU 
does not appear to have the autonomy to initiate an investigation. Nevertheless, it 
appears that it retains its independence during the investigative process, without 
government or political interference. It has submitted incidents such as the Gupta 
leaks, and overwhelming evidence presented by various anti-corruption movements 
portrays the SIU as having failed to execute its mandate as provided for in the SIU 
Act. This has led to citizens losing faith in this anti-corruption agency. 
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 5.2.4 Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit (SCCU) 
Another crime-investigating unit established in 1999 to deal with corruption and 
organised crime is the Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit (SCCU). The SCCU has 
its team of dedicated prosecutors who have been able to prosecute 700 cases by 2007 
in Pretoria and Johannesburg (Goga, 2014:67). The SCCU obtained a conviction rate 
of 94.1 per cent in relation to complex commercial crime matters over the last year 
(2016) against a target of 93 per cent (Annual Report National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2017/18, at 19). Section 28 of the NPA Act provides for the 
establishment of an investigating directorate headed by an investigating DPP. This 
section should be read with Chapter 6A (s17A to 17L) of the South African Police 
Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995) (SAPS Act), which provides for the 
establishment of a separate division in the SAPS, namely the DPCI, commonly known 
as the Hawks. These provisions, among others, ensure a multi-disciplinary and 
integrated approach in the prevention, combatting and investigation of priority crimes, 
including corruption offences. In terms of section 17D(3) of the SAPS Act, the National 
Head of the DPCI may, if he or she has reason to suspect that a national priority 
offence has been or is being committed, request the National Director to designate a 
DPP to exercise the powers of s28 of the NPA Act. In terms of section 17F(4) of the 
SAPS Act, the National Director must ensure that a dedicated component of 
prosecutors is available to assist and cooperate with members of the DPCI in 
conducting its investigations. Currently, no such component is in place. 
The Asset Forfeiture Unit continues to play a critical role against the scourge of 
corruption and has delivered significant returns in the past few years, showing that 
crime does not pay. In an endeavour to curb the increase of corruption, the AFU froze 
assets to the value of R4.3 bn. An amount of R3.8 bn relating to corruption where the 
amount involved is more than R5 m was frozen. Recoveries in terms of POCA to the 
value of R308.3 m were also recorded during the last financial year. In line with its 
operational plan, the AFU has adopted a strategy that not only seeks to extend the 
footprint of asset forfeiture in the fight against crime but also to deliver maximum 
impact in several identified focus areas.  
Through proper case selection and prioritisation, the AFU has made a concerted effort 
to strike a balance in the delivery of complex high-value cases and addressing other 
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identified priority focus areas. In this regard cases are prioritised according to national 
and regional priorities as determined by AFU with the assistance of its partners and 
stakeholders. The unit has prioritised a total of 113 cases, a combination of complex 
high-value and impact cases. The slow pace of finalising criminal investigations, 
including the delays in finalising forensic reports, remains a challenge in so far as it 
relates to the AFU’s ability to achieve its seizure targets. In order to mitigate the said 
risk, the unit will continue to make extensive use of Chapter 6 (civil forfeiture) in order 
to reduce the turn-around time and to ensure maximum impact within the shortest 
possible time. 
Seventeen cases with asset forfeiture potential to the collective value of R50 bn have 
been identified and are to be dealt with in terms of Chapter 5 and 6 of POCA. Billions 
of rand are expected to be recovered in future in respect of various investigations, 
spanning the country and across the globe presently and extending over the next three 
to five years. Similarly, it is envisaged that “comprehensive and complicated 
investigations will yield prosecutions and ultimately convictions and lengthy periods of 
incarceration for offenders” (Annual Report National Director of Public Prosecutions, 
2017/18:19–20). 
The SCCU maintained high conviction rates during this financial year. The impact on 
serious economic crime is evident as the advocates excelled by finalising 968 verdict 
cases and obtaining 911 convictions, representing a conviction rate of 94.1 per cent. 
Not only was the target of 93 per cent exceeded by 1.1 per cent but, compared to the 
previous years, an improved performance is noted. This achievement should be 
viewed against serious resource constraints that are still experienced in some offices.  
The SCCU participates in the ACTT, which was set up to focus on fast-tracking the 
investigation and prosecution of serious corruption cases, and to increase the success 
of fighting and preventing corruption in South Africa. Members of the SCCU were 
instrumental in crafting the draft strategic plan for the ACTT, and are actively involved 
in the ACTT Secretariat.  
The SCCU represents the NPA in the FATF and the OECD. The SCCU significantly 
contributes to the NPA’s finalisation of money-laundering cases, and the co-ordination 
of enforcement action in the form of the prosecutions instituted and finalised. 
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During 2017/18 a total of 37 persons were convicted for corruption or related offences 
where the amounts involved were more than R5m. By their very nature, these matters 
are complicated and take a long time to finalise in both the investigation and 
prosecution phases. Many more cases were handled but there were a few that fit the 
category of amounts that exceed R5m.  
South Africa has developed quite a wide-ranging legislative framework for combatting 
corruption, ranging from the PCCA Act, through the legislation dealing with financial 
and organised crime, public finance management and procurement legislation, to 
legislation promoting the public’s access to information held by the public and private 
sectors. South Africa is also a signatory to several international conventions and 
treaties and is continually intensifying its efforts to defeat the scourge of corruption. 
In line with the MTSF and NDP, a special focus was placed on the prosecution of 
corruption to improve investor perception and trust to invest in South Africa. The total 
number of government officials convicted of corruption during the current year is 213. 
This is 1.4 per cent more than the set target of 210 officials, even though it is 4.9 per 
cent lower than the number of officials convicted during the previous financial year. 
Against this backdrop, it is evident that a collective approach by all partners in the 
criminal justice value chain has ensured a heightened focus on corruption throughout 
this reporting period. 
During the financial year 2014/15 the NPA broadened its vision in line with the new 
MTSF and included all government departments, as opposed to only JCPS officials 
being recorded from 2012 to 2014. Since September 2016 however, all national and 
provincial departments, inclusive of local authority and government agencies, are 
included.  
5.2     COURTS 
The more telling exposition of the role the courts play in South Africa is that by Hoexter  
(2014:v) who stated that “The judiciary and the Public Protector have been established 
with the purpose of ensuring that all comply with the Constitution”. Section 165(1) of 
the Constitution postulates that the judicial authority of South Africa is vested in the 
court (the Judiciary), which, according to section 165(2), are independent bodies 
“subject only to the Constitution and the law” with an obligation to apply constitutional 
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provisions and the law “impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice” (see also 
Seedat, 2015:10).  
The relevant provisions of section 165(1) reads: 
 
Judicial authority 
165. (1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution 
and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour 
or prejudice. 
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of 
the courts. 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must 
assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, 
dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts. 
(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom 
and organs of state to which it applies. 
(6) The Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary and exercises 
responsibility over the establishment and monitoring of norms and 
standards for the exercise of the judicial functions of all courts. 
[Sub-s (6) added by s. 1 of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment 
Act of 2012.] 
At the helm of the Judiciary is the Chief Justice, currently Chief Justice of the 
Constitutional Court Mogoeng Mogoeng. According to section 165(6) of the 
Constitution the Chief Justice is the accountable officer with regard the Judiciary and 
he is required to establish and monitor “norms and standards for the exercise of judicial 
functions of all the courts” in the country.  
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Figure 3: Schematic Representation of the Judiciary 
South African courts are at the forefront of the fight against corruption, and have not 
hesitated to deal with the core of corrupt activities. Law books are replete with cases 
dealing with corruption issues with serious ramifications for the legal system. An 
interesting case that remains an eyesore, in my view, is the judgment of Nicholson J 
in Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions (2009] 1 All SA 54 (N); (8652/08) 
(2008] ZAKZHC 71; 2009 (1) BCLR 62 (N). In casu Nicholson J set aside the decision 
by the then Acting NDPP, Advocate Mpshe, to indict Mr Zuma on 18 counts of 
racketeering, corruption, money laundering, tax evasion and fraud. The reason for the 
setting aside was that the investigation and the prosecution were politically motivated. 
The Nicholson J decision was subsequently vacated by the SCA in National Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA); 2009 (1) SACR 361 (SCA); 
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2009 (4) BCLR 393 (SCA); (2009] 2 All SA 243 (SCA); (573/08) (2009] ZASCA 1. 
Swifambo Rail Leasing v PRASA (1030/2017) [2018] ZASCA 167 (30 November 2018) 
involved the award of a tender by irregular and corrupt means, and with the 
involvement of “fronting” as prohibited by the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. PRASA, under the leadership of Lucky Montana as the 
Group Chief Executive Officer, “approved the award of a tender for the supply of 
various train locomotives to a recently incorporated company, Swifambo Rail Leasing 
(Pty) Ltd (Swifambo), the appellant”. However, the award was subsequently rendered 
null and void because it had been procured or secured illegally in the form of the 
“dishonest and corrupt conduct of officials of PRASA”. Swifambo pleaded innocent to 
the conduct of the officials of PRASA in order to have its contractual obligations with 
PRASA still enforceable (Swifambo Rail Leasing v PRASA (1030/2017) [2018] ZASCA 
167 (30 November 2018), para 1). In arguing its case to disallow condonation for 
review, Swifambo cited the Constitutional Court in Cape Town City v Aurecon SA (Pty) 
Ltd [2017] ZACC 5; 2017 (4) SA 223 (CC), In that case the City of Cape Town had 
awarded a tender that was later found to have been irregularly awarded. The City 
failed to have the contract nullified. The court said “the delay was unreasonable in the 
circumstances, refused condonation, and did not consider whether the award had 
been irregular” (Swifambo Rail Leasing v PRASA, para 38).  
However, the Constitutional Court came to a different conclusion in Swifambo Rail 
Leasing v PRASA when it allowed condonation after a delay (Swifambo Rail Leasing 
v PRASA, para 3). According to the court, Swifambo Rail Leasing v PRASA, para 40: 
the overriding consideration in condoning delay is the interests of 
justice … in determining whether condonation should be granted, the 
relevant factors that require consideration are the nature of the relief 
sought; the extent and cause of the delay; its effect on the 
administration of justice; the reasonableness of the explanation for 
the delay; the importance of the issues raised and the prospects of 
success on review. The Constitutional Court endorsed this statement.  
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It must be appreciated that the Court in this case made the public interest of paramount 
importance in combatting corruption, which in my view should be the approach 
followed by other courts. In particular, the court in Swifambo Rail Leasing v PRASA 
stated: 
[41] There is undoubtedly a public interest in entertaining the 
application for review. At least R2 bn of taxpayers’ money has been 
spent in pursuit of a fraudulent and corrupt tender. The explanation for 
the delay, if such there is, is clear and plausible. It is in the interests of 
PRASA and the general public that the award of the contract to PRASA 
be reviewed. And in Aurecon CC the court said that if the irregularities 
raised had ‘unearthed manifestations of corruption, collusion or fraud 
in the tender, this court might look less askance in condoning the delay. 
The interests of clean governance would require judicial intervention’. 
[42] In this matter, both PRASA and Swifambo were not innocent. The 
award of the tender to Swifambo was corrupt. And there is no reason 
to interfere with the exercise of the high court’s discretion to grant 
condonation. It was in the interests of justice and in the public interest. 
Case reports are replete with judgements that frown upon corruption and effectively 
punish offenders. The sentencing judgment in S v Selebi (judgment on sentence) 
(25/2009) [2010] ZAGPJHC 58 (3 August 2010) was a most scathing judgment, which, 
it is submitted, demonstrated how strongly corruption is disapproved of, particularly by 
persons in positions of power and influence who should always act in good faith in the 
public interest. Although lengthy, the relevant part of the judgment is quoted below to 
highlight the strong position the court took against corruption:  
[10] Mr Selebi, from 2000 until 2008 you occupied the position of 
National Commissioner of the SAPS. You led the service that is 
constitutionally enjoined to secure and preserve law and order in our 
country, to fight crime in all its forms and to protect all who find 
themselves within the borders of our country. This is indeed a high 
and illustrious office. Those under your command looked up to you 
with respect. They looked to you for guidance and direction.  
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The citizens of this country likewise looked up to you in your exalted 
office. They sought leadership in you in the fight against the scourge 
of crime which the people of South Africa were experiencing.  
11. It is in this context and the esteem in which the office that you 
occupied is held that reference must be made to your performance in 
the witness box during the trial. No point would be served in repeating 
that which has already been said in the judgment that was delivered 
at the conclusion of the trial in regard to your flagrant mendacity. Mr 
Selebi, you were an embarrassment in the witness box. Firstly, you 
were an embarrassment to the office you occupied. It is inconceivable 
that the person who occupied the office of National Commissioner of 
Police could have been such a stranger to the truth. Secondly, you 
must have been an embarrassment to those who appointed you. 
There can be no doubt that had they known the extent that you were 
prepared to depart from the truth when you thought it was necessary 
to do so, they would not have been appointed you to that office. 
Thirdly, you must have been an embarrassment to the members of 
the South African Police Service who you led. It is not possible to 
measure the level of embarrassment of police men and women who 
are in the front line of the fight against crime, who daily put their lives 
on the line for their fellow citizens and whose credibility and 
truthfulness is relied upon by their fellow countrymen, when 
confronted by the reality that their former National Commissioner 
jettisons the truth when he thinks it will advance his case. These 
police men and women work in harsh conditions. They do so for the 
good of their fellow citizens. They deserve more than to be 
embarrassed in the manner already described. Fourthly, you must 
have been an embarrassment to all right-thinking citizens of this 
country. They are entitled to expect so much more from the National 
Commissioner of Police. For a citizen of this country it is 
incomprehensible that the National Commissioner of Police would be 
found to be an unreliable witness. Whilst there may be debate and 
difference of opinion as to competence, effectiveness, suitability and 
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ability, it cannot be doubted that all the people of South Africa would 
join in rejecting a National Commissioner of Police who is found to be 
an untruthful witness. Fifthly and finally, Mr Selebi, you were an 
embarrassment to this court. It is beyond understanding that, a 
person who occupied the high offices that you did, including that of 
National Commissioner of Police in which you must have come into 
contact with the courts, could have believed that any court would 
have accepted your mendacious and in some respects manufactured 
evidence. The fact that you must have thought that this evidence 
would have been believed by this court is an embarrassment to this 
court in itself. 
Similarly, the court in S v Yengeni [2005] ZAGPHC 117; 2006 (1) SACR 405 (T) at 
427 lambasted the accused, describing corruption and other crimes of dishonesty by 
public office-bearers and officials in the public service as “of the most serious threats 
to our country’s wellbeing, is to state the obvious … a pandemic that needs to be 
recognised as such and requires concerted and drastic efforts to combat it.” It is 
submitted that the sentiments of the court in S v Yengeni still ring true today in South 
Africa. The corruption pandemic seems to be on the rise rather than abating. 
5.3 INDEPENDENT POLICE INVESTIGATIVE DIRECTORATE (IPID) 
Oversight and accountability are crucial in the fight against corruption. In South Africa, 
the IPID was established by the Constitution and the IPID Act independent of the 
police; its primary function is to ensure that the police are accountable and responsive. 
The activities to discharge this function include investigating any alleged unlawful 
conduct by any police member. The IPID is the successor of the Independent 
Complaints Directorate (ICD), which had the responsibility of enforcing accountability 
to align the SAPS with democratic principles and respect of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights in discharging its duties and exercising its powers. Like its predecessor the ICD, 
the IPID has an oversight role over the police (Berg, 2013) and is also responsible for 
the accountability of members of the policing agencies. Unlike the IPID which is 
governed in terms of the IPID Act, the ICD was governed pursuant to section 10 of the 
SAPS Act. Ironically, the ICD was required to be independent from the SAPS. This 
flew in the face of the UNOCD Handbook on Police, Accountability, Oversight and 
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Integrity, that requires oversight institutions to “have full operational and hierarchical 
independence from the police and be free from executive or political influence”. 
Another important difference between the ICD and IPID is that the former was 
established as an independent civilian oversight body (ICOB), following in the 
footsteps of countries like Lesotho and Kenya. Section 222 of the Interim Constitution 
(Act 200 of 1993) made provision for an ICD as the country’s first ICOB. The relevant 
provision states: 
There shall be established and regulated by an Act of Parliament an 
independent mechanism under civilian control, with the object of 
ensuring that complaints in respect of offences and misconduct 
allegedly committed by members of the [South African Police] Service 
are investigated in an effective and efficient manner. 
One of the corruption cases that the ICD investigated was that of former national 
commissioner Jackie Selebi. Mr Selebi was ultimately found guilty of corruption by the 
court in State v Selebi and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. He was released on 
medical parole on July 2012 (Nanabhay, 2014:96). Below is the restatement verbatim 
from the writing of Nanabhay (2014), as it succinctly narrates the corruption case of 
State v Selebi: 
Count 1: Corruption  
The charge sheet against Selebi narrates the history of the relationship 
between Selebi and Glen Agliotti (Basson, 2010:199–200). This 
relationship began in 1990 when Agliotti desired to do business with the 
ANC and stumbled upon Selebi, the latter had then been tasked with 
the repatriation of former ANC members in exile (Basson, 2010). 
According to the court papers, in 2000/2001 Agliotti suggested the idea 
of a project with children suffering from mental ill health to Selebi and 
subsequently SAPS became a partner in the project. Soon thereafter, in 
2002, Agliotti was appointed as a police informer, after which the liaison 
between Selebi and Agliotti began to spiral into a generally corrupt 
relationship (Basson, 2010:199–200). According to the court papers 
Selebi received cash and clothing for himself and his sons from Agliotti 
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(Joffe, 2010). This gratification was unlawful, since the act of receiving 
such gratification is denounced in Section 4(1)(a)(i) to (iv) of the 
Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act (Joffe, 2010). It is 
further stated in the charge sheet that Agliotti’s ‘friendly’ relationship 
became known to Brett Kebble, John Stratton and Paul Stemmet, who, 
together with Agliotti, abused and exploited the relationship by bribing 
Selebi via discreet methods (Basson, 2010:199–200). Basson 
(2010:200) notes from the following excerpt from the charge sheet: ‘It 
was agreed between the parties that the bribes would be paid to the 
accused’ (Nanabhay, 2014:101).  
Soon after, Brett Kebble transferred $1 m ‘for the purpose of conducting 
investigations and campaigns and to buy the favour and support of the 
accused (Selebi) to promote their business’ (Basson, 2010:200). 
According to the charge sheet, there were other instances where 
monies were allegedly transferred to Selebi from Agliotti; for example, 
in August 2004, a crucial time in Selebi’s career when he was preparing 
and campaigning to be elected president of Interpol (Basson 2010:200). 
At this time, he requested money from Agliotti to cover the costs of a 
dinner in Paris to the sum of R30 000. Further, in November 2004, 
Selebi asked Agliotti for R1 m and Agliotti transferred R310 000 
(Basson, 2010:201). Selebi also received money from Agliotti for an 
overseas holiday with his family (Joffe, 2010: para 248). Agliotti testified 
in court to the effect that he made payments to Selebi because of an 
ulterior motive, that is, he needed Selebi to be part of his business 
dealings which made it necessary for him to keep Selebi close to him 
(Joffe, 2010: para 257)” (Nanabhay, 2014:101). 
Count 2: Obstructing the ends of justice  
This count is elaborated on extensively in Basson (2010), in which the 
author succinctly lists numerous instances of illegal and unethical 
conduct by Selebi, which the court viewed as amounting to the 
obstruction of justice. They were: 
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• First, Selebi imparted official information contained in the United 
Kingdom intelligence reports to Agliotti, which contained information 
that the latter was allegedly involved in drug smuggling (Nanabhay, 
2014:103). 
• Second, Selebi sheltered Agliotti from a police investigation by 
discussing with him particulars contained in a National Intelligence 
Estimate report in 2005; 
• Third, in 2002, Selebi omitted to divulge Agliotti’s involvement in a 
Mandrax drug bust; 
• Fourth, Selebi agreed with Agliotti to use his (Selebi’s) office to 
manipulate the prosecution of Billy Rautenbach; 
• Fifth, Selebi shared privileged information regarding tenders for 
work in Sudan that the police were intending to advertise; and 
• Selebi granted Agliotti preferential treatment regarding police 
services after a report of a housebreaking at Agliotti’s residential 
complex (Nanabhay, 2014:104). 
The IPID has been critical in ensuring that the SAPS, for example, act with credibility 
and pursue criminal activities such as corruption without fear or favour. In fact, the 
SAPS has an obligation to cooperate with the IPID. Section 29(2)(a) of the IPID Act, 
for instance, requires the SAPS or municipal police services to arrange for an 
identification parade within 48 hours of the request of IPID. However, it has not been 
plain sailing for IPID in discharging its constitutional mandate. It has on several 
occasion had to fight of political interference and threats to its institutional set-up. In 
particular its independence has been under threat and the Constitutional Court has 
had to intervene to safeguard its independence. A case in point is McBride v Minister 
of Police and Another [2016] 1 All SA 811 (GP); 2016 (4) BCLR 539 (GP) in which an 
application was made by Robert McBride to have his suspension as the Executive 
Director of IPID and disciplinary action against him by the Minister of Police Nathi 
Nhleko set aside as constitutionally invalid. In 2015 in the High Court certain legislative 
provisions of the IPID Act were declared unconstitutional. Likewise, the Constitutional 
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Court declared certain sections of the IPID Act, Public Service Act and the IPID 
Regulations to be invalid “to the extent that they authorise the Minister of Police to 
suspend, take any disciplinary steps pursuant to suspension, or remove from office 
the Executive Director of the Independent Police Investigative Directorate”. The 
independence of the IPID was stressed by both courts making reference to section 
206(6) of the Constitution, which requires the IPID to be independent. According to the 
Constitutional Court the powers given to the minister to suspend or remove the head 
of IPID were too over-reaching and encroached on the independence of the IPID.             
With regard to section 6 of the IPID Act, the court stated: 
[it] gives the Minister enormous political powers and control over the 
Executive Director of IPID. It gives the Minister the power to remove 
the Executive Director of IPID from his office without parliamentary 
oversight. This is antithetical to the entrenched independence of IPID 
envisaged by the Constitution as it is tantamount to impermissible 
political management of IPID by the Minister. To my mind, this state of 
affairs creates room for the Minister to invoke partisan political 
influence to appoint someone who is likely to pander to his whims or 
who is sympathetic to the Minister’s political orientation. This might 
lead to IPID becoming politicised and being manipulated. Is this 
compatible with IPID’s independence as demanded by the Constitution 
and the IPID Act? Certainly not. 
The Constitutional Court in McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2016] 1 All SA 
811 (GP); 2016 (4) BCLR 539 (GP) issued an instruction to parliament to “cure the 
defects in the legislation” within 24 months – by 5 September 2018. Some delays were 
experienced with regard to meeting this deadline. Finally, the National Assembly 
passed a bill envisaged to comply with the instruction of the Constitutional Court. The 
Bill, once passed, will give more oversight powers to IPID and secure its 
independence, including any fear of arbitrary removal from office. To this end, the Bill 
inserted section 6A into the IPID Act, which reads:  
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Removal from office of Executive Director  
6A. (1) The Executive Director may only be removed from office on the 
ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence – 
(a) on a finding to that effect by a Committee of the National 
Assembly; and 
(b) the adoption by the National Assembly of a resolution calling for 
that person’s removal from office. 
(2) The National Assembly may adopt a resolution contemplated in 
subsection (1)(b) with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its 
members. 
(3) The Minister – 
a) may suspend the Executive Director from office at any time after the 
start of the proceedings of a Committee of the National Assembly for 
the removal of that person; and 
(b) must remove the Executive Director from office upon adoption by 
the National Assembly of a resolution calling for the Executive 
Director’s removal. 
The structural and operational autonomy of the IPID was proffered by the 
Constitutional Court in McBride v Minister of Police and Another [2016] 1 All SA 811 
(GP); 2016 (4) BCLR 539 (GP), and also in Glenister II. The latter case dealt with the 
independence of the DPCI. The amendment to IPID Act by the insertion of section 6A 
promotes the structural and operational autonomy of IPID. 
It is perhaps appropriate in the context of this study to conclude with the remarks that 
the fight between the IPID on the one hand, and the SAPS and government executives 
on the hand has reached all-time lows. For instance, it has been reported that the 
Head of IPID (Mr Robert McBride) has secured an opportunity to appear before the 
Zondo Commission. Also that McBride will at the Zondo State Capture Commission 
make some startling revelations that will include, corruption, capture of the criminal 
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justice cluster and subversion of justice enabled by a number of people that could 
include former Minister of Police and former Head of the NPA (Saba & Smit, 2019:4). 
It is submitted this and similar allegations pay credibility to concerns about the rocky 
inter-organisational relationship between the multiple anti-corruption agencies in 
South Africa. It would seem that the system is collapsing under the weight of its many 
in-fighting agencies, leaving corruption to fester and thrive unchecked. 
5.4 CHAPTER 9 INSTITUTIONS 
The reference “Chapter 9 Institutions” derives from the fact that the state institutions 
supporting constitutional democracy, discussed hereunder, are established in terms 
of Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. What is interesting is 
that the establishment and the governing principles of this institutions are unique 
somehow unique, with the Constitution expressly protecting their independence and 
zero tolerance to interference to an extend mandating other state organs to help 
protect and promote the autonomy and independence of the Chapter 9 Institutions. It 
is declared in section 181(2) of the Constitution that: 
These institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution 
and the Law, and the must be impartial and must exercise their powers 
and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. 
Section 181(3) of the Constitution continues on to bolster the independence of these 
institutions by requiring that: 
Other organs of the state, through legislative and other measures, must 
assist and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, 
impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions. 
 
5.4.1 The Public Protector 
In Public Protector v Mail and Guardian Ltd & others 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA); [2011] 
ZASCA 108, Nugent JA described the Office of the Public Protector as an 
“indispensable constitutional guarantee”, which “provides what will often be a last 
defence against bureaucratic oppression, and against corruption and malfeasance in 
public office that are capable of insidiously destroying the nation”. The role the Office 
of the Public Protector assumes in South Africa can be simply explained by referring 
to how the courts describe its independence and relation to the national government. 
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For instance, in Minister of Home Affairs v The Public Protector (308/2017) [2018] 
ZASCA 15 (15 March 2018) the court said: 
[34] The Office of the Public Protector is not a department of state 
or administration and neither can it be said to be part of the 
national, provincial or local spheres of government: it is an 
independent body that is answerable only to the National 
Assembly.16 It is therefore not an organ of state as contemplated 
by subsection (a) of the definition. It is, however, an institution that 
exercises both constitutional powers and public powers in terms of 
legislation. It is, consequently, an organ of state as contemplated 
by subsection (b) of the definition. 
A similar position was maintained earlier by the Constitutional Court in Independent 
Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC); [2001] ZACC 
23 para 27. The Public Protector is one of the so-called Chapter 9 institutions 
established pursuant to section 181(1) of the Constitution. It is of significance that 
Chapter 9 institutions derive their mandate from the Constitution. Section 181(2) of the 
Constitution, for instance, declares all the Chapter 9 institutions “independent, and 
subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must 
exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. 
There is further an obligation by organs of the state in terms of section 181(3) to “assist 
and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity and 
effectiveness of these institutions”. Furthermore, in terms of section 181(4) of the 
Constitution, persons or organs of state are prohibited from interfering with the 
functioning of any Chapter 9 institution, and they are accountable only to the National 
Assembly (Constitution section 181(5)).  
The first Office of the Public Protector formed under the interim Constitution of 1993 
to investigate and report on maladministration and other similar undesirable conduct 
within the government and public service. The powers, functions and obligations of the 
Public Protector are dealt with under sections 182 and 183 of the Constitution. 
Specifically, according to section 182(1) the Public Protector has:  
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 (a) to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public 
administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or 
suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or 
prejudice; 
(b) to report on that conduct; and 
(c) to take appropriate remedial actions. Public Protector has the 
power, as regulated by national legislation. 
Additional powers of the Public Protector are covered in the Public Protector Act, which 
essentially gives effect to the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Section 6(4)(a) 
of the Public Protector Act further outline matters that the Public Protector may 
investigate and the procedural boundaries of his or her office. Section 6(4)(a) provides:  
The Public Protector shall be competent – 
(a) to investigate, on his or her own initiative or on receipt of a 
complaint, any alleged - 
(i) maladministration in connection with the affairs of government at 
any level; 
(ii) abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, 
discourteous or other improper conduct or undue delay by a 
person performing a public function;  
(iii) improper or dishonest act, or omission or offences referred to in 
Part 1 to 4, or section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the 
aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention and 
Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, with respect to public 
money;  
(iv) improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt of any improper 
advantage, or promise of such enrichment or advantage, by a 
person as a result of an act or omission in the public 
administration or in connection with the affairs of government at 
any level or of a person performing a public function; or  
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(v) act or omission by a person in the employ of government at any 
level, or a person performing a public function, which results in 
unlawful or improper prejudice to any other person. 
Section 6(5) empowers the Public Protector to investigate similar misconduct within 
institutions in which ‘the State is the majority or controlling shareholder or of any public 
entity as defined in section 1 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 
1999)’; and section 6(7) allows her to investigate attempts to commit the types of 
misconduct specified in section 6(4) and (5). However, the Public Protector has no 
powers to investigate or review court decisions (see section 182(3) of the Constitution).  
Other than the Constitution and the PPA, the Public Protector has some powers 
relevant to his or her operations from legislation such as the Electoral Commission Act 
No. 51 of 1996; the Executive Members’ Ethics Act No. 82 of 1998; the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000; the Promotion of Equality & Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of 2000; and the PCCA Act. It was the on the basis of 
the Executive Members’ Ethics Act that the Public Protector investigated the Nkandla 
saga.  
The powers of the Public Protector are not unfettered nor is he or she compelled to 
investigate certain matter reported to him or her by certain persons or organs. In terms 
of section 6(3) “[t]he Public Protector may refuse to investigate a matter reported to 
him or her, if the person ostensibly prejudiced in the matter is “the state office or in 
the employ or service of the state who has not exhausted all remedies available to 
him or her under the Public Service Act of 1994”.  
Once investigations are completed the findings will, pursuant to Section 8(1) of the 
Public Protector Act, be made public. The investigation by the Public Protector of 
corrupt activities has been questioned, and some hold that involvement of the Public 
Protector in corruption investigations is beyond the primary mandate of the office 
(Pillay, 2004:586). The argument is that corruption investigation is primarily the 
mandate of agencies such as the SIU and the SAPS ACU. One of the many reports 
from the Office of the Public Protector, entitled Secure in Comfort: Report on an 
investigation into allegation of impropriety and unethical conduct relating to the 
installation and implementation of security measures by the Department of Public 
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Works at and in respect of the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla 
in the KwaZulu-Natal province (Nkandla Report), shows the depth of investigation the 
Public Protector applied in dealing with issues. For instance, this highly detailed report 
points to a high level of maladministration, corruption, and corrupt activities that 
implicate the former President Jacob Zuma. According to Pillay (2004:58), “[t]he 
Nkandla case can be regarded as a litmus test of the effectiveness of efforts to ensure 
public accountability and curb public corruption in South Africa.”  
The Public Protector has investigated numerous other cases of maladministration, 
abuse of public office and corruption involving public offices and officials. The Nkandla 
case was one of the many high-profile ones. The Public Protector has investigated 
allegations of maladministration, corruption and potential conflicts of interest against 
a former minister of communications, and abuse of power and irregular appointment 
of a head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation.  
In line with its mandate, the Public Protector made recommendations in terms of 
remedial actions that should be taken to address the findings described above. Having 
found out that the president benefited unduly from the construction at Nkandla, 
particularly with regard to the non-security aspects of the project, the Public Protector 
recommended that the president should work with the National Treasury to determine 
the cost of non-security measures and refund same to public purse. The refund of the 
money as recommended has become a major subject of contention, particularly in 
parliament, between the ruling and opposition parties. On a number of occasions, the 
president has had to appear before parliament to respond to questions on Nkandla, 
which has led to conflict between the ruling party, the ANC (which tends to support 
Zuma publicly), and the leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and 
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). 
The Nkandla Report and processes taken by the former Public Protector Adv. 
Madonsela are not only significant because of how she exposed corrupt practices. It 
is also important to demonstrate the challenges the Public Protector experienced in 
investigating the case, some of which were in the form of undisguised political 
meddling. Others were personal attacks on her (Netwerk24 2014a). According to the 
CSO, they considered the legal action against the secretary and his deputy because 
“Not only did they criticize her, but made a series of personal attacks. For instance, an 
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ANC MP, Thandi Mahambehlala, attacked the Public Protector by saying its report 
was misleading” (Khoza, 2015). It must be said that “political will is undoubtedly a 
critical factor in the fight against corruption and the promotion of good governance” 
(Madonsela, 2010:2).  
But it becomes problematic when instead of supporting work done by agencies such 
as the Office of the Public Protector they maliciously attack incumbents of such offices. 
The commitment from the government and political leaders to address the causes and 
manifestations of corruption is key in reducing or eliminating corruption (Nwokorie & 
Viinamaki, 2017:3. See also Lekubu, 2015). Abdulai (2009:388) contends that “political 
will is the decisive factor in determining the success or failure of anti-corruption reforms 
in any country”. Brinkerhoff (2010:1) defines “political will as a commitment of actors 
to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives, in this regard, with a view of 
reducing corruption and sustaining the costs of those actions over time.” According to 
the NDP 2030 (2015:449), political will goes beyond mere public statements of 
support. It includes committing sufficient resources to anti-corruption initiatives and 
measures and taking strong and swift action against corrupt officials. Abdulai 
(2009:389) contends that “regardless of how wealthy a state may be, if its political 
leaders do not devote the required resources to anti-corruption resources, it is unlikely 
to win the fight against corruption”. In his opening speech in parliament in 1999, the 
then President of South Africa, the late Dr Nelson Mandela, alluded to the fact that 
“South Africa’s future depends also on our resolution as a nation in dealing with the 
scourge of corruption. Success will require an acceptance that, in many respects, we 
are a sick society and that It is perfectly correct to assert that all this was spawned by 
apartheid” (Mandela, 1999).  
It is submitted despite the commendable achievements of the Office of the Public 
Protector in combating corruption within the ambits of its powers and processes, there 
is a danger lurking of institutional ineffectiveness as was identified by Blaauw (2016) 
with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman in Namibia. This office was previous 
burdened with many responsibilities including the investigation of corruption. Its 
operations were improved once the corruption investigation function was assigned to 
the ACC and it striped off “constitutional powers to deal with corruption” (Blaauw, 
2016:9). However, Blaauw (2016:9) warned of the existing perception of corruption in 
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Namibia and suggests that “[i]mproving governance and controlling corruption require 
that [the Ombudsman and the ACC] work in tandem to achieve a common purpose 
and ends.” This may sound like a self-contradictory position by Blaauw. But, a cursory 
reading entail that he is arguing that the Ombudsman and the ACC should not work in 
clinical isolation of each other.  In the context of South Africa, the Office of the 
Ombudsman clearly is saddled with many responsibilities. Section 6(4)(a)(iii) of the 
Public Protector Act states that may investigate any conduct in relation to “improper or 
dishonest act, or omission or offences referred to in Part 1 to 4, or section 17, 20 or 
21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention 
and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, with respect to public money”. This 
responsibility and related other covered in section 6(4) should be performed by the 
Public Protector, despite the existence of other institutions capable of investigating 
corruption such as the SIU and the Hawks. A counter-argument may be made that 
section 6(40(a)(iii) is not a mandate for the South Africa Public Protector to deal with 
every complaint of corruption including corruption in the public sector because it has 
as qualifier  that the investigated act must be “with respect to public money”. It is 
submitted that such a counter-argument will have some merit from the perspective 
that the Public Protector office was established as a constitutional body to help protect 
democracy and constitutional rights through amongst other enjoining the executives 
to observe the principles of good governance and accountability. Corruption relating 
to public money has the potential of undermining democracy and governance. 
Furthermore, 182(1)(a) of the Constitution empowers the Public Protector to 
investigate any conduct in state affairs or in the public administration in any sphere of 
government…” An improper conduct or offence in respect to public money is an issue 
of State Affairs. A system were public funds are plundered without repercussions will 
lead to the state of lawlessness and ultimately the death of democracy in favour of 
cleptocracy and undemocratic institutional cultures. 
5.4.2 Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
Like the public Protector and the SAHRC, the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
a Chapter 9  institutions established under section 181(1)(e) of the Constitution, with 
its powers and functions covered under section 188 of the Constitution. In terms of 
section 188(1) of the constitution AGSA is responsible for auditing and reporting on 
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the accounts, financial statements and financial management of all national and 
provincial state departments, as well as administrations and all municipalities. The 
same obligation is mandated under section 4(1) of the PAA, which elaborates the 
powers and functions of AGSA.  
Section 188(2) of the Constitution further provides that AGSA also responsible for 
auditing any other institution or accounting entity provided for in national or provincial 
legislation. This function is replicated in  section 4(2) of PAA and section 122 Municipal 
Finance the MFMA. Furthermore, AGSA has discretionary powers, in accordance to 
Section 4(3) of the PAA, to audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and 
financial management of any public entity listed in the PFMA, and any other institution 
funded by the National Revenue Fund of South Africa, a provincial revenue fund or by 
a municipality. In terms of section 6(1) the president is responsible for the appointment 
of AGSA upon recommendation by the National Assembly.  The AGSA must be 
impartial and must exercise its powers and perform its functions without fear, favour 
or prejudice required by section 181(2) of the Constitution and section 3(b) of PAA. 
The AGSA is, as a consequence of its constitutional powers, the external auditor of all 
national and provincial state departments and municipalities of South Africa.  As 
referred to under section 3(a) of PAA, AGSA is the supreme auditing institution of the 
Republic.  It oversees the management of public finances, and must promote public 
sector transparency and accountability (Answer, 2008:1). Where corruption and 
maladministration is found such will be reported to the responsible accounting 
authority. It is from this perspective that it may be argued that AGSA indirectly plays a 
role in the fight against corruption.  
An important provision of the Constitution, section 81(5), is that AGSA is accountable 
only to the national assembly, must report its activities and the performance of its 
functions to the assembly at least once a year (see also section 3(d) of PAA). It is 
submitted that this accountability line is important and critical in the realm of auditing 
to address allegations of corruption. Being independent from a body that has the 
responsibility to appoint it, the president, AGSA is enable to carry out its function 
impartially, without fear or favour. 
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AGSA plays an active role in supporting existing initiatives and programmes that aim 
to prevent corruption, such as the NACF. Furthermore, in terms of interaction around 
corruption-related issues, there is informal co-operation with a number of key 
agencies including the PSC, the PP, the SAPS and the NDPP. Cases of alleged 
corruption are referred to the appropriate agency based on the nature of the complaint 
or of the finding. The AGSA conducts several different types of audits (Commission, 
2001:12–13; Van Vuuren, 2005:45), as prescribed in Chapter 3 of the PAA. 
The forensic auditing conducted by the AGSA seeks to support the relevant 
investigating authorities and the NPA, as the cases are handed over to these 
institutions, by providing their accounting and auditing skills. It is unclear, however, if 
the AGSA continues to support these institutions during the investigations and 
resulting prosecutions, and if there is a follow-up and feedback mechanism to ensure 
the effectiveness of the system. Regarding the effectiveness of the auditing reports 
provided by the AGSA, however, Van Vuuren (2005:46) points to the fact that they are 
partly superficial. Van Vuuren (2005:46–47) points to two elements in this matter: 
i.  The materials provided to the AGSA for auditing purposes are 
insufficient to conduct a thorough auditing process, which 
undermines the reports produced by the AGSA, the accountability 
processes of the audited institutions, and the principle under which 
these institutions operate and get their funding from the National and 
Municipal Revenue funds; and 
ii. The human and financial resources available to the AGSA. The 
AGSA makes use of private forensic auditors, claiming that 70-80% 
of such auditing is outsourced by the AGSA. Consequently, the role 
of these private auditors and the AGSA is hindered by either 
constraints in the exact mandate given to the private auditors or the 
amount of financial resources available to hire them. 
Be that as it may, having auditing capacities, including forensic auditing, is a 
fundamental aspect of preventing and fighting against corruption, as the ultimate goal 
of corruption is to enable the corrupt public official or the person offering the bribe to 
benefit from an undue advantage. It is unclear, however, to what extent the AGSA is 
in fact able to assist in such cases.  
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5.5    OTHER BODIES  
5.5.1 PARLIAMENT  
Parliament and its oversight and accountability mechanisms are crucial in the fight 
against corruption. It is also expected of MPs to be exemplary, and they cannot act 
with impunity when engaging in corruption. The understanding is that 
“constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of law constitute a sharp and mighty 
sword that stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck” (Public 
Protector, 2016:3). As stated by Joubert (2015:10), democracy “entails government by 
the people for the people.” Thus parliament should govern in the interest of the people, 
and that includes dealing decisively with corruption through its oversight 
responsibilities. Stapenhurst et al., (2006:3) and Madue (2012:45) respectively submit 
that good governance and accountability are important for a democratic political 
system to function properly. Also, that effective oversight is a key component of such 
good governance and accountability, and an effective parliament is a pillar of a quality 
democracy (Jahed, 2013).  
Malapane (2016:144) argues that effective oversight is dependent on the willingness 
of parliament to take action. Unfortunately, up to now parliament has shown a certain 
lack of wiliness to deal with corruption within its ranks. MPs are mainly interested in 
holding on to their seats; they are not willing to risk losing them by speaking out against 
corruption within their party ranks (Malapane, 2016:145; Bruce 2012:50). Stapenhurst 
et al., (2006:3) observe that “Parliament that reflects well the interests of the citizens 
and not captured by other forces, become part of the solution to curb corruption.” To 
date the South African parliament does not have a good reputation and allegations of 
state capture have engulfed it. It has also failed to effectively exercise powers 
conferred by section 56 of the Constitution that allow the National Assembly or any of 
its established committees to subpoena any person to give evidence or affirmation 
under oath, produce documents, require institutions to report to it and compel any 
person or institution to comply with a summons to fight corruption. Section 56 simply 
translates as accountability, which is explained as “a social relationship where an 
individual or an agency has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, 
which is the hallmark of modern democratic governance” (Oversight and 
Accountability Model of the South African Parliament, 2009).  
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The million-dollar question is: with the recent state capture reports or activities that are 
casting a shadow on the former President and his allies, what role will parliament play 
in holding the Executive accountable in this regard? (Malapane, 2016:138). 
5.5.2 THE PRESIDENCY 
Section 83 of the Constitution states that the President is the head of state and the 
national executive, who must uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the 
supreme law of the country, and in the advancement of the Republic, he must promote 
unity of the nation. So important is the President that section 85(1) of the Constitution 
vests the executive authority of the Republic of South Africa on the President. The 
importance of the position the President holds is highlighted by the provision of section 
89(1) of the Constitution that allows for the removal of the President from office on the 
grounds of a serious violation of the Constitution and serious misconduct. This is in 
line with section 102(2) of the Constitution, which also makes provision for the 
President and other members of cabinet and any deputy ministers to resign if the 
national assembly, supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no 
confidence in the President.   
A catalogue of powers and functions of the President is found in section 84(2) of the 
Constitutions. In terms of section 84(1) of the Constitution these constitutional 
executive powers of the President do not preclude powers as may be assigned by 
legislation, provided such legislation is not inconsistent with the relevant provisions of 
the Constitution.  
It is submitted that so wide are the powers of the President that it makes that section 
87 of the Constitution requires that the President at assuming office must swear or 
affirm faithfulness to the Republic of South Africa and the Constitution as prescribed 
by section 1 of Schedule 2 of the Constitution. The Schedule, section 1, oppose any 
thing that may harm the Republic; to promote and protect the rights and freedoms of 
all south Africans; to devote himself to the well-being of the Republic and all its people; 
and to do justice to everyone. These are important obligations in the context of a study 
that looks at the country’s legislative and institutional framework that directly and/or 
indirectly fights corruption. It is for this reason that generally the infamous corrupt 
relationship between former President Zuma and the Gupta family was regarded as 
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the former’s breach of his constitutional duties to protect the Constitution and uphold 
his oath of office.  
In many occasion, even where there was clear evidence of corruption and/or 
maladministration linked to former President Zuma and/or his family, the ANC’s the 
parliamentary oversight had made it difficult for ANC members of parliament to criticise 
the President and other party leaders (Mattes, 2002:24&27). To refer to the 
observation of Bhorat et al., (2017:15), this could be referred to as “a set of ‘kitchen 
cabinets’ comprising selected groups from various networks: for example, the SOE 
sector, sub-groups of cabinet ministers and deputy ministers, family networks and 
selected loyalists in the public service.” Bhorat et al., (2017:3) assert: 
South Africa has become one typical example of a global trend in the 
growth of increasingly authoritarian, neo-patrimonial regimes where a 
symbiotic relationship between the constitutional and shadow states is 
maintained, but with real power shifting increasingly into the networks 
that compromise the shadow state.  
5.5.3.1 Presidential Commission of Enquiry 
Section 84(1)(2)(f) of the Constitution gives the President the powers to make 
appointments of commissions of enquiry. The most notable commission to date tasked 
with investigating corruption and corrupt activities is the Judicial Commission of Inquiry 
into State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of 
State (commonly referred to as the Zondo Commission into State Capture, because it 
is led by the Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo). It was appointed by the President 
in terms of section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution by way of Proclamation No. 3 of 2018, 
published in the Government Gazette of 25 January 2018 (Government Gazette No. 
41436). The terms of reference of the commission appear as a schedule to the 
proclamation.  
The Zondo Commission exposed in great detail the growing threat of public- and 
private-sector corruption. The commission was established following the report of the 
Public Protector (State Capture, 2016), which relates to an investigation into 
complaints of alleged improper and unethical conduct by the President and other state 
functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships with and involvement of the 
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Gupta family in the removal and appointment of ministers and directors of SOEs, 
resulting in improper and possibly corrupt awarding of state contracts and benefits to 
the Gupta family’s businesses. The report submitted by academics from various 
Higher Educational Institutions, Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa is being 
stolen - May 2017 highlighted the problem of corruption in the South African public 
offices. Other revelations that prompted the setting-up of the commission came from 
the media. For instance, the Sunday Times (28 May 2017), City Press (28 May 2017) 
and Sunday World (28 May 2017) released damning allegations of corruption, 
maladministration and money laundering against the president of the country, senior 
government officials and the famous Gupta family that was threatening to take over 
the country. 
It is submitted that these commissions play a crucial role as measures designed to 
address the issues of corruption. Also, as supplementary outlets to assist law 
enforcement agencies and other agencies to fight corruption. 
 5.5.2 Parliamentary (portfolio) committees 
The functions of the portfolio committees in South Africa, according to Mataure 
(2003:9), are: 
Oversight of the government on financial matters (public accounts); 
Internal functions to ease the work of the House (rules and disciplinary 
committees); Examination of specific areas of public life or matters of 
current public interest (ad hoc and joint committees); Consideration of 
legislation (portfolio and selected committees); Monitoring and oversight 
of government affairs and provinces (portfolio and selected 
committees); Consideration of private members’ legislative proposals; 
Considerations of petitions; and Considerations of international 
agreements and conventions. 
In terms of the Constitution, 1996, ministers and departmental officials are accountable 
to parliament through portfolio committees to report on their powers and the execution 
of their duties. According to sections 92(2) and (3) of the Constitution, members of 
Cabinet are individually and collectively accountable to parliament “by providing full 
and regular reports to Parliament concerning matters under their control” (Madue, 
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2012:431). The Oversight Model of the South African Legislative Sector (2012:6) 
points out that oversight in the South African political context is often “perceived as the 
purview of opposition politicians.” A similar view is held by Madue (2012:46), who 
argues that the opposition party position is “designed to police and expose 
maladministration and corruption.” It is submitted that regard such view as is limited 
and deficient. Another view by Nyathela and Makhado (2014:43) is that, the work of 
an oversight committee must entail “gathering information on the views of customers 
and clients of departments, constitutional institutions or agencies being reviewed.” 
Nyathela and Makhado (2014:47) contend that “in order to conduct effective and 
efficient oversight which is critical for improving the quality of service delivery to the 
public, it should be noted that: 
1) Continuous capacity development of members of Parliament and 
support staff attached to committees is necessary, ranging from 
improving skills in information and communication technology, 
budgeting practices and other skills required to enhance their 
oversight capacity; 
2) Committee support staff should be provided with the necessary 
resources and upgraded in terms of technologies related to oversight 
and accountability; 
3) Stakeholders should be informed well in advance on issues of interest 
to avoid oversight stampede; 
4) Committees should be well-prepared for oversight with the necessary 
information for proper phrasing of questions which are directly related 
to issues of service delivery rather than putting questions reflecting 
micromanagement of issues.  
5.4 SUMMARY 
The discussions in Chapter 5 identified some of the relevant anti-corruption agencies 
in South Africa, with their successes and failures in their fight against corruption. What 
came through strongly is the question of independence and operational effectiveness 
of these bodies.   It is submitted that this challenge is as a result, in part, of the multi-
agency approach the country maintains of having parliament; the Office of the Public 
Protector; the Office of the Auditor-General; IPID; NPA; SAPS; SCCU; the Hawks, 
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SIU; the Judiciary; and FIC all working toward the same objective with different 
intentions and commitment. The constitutional role played by the NPA as the national 
prosecuting body is important in the fight against corruption. However, it was revealed 
that the management of the NPA has been plugged with legitimacy and integrity 
concerns as was the case in Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another V President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the Advancement of the South 
African Constitution v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2018] 1 
All SA 471 (GP) wherein the legality and validity of the appointment of 
Advocate Shaun Abrahams as the NDPP. The court subsequently ruled that Advocate 
Abrahams must vacate office as the NDPP. It is submitted, however, what was revealed 
during the discussions should not be the case of doom. Many of the inefficiencies and 
gaps identified can be corrected, as will be explained further in the Chapter 7 of this 
study.  
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CHAPTER 6 
FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION: 
LESSONS FROM SINGAPORE, HONG KONG AND BOTSWANA 
  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws some significant and comparative lessons from Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Botswana. In particular, the focus is on the anti-corruption agencies of 
these countries, and their effectiveness in combatting corruption. These countries are 
studied because they have a background and history with regard to the fight against 
corruption. For instance, Botswana is regarded as the best-performing country with 
regard to combatting corruption and has consistently maintained low levels of corrupt 
activities (Mbao & Komboni, 2008). On the other hand, Singapore’s Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) are regarded as very effective anti-corruption agencies that have 
influenced the establishment of many anti-corruption agencies in other Asia-Pacific 
countries (Quah, 2017). Another important factor informing the choice of the countries 
in this chapter is their Transparency International rankings. According to the 2016 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures the 
perceived levels of public sector corruption of 176 countries around the world, 
Singapore is ranked 7th (one place up from 2015, having been ranked 8th with a score 
of 85) with a score of 84 as one of the least corrupt countries in the world, followed by 
Hong Kong at 15 (having improved three places compared to 2015, when Hong Kong 
was ranked 18 with a score of 75), with a score of 77. Our neighbouring country 
Botswana stands at 35 with a score of 60. Of these countries selected for comparative 
analysis, South Africa comes last, ranked at 64 with a score of 45, dropping three 
places from 2015 (coming in at 61 with a score of 44) (Transparency International 
2018).  
The types of anti-corruption agency may differ according to the ambit of their functions. 
In the Asia-Pacific countries, for example, they are classified into type A and type B.  
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The former “focus exclusively on the performance of the anti-corruption functions of 
investigation, prosecution, education and awareness-raising, prevention and 
coordination” whist the latter “perform both anti-corruption and non-corruption-related 
functions” (Quah, 2017:60). According to Quah (2017:6), type A anti-corruption 
agencies are more specialised and have advantages over other less specialised 
agencies in combatting corruption in the form of: 
reduced administrative costs; less uncertainty regarding jurisdiction by 
preventing duplication of powers and work; high degree of 
specialisation, expertise and autonomy; separation from the agencies 
and departments that it will be investigating; high public credibility and 
profile; established security protection; political, legal and public 
accountability; clarity in the evaluation of its progress, achievements and 
failures; and swift action can be initiated against corruption with its own 
resources and specialised personnel. 
6.2 Hong Kong 
6.1.1 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
The levels of corruption in Hong Kong were at one point very high and the city was 
regarded as one of the most corrupt in the world (Man-wai, 2006:196). According to 
Pelmier (1985:123), corruption was a way of life in Hong Kong because “[t]he Chinese 
who formed its population had long been accustomed to a system where most of an 
official’s income depended on what he was able to extort from the public. Not 
surprisingly, during the first decade of the colony’s history, corruption propelled at all 
levels of government”.  
The proscription of bribery as an offence in Hong Kong is traced to 1898, when the 
Misdemeanours Punishment Ordinance was enacted. This was replaced in 1948 by 
the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (PCO). In May 1971 the PCO was 
strengthened by the inclusion of “heavier penalties and stronger investigative powers” 
(ICAC, 2015; Wong, 2003) for the Anti-Corruption Office of the Police Force. On 15 
February 1974 ICAC was established following the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption Ordinance (ICAC 2017). Quah (2017:11) reports that corruption was a 
serious and wide-spread problem during British colonial rule in Hong Kong because 
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“the British colonial government relied on the police to combat corruption even though 
[the force] was notoriously corrupt.” The defining moment was the escape of a 
corruption suspect, Chief Police Superintendent Peter Godber, in June 1973, to 
Britain, which led to the appointment of a commission by Governor Murray MacLehose 
to investigate the circumstances of his escape. Ultimately, the commission’s 
recommendation to establish an anti-corruption commission independent of the police 
was accepted in February 1974. 
According to the OECD (2008:9), “ICAC is one of the best known specialised anti-
corruption institutions in the world which contributed significantly to Hong Kong’s 
success in reducing corruption”. Interestingly, the anti-corruption approach of the Hong 
Kong anti-corruption agency has been adopted in other countries. For example, the 
New South Wales ICAC adopted the Hong Kong approach, except that the New South 
Wales ICAC “reports to parliament and is independent from the executive and judicial 
branches of state” (Majila et al., 2017). 
Whist this commission is independent of the civil service, its commissioner is directly 
answerable to the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. ICAC 
remains the most successful in Hong Kong dealing with corruption, taking the 
operational form of type A except that it does not deal with prosecution, which is left 
to the Department of Justice. Man-wai (2006:196) reports that “[w]ithin three years, 
the ICAC smashed all corruption syndicates in the government and prosecuted 247 
government officials, including 143 police officers”. ICAC adopts a three-pronged 
approach in fighting corruption, namely: investigation, prevention and education 
through their functional departments of Operations, Corruption Prevention and 
Community Relations (Man-wai, 2009:140; Wong, 2003; Audit Commission, Hong 
Kong, 2013:v). The ICAC has a multi-layered operational set-up and is also subject to 
strong oversight by other committees. For instance, is closely monitored and 
scrutinised by four independent committees. One of these committees, the Operations 
Review Committee, examines and monitors all ICAC investigations in order to ensure 
best practices and efficiency through enhanced anti-corruption practices and 
procedures. There is also the Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations, 
which advises on measures “to foster public support in combatting corruption and to 
educate the public against the evils of corruption. [And] the independent ICAC 
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Complaints Committee, which examines complaints against the ICAC or its staff, 
monitors the handling of complaints and advises on follow-up actions” (ICIC, 2015). 
6.1.2 ICAC OPERATIONS, COMPLAINTS, INVESTIGATIONS AND CRIME PREVENTION  
As noted, the Hong Kong ICAC has three functional departments, namely the 
Departments of Operations, Corruption Prevention and Community Relations (Man-
wai, 2009:140; Wong, 2003; Audit Commission, Hong Kong, 2013:v). The key 
responsibility of the operations department within ICAC is to receive, consider and 
investigate reports of alleged offences. The operations department serves as the 
investigative arm of the ICACA Commission, headed by a deputy commissioner (ICIC, 
2015). The investigating officers of ICAC have all the necessary powers needed by 
law enforcement agencies, including powers of arrest and evidence collection. Any 
prosecution planned must be reported and consented to by the Secretary for Justice 
(ICIC, 2015; Wong, 2003). 
The ICAC has a 24-hour report centre to receive complaints, and has regional offices 
in various districts. Not every matter reported by the ICAC will be investigated and 
addressed. Those complaints outside the jurisdiction of ICAC are referred to the police 
for further handling, with prior consent of the complainants. Complaints are regarded 
as outside the jurisdiction of ICAC when they are “found not to involve criminality, but 
disclose inappropriate conduct or systems considered conducive to corruption. 
[These] may be referred to the relevant government department for consideration of 
disciplinary or administrative action or to other relevant organisation for appropriate 
follow-up action” (ICIC, 2015).  
A referral system like this, in my view, can operate seamlessly in a system where the 
different law enforcement agencies have a good collaborative relationship and 
governance structure. There must also be a supportive administrative and political 
environment. According to Camerer (1999:11), ICAC activities are supported by a well-
resourced police force and criminal justice system that acts within a “supportive” 
political environment, and its success has also been attributed to this (Awopeju, Olowu 
& Jegede, 2018:6). This is different to South Africa, where the institutional capacity to 
deal with corruption is marred by tension and distrust amongst the agencies. Man-wai 
(2006:200) notes a number of factors responsible for the rapid success of the agency, 
which include the political will of the country’s leadership to deal decisively with 
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corruption. Mr Man-wai, a former Deputy Commissioner and Head of Operations at 
the ICAC, highlights as important for the success of any anti-corruption structure and 
programme a conducive political, social, economic and legal environment. In 
particular, political interference must not be allowed. In fact, Hong Kong’s ICAC has 
not shied away from investigating political leaders and senior civil servants for 
corruption and corrupt activities. A notable investigation and conviction for 20 months 
in 2017 was that of former chief executive Donald Tsang in 2012 (Quah, 2017:13). 
 6.1.3 Community relations, and corruption prevention 
The involvement of the community, its knowledge and appreciation of corruption and 
corrupt activities is also very important in the fight against corruption. Community 
relations forms an integral part of anti-corruption activities in Hong Kong. The 
Community Relations Department is responsible for educating the public on corruption 
and its consequences. To this end the Community Relations Department runs different 
anti-corruption education and advocacy programmes and campaigns. This multi-
media anti-corruption education is run alongside the activities of the Hong Kong 
Business Ethics Development Centre. The centre was “established in 1995 in 
collaboration with the business community to promote business ethics as the first line 
of defence against corruption. Its work is steered by the Hong Kong Business Ethics 
Development Advisory Committee, which comprises 10 major chambers of commerce 
in Hong Kong” (ICIC, 2015). This ethical dimension of anti-corruption activities in Hong 
Kong is crucial given the importance of good business ethics in crime prevention. 
One important aspect that the ICAC has continued to monitor and discourage is 
private-sector corruption. The ICAC’s Corruption Prevention Department publishes 
corruption prevention guides, tools, best-practice checklists and training resources to 
educate private-sector companies and public corporations on how to eliminate 
enablers and loopholes for corruption in their institutional or organisation structure 
(Quah, 2017:19). 
6.1.4 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 
ICAC Hong Kong is supported by other agencies in the fight against corruption. 
Important in this regard is the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman 
was established as an independent watchdog of public administration.  
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Notable are the wide investigation powers the office has, which range from 
investigating matters related to: 
maladministration (actions by Government departments and public 
bodies for administrative deficiencies and recommend remedial 
measures) but also limited to security, defence or international relations, 
legal proceedings or prosecution decisions, exercise of powers to 
pardon prisoners, contractual or other commercial transactions, 
personnel matters, actions by the Chief Executive personally and crime 
prevention and investigation actions by Hong Kong Police Force or the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption which includes corruption 
(Annual Report of the Ombudsman, Hong Kong, 2015:16–59). 
6.3 Singapore  
6.3.1 CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATION BUREAU  
A fishing village first discovered in 1819, Singapore has transformed into a 
cosmopolitan city today. A melting pot of both commercial and leisure activities, this 
city-state is a place where visitors get to experience a bit of everything. This city-state 
plays home to many wildlife species and is zealous in creating more gardens, parks 
and green spaces. With an estimated 5.61 m total population in June 2016, citizens 
numbered 3.41 m. With a total of 0.52 m permanent residents, there were 3.93 m 
residents (the resident population comprises Singapore citizens and permanent 
residents) and non-residents (foreigners who are working, studying or living in 
Singapore but not granted permanent residence, excluding tourists and short-term 
visitors) totalled 1.67m (Singapore Attraction Guidebook 2017:5–9; Singapore 
Department of Statistics, 2016:3). 
Like Hong Kong, Singapore was once a British colony, which also became a 
settlement under the British East India Company to “became the ‘entrepot’ for 
economic activity” (Mauzy, 2002:21). As an economic hub, Singapore did not escape 
the clutches of corruption. According to Quah (2017:11), corruption was “widespread 
in Singapore during the British colonial period because the government lacked political 
will and made the serious mistake of relying on the police to combat corruption when 
police corruption was rampant.” Corruption in Singapore was outlawed in 1871 with 
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the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca, Penang and 
Singapore. During 1879, a commission of enquiry into the causes of inefficiency of the 
Straits Settlements Police Force found that corruption was prevalent among the 
European inspectors and the Malay and Indian junior officers. Similarly, another 
commission of enquiry into the extent of public gambling in the Straits Settlements in 
1886 confirmed the existence of systematic corruption in the police forces in Singapore 
and Penang (Quah, 1979:24–26; Quah, 2007:75–77; Quah, 2017:10). 
The October 1951 opium hijacking scandal was apparently the defining moment in the 
history of anti-corruption efforts in Singapore. The scandal involved the arrest of a 
notorious gang of robbers and three police members caught stealing 1 800 pounds of 
opium. This arrest was embarrassing for the police in Singapore, who were expected 
to fight corruption and not to be party to it. In September 1952 the CPIB was 
established as a Type A anti-corruption agency to replace the police. However, 
according to Meagher (2005:72) the CPIB was only truly functional after the inception 
of the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew in 1959, when it was strengthened and equipped 
to perform its statutory mandate. According to the CPIB Annual Report (2015:4), 
“strong political will, leadership, constant vigilance by the CPIB, an independent 
judiciary and a responsive public service continue to keep corruption in check”. 
According to Meagher (2005), the CPIB has been criticised for its enormous powers. 
For instance, its staff have been criticised for being over-zealous in discharging their 
duties, as they are authorised to arrest, search and prosecute alleged offenders. They 
have also been criticised for being too secretive in their operations. Nevertheless, the 
CPIB remains an example of a successful anti-corruption agency, which has informed 
the establishment of others across the world, including the ICAC of Hong Kong. 
6.3.2 CPIB OPERATIONS, COMPLAINTS, INVESTIGATIONS AND CRIME PREVENTION 
Quah (2017:13) argues that Singapore’s CPIB success lies in its legal powers to 
investigate corruption and in the support it has received from successive political 
leaders who “have ensured its operational impartiality by not interfering in its daily 
operations.” Obligations to combat corruption in Singapore derive from both national 
and international instruments. The country was a signatory to the UN Convention 
against Corruption on 11 November 2005, which it ratified on 6 November 2009, and 
to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime on 13 December 2000, 
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which it ratified on 28 August 2007. Furthermore, other relevant institutions that 
Singapore is party to are the FATF; the Asia-Pacific Group on Money-Laundering: and 
the OECD’s joint Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific.  
Corruption and bribery in Singapore are primarily dealt with under the Prevention of 
Corruption Act (PCA) (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) and the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 
Rev Ed). The statutes, for instance the PCA, have provisions similar to those of many 
other countries. Some provisions are similar to those in South African anti-corruption 
legislation. Section 5 of the PCA criminalises active and passive bribery by individuals 
and companies in the public and private sectors. According to section 6 of the PCA, it 
is an offence for an agent to be corruptly offered gratification in relation to performance 
of his or her official duties; or to corruptly accept gratification in relation to the 
performance of his or her official duties or for the purposes of misleading the 
principal/authority. A case demonstrating this provision is Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix 
Corp Ltd [2014] SGCA 22, where a company successfully sued its former chief 
executive and director, Ho Kang Peng, for involvement in corrupt activities. In 
dismissing his appeal against the decision of the High Court, the Court of Appeal held 
that he had breached his fiduciary duties owed to the company by making and 
concealing unauthorised payments in the name of the company. The payments made 
to Mr Ho had the unjustified risk of exposing the company to criminal liability. In terms 
of the PCA, the contravention of the general anti-corruption provisions under sections 
5 and 6 is punishable by a fine not exceeding S$100 000, a custodial sentence 
exceeding five years, or both. But where the corruption offence involves a government 
contract or bribery of a member of parliament, the maximum custodial sentence is up 
to seven years. 
The PCA goes further, in sections 11 and 12, to prohibit the bribery of domestic public 
officials, such as members of parliament and members of a “[A]ny corporation, board, 
council, commissioners or other body which has power to act under and for the 
purposes of any written law relating to public health or to undertakings or public utility 
or otherwise to administer money levied or raised by rates or charges in pursuance of 
any written law.”  
Furthermore, sections 161 to 165 of the Singaporean Penal Code deal with the bribery 
of public officials (or public servants, as they may be called).  
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An important feature of the PCA is that it provides for extra-territorial prosecution or 
extraterritorial effect. According to section 37 of the PCA an act of bribery that takes 
place outside Singapore by a Singaporean citizen is still dealt with as if the bribe had 
taken place in Singapore. Such an offender will thus be prosecuted according to the 
applicable legislation. Also, section 4 of the Penal Code allows extraterritorial 
prosecution of Singaporean public servants. Accordingly, a public servant accepting a 
bribe overseas by an act or omission is liable under Singaporean law. The anti-
corruption efforts of the CPIB are strengthened by the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and 
Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA) (Cap 65A, 2000 Rev Ed), 
which provides for the confiscation and forfeiture of benefits derived from corruption 
and other criminal conduct. The limitation of section 37 to citizens only was challenged 
in Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR 410 as unconstitutional. In casu 
the court upheld the provision and held that it was “rational to draw the line at 
citizenship and leave out non-citizens”. 
Like the Hong Kong ICAC, the CPIB has extensive powers of investigation. It can 
therefore call or subpoena the attendance of witnesses for interview, request 
disclosure of information or request further information from individuals including 
investigating financial and other records of suspects. Moreover, the CPIB may be 
granted special investigative powers by the public prosecutor. While it carries out 
investigations into complaints of corruption, the CPIB cannot prosecute cases itself. 
Cases must, where appropriate, be referred to the public prosecutor.  
Collaborative efforts to fight corruption are favoured by the CPIB. For instance, on 5 
July 2017 the CPIB became a party to the International Anti-Corruption Cooperation 
Centre (IACCC) that will be hosted by the UK National Crime Agency in London until 
2021. Other agencies that are members to IACCC are Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the UK and the US. The IACCC was established to coordinate law 
enforcement action against global grand corruption. 
 6.3.3 Public anti-corruption education and private-sector corruption control 
The CPIB regards as equally important the need to address the increasing amount of 
private-sector corruption. For example, in January 2017 the CPIB published a “four-
step guide for business owners to develop and implement an anti-corruption system 
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in their companies” (Quah, 2017:19). This followed the October 2016 collaboration 
agreement with SPRING Singapore “to develop ISO 37001 on Anti-Bribery 
Management Systems to help private companies in Singapore implement an anti-
bribery compliance programme in April 2017” (Quah, 2017:19). In fact, the Singapore 
High Court in Public Prosecutor v Syed Mostafa Romel [2015] 3 SLR 1166 held that 
private-sector bribery was as repugnant as public-sector bribery. The court saw the 
distinction between private- and public-sector bribery as immaterial. In casu the jail 
term of a marine surveyor convicted on corruption charges relating to the receipt of 
bribes to exclude safety breaches in his reports was increased from two to six months.  
6.4 Botswana  
6.4.1 DIRECTORATE ON CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC CRIME 
Unlike Singapore and Hong Kong, according to Sebudubudu (2013:4) Botswana was 
originally under British colonial administration as a protectorate, “ruled by its traditional 
chiefs who each with his or her own sphere of influence” with an economy that was 
highly agrarian. Not much economic development took place in Botswana then. The 
country, says Sebudubudu (2013:4), gained its independence and its economy was 
characterised by levels of very low corrupt activities. Importantly, corruption and 
corrupt practices were “closely controlled through social pressures evoking ethical and 
moral codes of conduct” and zero tolerance towards corruption (Sebudubudu, 2013:4). 
Likewise, Mbao and Komboni (2008:49) observe that for some time “Botswana was 
almost universally praised for its excellent record on political governance, exemplified 
by a relatively functioning multi-party democracy since independence in 1966.” This, 
they assert, had a positive influence on anti-corruption efforts in Botswana and on its 
internal acclaim as the least corrupt country in the world and in Africa (Mbao & 
Komboni, 2008:49). This is supported by Alo (2014:57), who states that the low levels 
of corruption in Botswana “cannot be separated from the government’s resolute effort 
at combatting corruption, the entrenchment of the institutions of democracy, including 
the judiciary and the anti-corruption agencies, as well as the long history of zero-
authoritarian interference.” 
The Botswana Penal Code Law No. 2 of 1964 and the Corruption and Economic Crime 
Act (CECA) No. 13 of 1994 make both active and passive bribery in the public and 
private sectors a crime.  
173 
 
The Botswana Penal Code, for example, addresses corruption and abuse of public 
office through different provisions from Article 99 to Article 123. Part IV of CECA, 
Articles 23 to 38, deals extensively with corruption offences. In terms of Article 36 of 
CECA the penalties for corruption may be imprisonment for up to 10 years, or a fine 
of up to BWP 500 000, or both. The significance of this legislation in the fight against 
corruption in Botswana is that both natural and juristic persons can be held liable. AS 
in Singapore, the provision of CECA applies extra-territorially to Botswana citizens, 
thus strengthening the hand of DCEC to deal with corruption offences. The relevant 
part of section 46 of CECA reads: 
Liability for offences committed abroad 
The provisions of this Act shall have effect, in relation to citizens of 
Botswana, outside as well as within Botswana; and where an offence 
under Part IV is committed by a citizen of Botswana in any place outside 
Botswana, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had 
been committed within Botswana. 
The existing legal framework to deal with corruption that seems to have provided the 
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) with the best environment is 
Botswana’s anti-corruption agency. The DCEC was established in September 1994 in 
terms of section 3 of CECA (DCEC May 2017) as amended by the Corruption and 
Economic Crime (Amendment) Act No. 6 of 2008 (CECA Amendment). The DCEC is 
an operationally independent law enforcement agency with the mandate to combat 
corruption in Botswana. However, Mbao and Komboni (2008:64) lament the reporting 
arrangements of the DCEC, which in their view “compromises the institutional 
autonomy of the Directorate, contrary to international best practice which requires anti-
corruption agencies to be functionally and institutionally independent”. In particular, 
the authors are concerned about the DCEC Directorate being under the Office of the 
President and formally and directly responsible to the president. Another shortfall of 
the DCEC highlighted by Mbao and Komboni (2008:64), which the researcher agrees 
with, is the fact that the president is empowered under section 4(1) of the CECA 
Amendment to appoint the Director-General of the DCEC “on such terms and 
conditions as he sees fit”. The possible abuse of this authority by the President is 
addressed in section 4(3), which states that “any decision, including investigations by 
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the Director-General, shall not be subject to the direction and control of any person or 
authority”. This, in the researcher’s view, provides the Director-General with the legal 
support to resist any influence and/or interference from political figures including the 
president and from other persons. Contrary to the assertion by Mbao and Komboni 
(2008), it is submitted that in light of section 4(3) the Director-General should be 
expected to carry out his or her functions without fear or favour. Of cause, as happened 
in South Africa with regard to the IPID, the security of tenure of the DCEC cannot be 
guaranteed if the president can remove him or her when the president deems it fit.  
The statutory mandate of the DCEC is to combat corruption and this is done by 
implementing a three-dimensional strategy (DCEC, May 2017), namely: investigation 
of allegations of corruption, economic crime and issues related to suspicious 
transactions; and prevention of corruption by auditing government and parastatal 
institutions to detect it. This is done through routine assignment studies. Arguably, this 
function is more related to the internal audit departments/functions, which, according 
to Protiviti (2009:9), must have sufficient knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud and 
the manner in which it is managed by the organisation. As pointed out by Deloitte 
(2012:2): “the role of internal audit is to provide independent assurance that an 
organisation’s risk management, governance and internal control processes are 
operating effectively.”  
6.4.2 DCEC OPERATIONS, COMPLAINTS, INVESTIGATIONS AND CRIME PREVENTION  
Part III, sections 6 to 22, of CECA details the powers and functions of the DCEC. 
Regarding its functions, the relevant part of section 6 of the Corruption and Economic 
Crime Act (CECA) provides as follows: 
(a)  to receive and investigate any complaints alleging corruption in 
any public body; 
 (b)  to investigate any alleged or suspected offences under this Act, or 
any other offence disclosed during such an investigation; 
 (c)  to investigate any alleged or suspected contravention of any of the 
provisions of the fiscal and revenue laws of the country; 
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 (d)  to investigate any conduct of any person, which in the opinion of 
the Director, may be connected with or conducive to corruption; 
 (e)  to assist any law enforcement agency of the Government in the 
investigation of offences involving dishonesty or cheating of the 
public revenue; 
 (f) to examine the practices and procedures of public bodies in order 
to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and to secure the 
revision of methods of work or procedures which, in the opinion of 
the Director, may be conducive to corrupt practices; 
 (g)  to instruct, advise and assist any person, on the latter’s request, 
on ways in which corrupt practices may be eliminated by such 
person; 
 (h)  to advise heads of public bodies of changes in practices or 
procedures compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of 
such public bodies which the Director thinks necessary to reduce 
the likelihood of the occurrence of corrupt practices; 
(i)  to educate the public against the evils of corruption; and 
 (j)  to enlist and foster public support in combatting corruption. 
The DCEC has wide functions in relation to combatting corruption, contained in the 
provisions of other sections of the CECA. Notable powers akin to those exercised by 
the police are power to arrest with or without a warrant of arrest under section 10(1) 
of CECA, if there is a reasonable suspicion that the “person has committed or is about 
to commit an offence under this Act.” The DCEC is also empowered by section 11 to 
search a “person and the premises or place in which he was arrested” and to “seize 
and detain anything which such officer has reason to believe to be or to contain 
evidence of any of the offences referred to in Part IV” of the CECA. The efficacy of the 
operations of the DCEC is bolstered by the presumption of corruption provided by 
section 42 of CECA. In terms of section 42: 
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Where in any proceedings for an offence under Part IV, it is proved 
that the accused offered or accepted a valuable consideration, the 
valuable consideration shall be presumed to have been offered and 
accepted as such inducement or reward, as is alleged in the particulars 
of offence unless the contrary is proved. 
A major limitation of the powers and functions of the DCEC is that is has no 
prosecuting mandate or authority. In terms of section 39 of CECA the director must 
refer anyone considered to have committed corruption to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for his or her decision. The section 39 referral system is considered 
counter-productive in the fight against corruption, as it results “in inordinate delays and 
inefficiencies in the anti-corruption effort” (Mbao & Komboni, 2008:65). It has been 
proposed that the Attorney-General need empower the directorate with delegated 
authority to initiate prosecutions of persons the DCEC considers to have engaged in 
acts of corruption so that prosecutors from that Directorate could initiate prosecution 
(Mbao & Komboni, 2008:65). It is submitted that the proposal makes sense, 
considered from the point of ensuring that corrupt practices are handled promptly and 
that persons are charged and tried within a reasonable time. 
Another major concern is that section 6(a) seem to suggest that the directorate has no 
jurisdiction in private corruption. This is highly problematic because it ignores the role 
of private persons in the corruption of public institutions and officials, and in 
manifesting corruption in the country. In this regard Mbao and Komboni (2008:72) call 
for a change to the law to expressly empower the DCEC to deal with corruption in the 
private sector in line with article 12(1) of the UN Convention Against Corruption and 
articles 1 and 2 of the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, which cover corruption by 
private entities. 
 6.4.3 Public anti-corruption education and private-sector corruption control 
The DCEC uses public education as one of its strategies to prevent corruption, 
educate the public about corruption and solicit public support, as permitted by section 
6(i) of CECA. This the DCEC does through a multi-pronged approach which includes 
conducting anti-corruption fairs and exhibitions. It can also give presentations on 
corruption and related issues following invitations (CECA section 6(g)). 
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 6.4.4 Presidential commissions 
Botswana unearthed and dealt with some of its corruption scandals through a 
presidential commission. Mbao and Khumboni (2008:71) report that the earliest 
reported cases of corruption in Botswana “were exposed through three Presidential 
Commissions of Inquiry between 1991–1992”. Some of the commissions’ 
investigations mirror events in South Africa. For instance, the 1991–1992 Commission 
dealt with corruption regarding the procurement of school books and materials for 
primary schools for the 1990 school year (Mbao & Khumboni, 2008:71; Report of the 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of School Books and Materials, 
1991). The textbook tender that resulted in a loss by the government of 
BWP27 000 000.61 was awarded in this case to a relatively inexperienced company. 
The commission found the tender to have been awarded fraudulently.  
The second commission, also in 1991, investigated fraudulent land deals in 
Mogoditshane and other peri-urban villages near Gaborone, the capital city. The 
commission found that the land deals had been made by officials fraudulently under 
pressure from influential and powerful personalities (Mbao & Khumboni, 2008:71; 
Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Problem, 1991). The 
presidential commission of enquiry in 1992 dealt with the operations of the Botswana 
Housing Corporation, a parastatal company (Report of the Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry into the Operations of the Botswana Housing Corporation, 1992). According 
to Mbao and Khumboni (2008:71), this “revealed corrupt tendering practices involving 
collusion between Board members, a government Minister, top management of the 
Corporation on the one hand and construction companies on the other.”  
What all these commissions revealed was that the country’s elite was responsible for 
the perpetuation of corruption. Interestingly, a number of presidential and 
parliamentary commissions in South Africa on fraud and corruption involved 
allegations against South Africa’s elite, including government ministers and 
employees of the public service. The explosive revelations at the Zondo Commission 
exemplify the rot that has set in to the South African elite and the passive and active 
corruption, including related corrupt activities, South African public office-bearers and 
public servants have been dabbling in. 
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6.4.5 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 
According to Mpabanga (2009: ix, xv–xvi): 
[t]he Office of the Ombudsman in Botswana was conventionally 
established to protect the people against violations of human rights, 
abuse of power by public institutions, error, negligence, unfair 
decisions and maladministration, in order to improve public 
administration with a view to making governments more responsive to 
the needs of the people and to making public servants more 
accountable to members of the public. It is an important avenue for 
individual complaints against the actions of public authorities. 
However, the Office of the Ombudsman is precluded from investigating certain matters 
including  “matter[s] related to security, the defence forces, police, corruption, and 
crime, the appointment of officers, private contractual and commercial dealings, and 
matters that are sub judice.” It is rather startling that issues of corruption may not be 
investigated by the ombudsman. However, it is submitted that the exclusion is not cast 
in stone, as an investigation of abuse of power is wide enough to include using a 
position of influence to engage in corrupt activities. In a situation all too familiar to the 
Office of the Public Protector (South Africa) before its powers and legal status of its 
remedial actions were confirmed by courts, the office of the ombudsman may take 
remedial action but does not have the power to enforce compliance or take further 
action in cases of non-compliance.  
6.5 WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED BY SOUTH AFRICA? 
Unlike Singapore’s CPIB, the Hong Kong ICAC has much wider powers and is well 
resourced in terms of the execution of its mandate, with “very tightly controlled, rule-
based administrative sub-systems and networks” (Scott, 2013:79). Its operation is also 
much larger, with adequate human resources and budget (Meagher, 2005). 
Furthermore, activities of the ICAC are more open than those of the CPIB, giving the 
ICAC national and international appeal. Corruption in Hong Kong decreased 
substantially after the establishment of the ICAC in 1974 (Mao, Wang & Peng, 
2013:1116).  
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Botswana’s DCEC has been successful in its anti-corruption activities (Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime, 2017). But it continues to learn from the ICAC 
(Camerer, 1999:3). The DCEC has wider investigatory powers in terms of section 6 of 
the CECA. It is interesting that the South African NDP 2030 (2015:448) has declared 
that “[a] well-functioning anti-corruption system requires sufficient staff and resources 
with specific knowledge and skills; special legislative powers; high-level information 
sharing and co-ordination; specialised resources and operational independence.” The 
NDP 2030 proposes that, to create a resilient and strong anti-corruption system that 
is well suited to the South African context, South Africa must strengthen the multi-
agency anti-corruption system; strengthen the protection of whistle-blowers; create 
greater oversight over the awarding of large tenders or tenders with long duration; and 
empower the tender compliance monitoring office to investigate corruption and value-
for-money tenders.  
While South Africa and many other countries follow a multi-agency approach in the 
fight against corruption, Hong Kong’s ICAC is an exception (Madonsela, 2010:4). For 
the multi-agency approach to succeed, there must be cordial relations and close 
cooperation and co-ordination between the relevant stakeholders (Pereira et al., 
2012:85; Madonsela, 2010). It is submitted, however, that even though South Africa 
follows a multi-agency approach in an effort to prevent, fight, eliminate and/or reduce 
corruption, the challenge is not only in coordinating these agencies; there is also a 
serious challenge regarding duplication of investigations or functions; waste of human 
resources; fruitless and wasteful expenditure; lack of independence; political 
interference and pressure; and inter-agency conflict between the heads of these 
agencies. This has led the public to lack confidence in these agencies and the 
judiciary. Some of the agencies have been damaged and deformed by political 
contestations (Van Vuuren, 2013:20). 
According to Pereira et al., (2012:20), a single or centralised agency model is 
characterised by shifting multiple anti-corruption activities into a single agency with an 
overarching body governed by strong leadership to oversee a multitude of functions 
and individual entities. It is the submission of the researcher that South Africa cannot 
be an exception in this regard, with high-profile cases still depending investigation and 
others awaiting prosecution.  
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Having ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting 
Corruption (AUCPCC, 2016) like Botswana, South Africa should perhaps consider 
having a single anti-corruption agency to execute its obligations under the convention. 
This will also support its obligations under the UN Anti-Corruption Convention (Low, 
2006:4–5). However, Bruce (2014:54) doubts the efficacy of a single-agency 
approach, claiming that “if the lone anti-corruption body faces political capture, the 
independence of the entire system is compromised.” 
It is clear that South Africa, with multi-agencies and a plethora of legal frameworks, 
has performed very poorly over a period of five years. This could be related to the fact 
that corruption is a widespread phenomenon in both public and private institutions; 
particularly, corruption is now exacerbated among top government officials, SOEs and 
the state’s man, the President himself (Jacob Zuma), who has been implicated in a 
number of lucrative corruption deals in government. Bhorat et al., (2017:14) submit 
that “fraud and corruption proliferated during the 10 years leading up to 2014, peaking 
in 2012”. 
The lack of political will in the country to combat corruption is evident when the 
independence of these multi-agencies is brought into question. Their findings are 
questioned every time by top government officials being investigated and there is also 
too much political pressure and interference from the government. The lack of serious 
punishment for serious corrupt activities sees individuals accepting corruption as 
normal and a way of life in South Africa. Even the head of state is untouchable by the 
very same parliament that appointed him as mandated in section 89(1) and section 
102(2) of the Constitution. It is further evident that the multi-agency approach that the 
country is following is not working as intended; these agencies are headed by former 
cadres of the governing party with the president having the prerogative to appoint 
them. With the current status of politics in South Africa, it is clear that the president of 
the country, having the prerogative to appoint, will and can appoint individuals who are 
loyal to him to avoid investigation and prosecution – which then opens up opportunities 
for corrupt behaviour within these institutions. Quah (1999:75) refers to these 
institutions as “wet and dry agencies – wet agencies being the police for example, and 
dry agencies being research and administrative departments which have no 
interaction with the public whatsoever”.  
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 It has been observed by the former Public Protector, Advocate Madonsela that good 
governance, respect for the rule of law and unfettered independence of the anti-
corruption agencies are “fundamental pillars of a viable anti-corruption and good 
governance framework. [So] is anti-corruption agencies not beholden to the 
government of the day as this undermines their independence, objectivity and, 
needless to say, effectiveness” (Madonsela, 2010:2). The NDP 2030 (2015:448) also 
supports the institutional independence of anti-corruption agencies, but holds that in 
the current system in South Africa their independence is “contentious since they are 
all accountable to the Executive”, making them vulnerable to political influence and 
interference. With the majority party being the government of the day in South Africa, 
the researcher argues that it is highly unlikely that we will see the independence of 
these institutions, especially when former umkhonto we sizwe or political prisoners are 
appointed by the executive to head these institutions. Are these cadres here to seek 
revenge, enrich themselves or serve the nation?  
The researcher further argues that the appointment of heads of these anti-corruption 
agencies by the president is questionable and lacks integrity and independence. 
Although section 84 of the Constitution gives the president the power to make any 
appointments, the key question is: does the “president and other political leaders want 
to maintain control over these agencies for fear of prosecution and avoid legal liability 
for allegations of corruption against them?” (Bruce, 2012:55).  
It is further submitted that, with South Africa relying heavily on several pieces of 
domestic legislation and nine state corruption-fighting bodies, it is evident that the fight 
against corruption in the country is not being won. Corruption has permeated in all 
public and private sectors and these legislative prescripts and anti-corruption agencies 
have become “white elephants”. The South African government is deluged in serious 
allegations of “state capture”.  
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Table 5. 2012–2016 CPI rankings and scores of four countries 
Country Rank 
2012 
Score 
2012 
Rank 
2013 
Score 
2013 
Rank 
2014 
Score 
2014 
Rank 
2015 
Score 
2015 
Rank 
2016 
Score 
2016 
Hong Kong 14 77 15 75 17 74 18 75 15 77 
Singapore 5 87 5 86 7 84 8 85 7 84 
Botswana 30 65 30 64 31 63 28 63 35 60 
South 
Africa 
69 43 72 42 67 44 61 44 64 45 
No. of 
countries 
176 176 177 177 175 175 168 168 176 176 
Source: http://www.transparency.org (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) 
Based on Table 5, it is clear that compared with South Africa the three countries have 
been doing well in terms of rankings and scores over a period of five years. It should 
further be noted that this could be because the three countries are dealing decisively 
with corruption based on the Transparency International reports and that they have a 
single anti-corruption agency dealing with corruption. Between 2012 and 2016, South 
Africa was ranked more corrupt than Singapore, Hong Kong and Botswana, with 
rankings ranging between 61–72 and scores of between 42–45. In comparison, 
Singapore has rankings of between 5–8, scores of between 84–87; and Hong Kong 
has rankings between 14–18 and scores of between 84–87 over a period of five years. 
Botswana’s rankings are between 28–35, with scores ranging between 60–65.  
Majila et al., (2017) recommend that South Africa have an agency like the ICAC, which 
must be divided into three departments: “the Operations Department; the Corruption 
Prevention Department and Community Relations”. As the name suggests, the 
operations department would essentially investigate corruption and corrupt activities. 
The corruption prevention department would work more like a clearing house 
responsible for examining and maintaining proper systems of procedure. It would 
examine the systems and procedures “in the public sector, identify corruption 
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opportunities and make recommendations to eradicate ambiguity and inadequacy in 
the anti-corruption legislation” (Majila et al., 2017:97–98). The role of the community 
relations department would be educational and public advocacy, in that it would “focus 
on educating the public against the immorality of corruption and soliciting their support 
and partnership in combatting corruption” (Majila et al., 2017:98). But, because it is 
expensive to run the Singapore ICAC, the recommendation is that South Africa adopt 
an ICAC that “resemble[s] the New South Wales ICAC which is accountable to 
parliament” (Majila et al., 2017:99) to avoid interference with how the agency will 
discharge its mandate. Furthermore, Majila et al., propose that like the New South 
Wales ICAC, which reports to the premier, the South African ICAC must report 
“informally to the president” (Majila et al., 2017:98). 
Admittedly, this is a very enlightening and interesting proposal that combines certain 
elements of the ICACs of different countries. However, it is submitted that there are a 
few concerns with this proposal. To begin with, it is quick to throw out the baby with 
the bathwater. Instead, in the researcher’s view, efforts must be made to restructure 
and strengthen the existing structures first before establishing a single agency. The 
existing agencies will work as functionaries of such an established single anti-
corruption agency. Secondly, subjecting the ICAC to informal reporting to the president 
will open a Pandora’s box of abuse and manipulation. Even its accountability to 
parliament has some serious and potential risks. How the state capture and Nkandla 
cases have been dealt with by parliament and the former president makes the 
proposed approach by the authors doubtful. 
Another concern that the researcher agrees with, raised by Heilbronn (2004:15), is the 
absence of legislation necessary for the success of the proposed ICAC in South Africa. 
 6.5 SUMMARY  
The discussions in Chapter 6 has been important not only of the contribution of the 
knowledge learnt from comparator jurisdictions, namely Botswana, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Also, because the comparative approach to the research enabled a much 
enlightened and comprehensive review of the issues discussed. In his writing, 
Comparative Research in  Contemporary African Legal Studies, Professor Charles 
Manga Fombad (2018:978) makes reference to Esin Örücü, Maurice Adams, and Guy 
184 
 
Swanson who wrote about the importance of comparative research.  Örücü (2007) 
holds a view that, “the everyday process of thinking involves the making of a series of 
comparisons . . . the process of contrasting and comparing, juxtaposing the unknown 
and the known . . . [and] observing the differences and similarities.” According to 
Swanson (1971), it is unthinkable to think without comparison.  Adams (2011) posits 
that “[a] legal arrangement can only be qualified as satisfactory or good because there 
is another arrangement by which it can be measured; such arrangement is never good 
in and of itself.” It was evident that a comparison in chapter 6 helped provide a better 
view of anti-corruption framework in South Africa as a legal arrangement. 
The independent anti-corruption agencies in Botswana, Hong Kong and Singapore 
have proven relatively successful and can provide valuable lessons for South African. 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Botswana have some common and interpretable patterns 
in combatting corruption. Importantly, their anti-corruption agencies owe their 
successes to political support, better resources, organisational autonomy and 
independence. These attributes, unfortunately, are lacking in the current South African 
anti-corruption machinery. The question that will have to be answered in Chapter 7 is 
which anti-corruption approach and model should South Africa adopt. It is submitted 
from the onset that the researcher prefers a single-agency model or a model that fuses 
the strong characteristics of a multi-agency and a single agency. Also evident from the 
discussion in Chapter 6 is that PRECCA makes no provision for the establishment of 
an independent anti-corruption agency in South Africa, and that the country follows a 
multi-agency approach. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
A comparative determination and appraisal of the South African anti-corruption 
strategies and structures was undertaken in this thesis. In particular, the thesis focused 
on the efficacy on the anti-corruption agencies and the role they play in combating 
corruption in South Africa.  The study has spun over seven chapters, which provided 
valuable information and insight into this study.  This chapter contains a general 
conclusion and finding from data obtained from both literature review and the 
qualitative research. Chapter 7 also makes a number of important submissions and 
recommendations for consideration by the South African authorities. Provisions for 
recommended constitutional and legislative reforms will be suggested were possible. 
The recommendations are intended to address the shortfalls and challenges in the 
South African anti-corruption environment as identified in the literature and in observed 
and qualitative research, with the eventual goal of improving the efficacy of the South 
African anti-corruption agencies and legal instruments. The limitations and 
contributions of the study, and proposals for future research are covered in this 
Chapter.  
7.2 RECAPITULATION OF PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose statement of this study was manifold, and included identifying the 
relevant theories of corruption, analyse them, and apply them to determine the 
causes and effects of corruption and its impact on organisations and society; 
reviewing the current South African anti-corruption legislative and regulation framework 
to determine their efficacy; formulating and/or designing a more effective and efficient 
anti-corruption strategies and action plans to assist in addressing the bane of corruption 
in  South Africa. This was to be influenced by best practices in comparative 
jurisdictions and the researcher’s experiences.  
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In order to facilitate the execution of this study and to achieve the aim of this thesis a 
few research questions were set, which dealt with the following critical issues: the 
fundamental issues, concepts and knowledge in corruption,  theories of corruption, 
its causes and effects and its impact on organisations and society; factors that will 
have a direct influence on formulating and designing effective and efficient anti-
corruption strategies and action plans for South Africa; the nature of and the lessons 
from anti-corruption structures and strategies in Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Botswana; the type of technical and operational training in anti-corruption 
management, corruption investigation and corruption and anti-corruption community 
education existing in South Africa. 
7.3 SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS, FINDINGS AND MAIN ARGUMENTS 
7.3.1    Extend of the Research Problem 
Chapter 1 contextualised the study by demarcating and outlining the research problem, 
research questions, research objectives and limitations, and research design and 
methodology. provides an overview of the entire study. Moreover, the chapter clarified 
certain important terms and concepts in paragraph 1.8 such as corruption and State 
capture. Preliminary findings in Chapter 1 were that corruption is a serious problem in 
South Africa. This has been confirmed by both the 2017 and the 2018 Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) of the transparency international. A number of instruments are 
used to rate and measure country corruptions. The 2018 CPI, for instance, showed no 
improvement in South Africa’s CIP from that of 2017. Like in 2017, South Africa is still 
ranked at number 73 with a global average score of 43.  South Africa’s ranking, 
according to Sibanda (2019 – Daily Maverick), is a far cry from the countries that the 
study used for comparative purposes.  Singapore is ranked position number 3, Hong 
Kong ranked number 14 and Botswana ranked number 34 with a global average score 
of 61.   
Chapter 1 briefly touches on the key issues addressed from chapters 2 to 5. It was 
observed, for instance, that over the years South African government and executive 
members have periodically been involved in corruption scandals. 
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7.3.2    Previous Research 
In Chapter 2, A Thematic Reflection on Extant Literature on Corruption, the first 
question (question 1.4.1) in this study was addressed that sought to understand the 
prevai l ing scholarship and discourse on fundamental issues, concepts and 
knowledge in corruption as a phenomenon. Chapter 2 also covered issues related to 
the second question of the study (question 1.4.2) that deals with the ills of corruption 
through specifically looking at the impacts of corruption on the society and 
governance in general. In particular, the chapter addressed the following sub-
questions: What has been written about this topic before, if anything? What are the 
existing relevant debates? What are the key ideas and findings in the current literature 
on the topic and the specific problems identified? What are the gaps in the literature 
that call for further research? Therefore, this section will give a brief overview of the 
findings of the study and their relationship to previous work in these areas. In Chapter 
2 the study also looked specifically at issues of the current and historical prevalence 
of corruption in South Africa; perceptions and understanding of the meaning and 
importance of corruption and corrupt practices in South Africa and other jurisdictions; 
best practices in the combatting of corruption and the appropriate institutional, 
legislative and regulatory frameworks in the selected comparative jurisdictions; and 
international and regional anti-corruption instruments.  
According to previous study, corruption is a bane in many democracies and its 
corrosive effect have both macro-economic, macro-political and macro-social impact 
on the citizenry and on the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Data and findings in 
Chapter 2 are broadly in line  with the researcher’s observation and lived experiences 
in the South Africa context. The prevalence of corruption in South Africa and its 
effects have been eloquently captured in several reports of the Public Protector 
including the In  the Extreme: Report no.11 of 2011/12 of the Public Protector on an 
investigation into allegations of a breach of the executive ethics code by the minister 
of cooperative governance and traditional affairs, Mr Sicelo Shiceka, MP; the Against 
the rules too, Report of the Public Protector in terms of section 182(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and section 8(1) of the Public 
Protector Act, 1994 on an investigation into complaints  and allegations of 
maladministration, improper and unlawful conduct by the department of public works 
and the South African police service (SAPS) relating to the leasing of SAPS 
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accommodation in Durban, 2011, and the infamous Secure in Comfort: Report by the 
Public Protector on an investigation into allegations of impropriety and unethical 
conduct relating to the installation and implementation of security measures by the 
department of public works at and in respect of the private residence of president 
Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal province, Report no: 25 of 2013/24, 
March 19 2014; and the Public Protector State Capture Report of 14 October 2016.   
 
7.3.3       Importance of Ethics in the Fight Against Corruption 
Thus, the study in Chapter 3, Ethical dimensions of corruption and corrupt practices 
in governance and public service in South Africa, a focus was on ethics, ethical 
leadership and governance, and anti-corruption corporate as antecedent to fighting 
public sector corruption. It was found in Chapter 3 that public officials and government 
executives are often entangled in serious acts of misconduct, unethical performance 
of functions and allegations of involvement in corrupt activities. Notable was the VBS 
Mutual Bank – The Great Bank Heist report, which detailed how certain municipalities 
violated prohibitions not to invest municipal finances in mutual banks and how some 
of these municipal officials abused their public office position for private gain. Chapter 
3 also considered some theoretical underpinnings including Bundura’s Social 
Learning Theory that address learnt standards of behaviour (Agbim, 2018:24); and 
the those having the Stakeholder Theory which proposes that those with governance 
and oversight responsibility have a duty to always act in the best interest of the 
stakeholders (Agbim, 2018:24). Furthermore, Chapter 3 addressed several types of 
leaderships. Particularly relevant to this study was Ethical Leadership in terms of 
which the ethics and moral character of executive and/or public leaders are regarded 
as important in promoting good governance and fighting the bad influence of 
corruption (Naidoo, 2012:26). Discussed also in Chapter 3 was Servant Leaders, the 
essence of which places leaders as servants of those they lead (Okagbue, 2012:43–
47). The important of reference to servant leadership was to highlight the fact that 
leaders must serve the interest of the people the lead and not be preoccupied with 
lining their pockets with illicit gains and benefits for themselves and their families.  
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In terms of the third research question (question 1.4.3) that looked at the role ethics 
plays in anti-corruption measures, strategies and good governance; and the fourth 
research question (question 1.4.4) that addressed the issues of an appropriate 
leadership approaches and characteristics, the findings of Chapter 3 seem to build in 
particular on the work and sentiments of some researchers reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Information obtained in Chapter 3 places ethics as an important element of efforts to 
fight corruption. Likewise, the studies reveal a strong link between ethics and 
corruptions.   Ethics and moral behaviour are important in the understanding of 
corruption and corrupt practices. Sadly, ethical leadership, good governance and 
corporate culture was found to be lacking in the government.  To recap what Naidoo 
(2012:26) said, there exists a gap “between ethical leadership, corruption and 
governance” that affect clean governance and impact negatively on combating 
corruption. Undoubtedly, ethical conduct and corruption cannot be addressed 
separately. They are “two sides of the one coin” (Whitton, 2001:13), which needs to 
be urgently addressed (see Cheteni & Shindika, 2017; Gildenhuys, 2004:6). 
7.3.4     Current Anti-Corruption Normative Framework  
Chapter 4, Anti-corruption normative framework, dealt with the current normative anti-
corruption frameworks both nationally and internationally. These are important in 
guiding how corruption and corrupt practices must be dealt with, and determining if 
the South African anti-corruption agencies have been successful in implementing the 
letter and the spirit of these normative frameworks (Van Vuuren, 2016:1). Specifically 
dealt with in this Chapter included Prevention of Corruption and Corrupt Practices Act 
together with its 2018 Amendment Bill that criminalises corruption; the Criminal 
Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 (CPA); Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 of 
1998 (POCA) that deals with the issue of the participation in illicit activities and being 
party to the laundering or concealment of the nature, source, location, disposition or 
movement of the property or its ownership; the National Prosecuting Authority Act 
that deals with the powers of the national prosecuting authority, and the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution of 1996. Likewise, Chapter 4 covered the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN Anti-Corruption Convention); the African 
Union Convention Against Corruption (AU Anti-Corruption Convention); the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Protocol Against Corruption (SADC Anti-Corruption Protocol).  
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These instruments deals extensively with anti-corruption interventions (Sibanda, 
2005; Corr & Lawler, 1999; George, Lacey & Birmele, 2000; Gantz, 1998; Earle, 
1998). 
Findings in Chapter 4, with regard to the investigation of the fifth research question 
(question 1.4.5) that focus on the key national legislative or normative framework and 
South Africa’s regional and international obligations to combat corruption, revealed a 
globally accepted normative foundation for anti-corruption framework in South Africa.  
Numerous international and regional anti-corruption instruments enjoin state parties 
to take appropriate measures to find corruption (Pereira et al., 2012; Sibanda, 2005). 
Noted, with regard to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention in particular, is that there is 
a need for an effective and coordinated anti-corruption policies implemented by 
independent anti-corruption bodies and the independent judiciary. Both these bodies 
must have discharged their statutory duties without fear or favour.  Likewise, the AU 
Anti-Corruption Convention 2003 addressed the establishment of an anti-corruption 
agencies (Pereira et al., 2012). It was revealed that the formation of the AU Anti-
Corruption Convention was preceded by the SADC Anti-Corruption Protocol of 2001, 
and that the former covered the areas of concern addressed in the Protocol.  
Revealed in Chapter 4 is also the fact that PRECCA, section 23, proposes the 
possibility of an investigation by the NDPP into the lifestyle of person suspected or 
alleged to have been involved in illicit enrichment activities. This investigation, 
commonly known as lifestyle audit, will look into several issues including the standard 
of living above the person’s means; access to, possession or control of pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary not proportionate to his or her present or past known sources of income 
or assets; and involvement in corruption and corrupt activities. 
Covered in the findings in Chapter 4 is also the 2017 introduction of the Political Party 
Funding Bill, which is expected to be enacted into law by the end of 2019. This is a 
very important development because it has been found elsewhere that political party 
funding is the bedrock of corruption. 
With regard to punishment for corruption, it was noted in Chapter 4 that the courts 
consider corruption a serious offence that merits inhibitive penalties. In Phillips v The 
State, for example, the court highlighted that contravening section 4(1)(a)(i)(aa) of 
PRECCA is a serious offence.  
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And that the seriousness of this offence must be one of the key consideration when 
deciding on the punishment or sentencing of the wrongdoer. The court arrived at this 
concluding by referring to the case of S v Narker & Another which labelled bribery 
(corruption) as an “ugly offence striking cancerously at the roots of justice and integrity, 
and it is calculated to deprive society of a fair administration” that must be treated with 
the disdain its deserves. 
  
7.3.5      Functional Effectiveness of the South African Anti-corruption Strategies, 
Structures and Related Institutions 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, South African Anti-corruption Strategies, Structures and 
Related Institutions, dealt with the crux of this study. Also, it responded to the sixth 
research question (question 1.4.6) of this study that questions amongst others the 
successes and failures of the South African anti-corruption agencies in their fight 
against corruption.  Though some few significant successes can be noted, a number 
of deficiencies were revealed.  It was particularly noted that the operational 
effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in South Africa was affected by many issues 
including the multi-agency approach of the entire system and political interference. 
Noted and discussed as part of this multi-agency was the parliament; the Office of the 
Public Protector; the Office of the Auditor-General; the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate (IPID), the National Prosecution Authority (NPA); the South 
African Police Services (SAPS) with its specialised units including the Commercial 
Crimes Unit (CCU), the Hawks, the Special Investigation Unit (SIU); the Judiciary 
(Courts); and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). 
Central to this study was the revelation in Chapter 5 that in terms of section 179(5) of 
the Constitution, the NDPP is entrusted with determining prosecution policy and 
issuing policy directives to drive the prosecution processes. Also that pursuant to 
section 11 of the NPA Act, DNDPPs are subject to the control, direction and oversight 
of the NDPP.  Accompanying discussions highlighted the fact that the role of the 
President in appointing DPPs may lead to political interference with the functioning of 
the NPA. This concern, as discussed in chapter 5, was demonstrated in several cases 
including Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA and Others 2013 (1) SA 248 
(CC); 2012 (12) BCLR 1297 (CC); the Corruption Watch (RF) NPC and Another v 
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President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Council for the Advancement of 
the South African Constitution v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
[2018] 1 All SA 471 (GP). The latter case questioned critically the credibility of the NPA 
and the legality and validity of the appointment of Adv. Shaun Abrahams as the NDPP. 
The court subsequently ruled that Adv. Abrahams must vacate office as the NDPP.  
Also noted in Chapter 5 was political interference and encroachment into the 
independence of some of these institutions. A case in point was the Helen Suzman 
Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2014] ZACC 32 (Glenister III),  
which involved the appointment of the Head of IPID.  
The analysis of the data in relation to the six research questions, generally seems to 
support the various assertions in the literature review and case law that anti-corruption 
measures and initiatives cannot thrive in an environment marred with political 
interference. Also, that the reluctance sometimes of some of these institution to 
investigate and prosecute corruption is found to be problematic. One of the main 
concerns is that ACAs in South Africa are paper tigers (Sibanda, 2019a), who are 
stifled in the performance of their functions and exercise of their powers are muffled 
by unwarranted and excessive political interference. Their independence is severely 
compromised. The concepts of investigatory and prosecutorial independence proved 
to be a useful one in countries such as Singapore, Botswana and Hong Kong as 
demonstrated in Chapter 6 of this study. 
  
7.3.6   Best Practices and Lessons for Comparative Jurisdictions 
In Chapter 6, Foreign Jurisdictions and the Fight Against Corruption: Lessons from 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Botswana, a comparative enquiry of best practices and 
successes of foreign jurisdictions was conducted. Chapter 6 addressed the research 
question raised in question six (question 1.4.6) of the study, which focuses on the anti-
corruption structures and strategies that have been adopted in different countries that 
are known to have effective anti-corruption regime. In terms of the findings, a number 
of best practices in these jurisdictions are noted and possible lessons for South Africa 
are identifiable. It was revealed that Hong Kong, Singapore, and Botswana have some 
common and interpretable patterns in combatting corruption.  
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In addition, what came out of the discussions in Chapter 6 is that these countries have 
fairly successful anti-corruption agencies. In Singapore the Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) leads the fight against corruption. The Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is responsible for effectively rooting out 
corruption in Hong Kong (Quah, 2017). So successful has the ICAC been that its 
model and approach has been adopted in other countries such as New South Wales 
(Majila et al., 2017. See also OECD, 2008:9; Man-wai, 2006).  
Botswana’ Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) has reportedly 
been very successful in its efforts to combat corruption and corrupt activities 
(Sebudubudu, 2013; Mbao & Komboni, 2008). Notable about Botswana is that DCEC 
was established in 1994 under the Corruption and Economic Crime Act to investigate 
all forms of corruption, taking over from the Police who were then responsible for 
investigating corruption. However, PRECCA makes no provision for the establishment 
of an independent anti-corruption agency in South Africa. This, in my view, is a grave 
omission given the fact that PRECCA is the country’s key anti-corruption specific 
legislation which should have dealt with all relevant issues needed to combat 
corruption. This omission has contributed to the fragmentation of the country’s anti-
corruption work. The Act also does not make any provision for the establishment of an 
Independent Anti-Corruption Commission Against Corruption in South Africa. 
Comparatively, in the case of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (In 
the case of Hong Kong, the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission Against 
Corruption was established under the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
Ordinance and in the case of Singapore; the Commission was established under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act. 
 
7.4       SUBMISSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The submissions and recommendations in this section are postulated in thematic 
forms to properly depict and capture the problems identified in this study.  
7.4.1    Prosecutorial Independence and the NPA Act 
(a) The Constitutional Court in Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA and 
Others, discussed in Chapter 5.4.1, (at para 49) directed the president that 
when he appoints the NDPPA he must ensure always that the prosecutorial 
functions will be performed honestly and without fear, favour or prejudice; fairly; 
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and without any improper interference, hindrance or obstruction by any organ 
of state. It is submitted that the current provisions of the NPA Act has a number 
of loopholes, which makes it possible for the executive to thwart the provisions 
of the Act. Also, which as they stand will make it easy for the circumvention of 
the Constitutional Court in Democratic Alliance v President of RSA and others. 
It is therefore recommended that the following provision should be included in 
the NPA Act: 
 
 CHAPTER 4A 
20A Independence of National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(1)   Subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the National 
Director of Prosecutions— 
(c) is independent and is not subject to the direction or control of anyone 
with the required constitutional and legislative authority to exercise such 
control or direction; and 
(d) must exercise his or her functions impartially, honestly, without fear, 
favour or prejudices. 
           21A  Conduct of officers of National Prosecuting Authority 
(1)  The National Director of Public Prosecutions and other officers of the 
National Prosecuting Authority must act in accordance with this 
Constitution and the law. 
(2)  No officer of the National Prosecuting Authority may, in the exercise of 
his or her functions— 
(e) act in a partisan manner; 
(f) further the interests of any political party or cause; 
(g) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or 
(h) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person. 
(3)  Officers of the National Prosecuting Authority must not be active 
members or office bearers of any political party or organisation. 
(4)  The political neutrality of officers of the National Prosecuting Authority 
is of paramount importance to the country criminal justice system and 
the prosecutorial system. 
 
The provisions are also influenced by the provisions of the Ugandan Constitution 
dealing with the functions and appointment the national prosecuting directorate and 
the Uganda National Prosecuting Authority Act of 5 of 2014. In particular, the 
195 
 
Constitution of Uganda put it in no uncertain terms that political interference into the 
powers and functions of the national prosecuting authority is not allowed. 
 
(b) Alternatively, it is suggested that sections in line with the provisions of 179 of the 
Constitution be amended with the insertion of 179(5A) as follows: 
5A Autonomy and Independence of the Prosecuting Authority 
(a)   Subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: -   
(i) National Director of Prosecutions—is independent and is not 
subject to the direction or control of anyone with the required 
constitutional and legislative authority to exercise such 
control or direction; a 
(ii) The National Director of Public Prosecutions and other 
officers of the National Prosecuting Authority must act in 
accordance with this Constitution and the law. 
(b)  No officer of the National Prosecuting Authority may, in the 
exercise of his or her functions— 
(i) act in a partisan manner; 
(ii) further the interests of any political party or cause; 
(iii) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause;   
(iv) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person. 
(c)  Officers of the National Prosecuting Authority must not be active 
members or office bearers of any political party or organisation. 
(d)  The political neutrality of officers of the National Prosecuting 
Authority is of paramount importance to the country criminal justice 
system and the prosecutorial system. 
7.4.2 Establishment of an Independent Anti-Corruption Directorate 
a) It is recommended that South Africa must established an independent anti-
corruption directorate (IACD) dedicated to systematically deal with corruption. 
This proposal is not entirely new. It was first hinted by the Constitutional Court 
on 17 March 2011, the Constitutional Court in Glenister II case (at para [200]) 
held that “…[on] a common sense approach, our law demands a body outside 
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executive control to deal effectively with corruption” and further clearly 
supported by the same court, when the Chief Justice famously stated that “We 
are in one accord that SA needs an agency dedicated to the containment and 
eventual eradication of the scourge of corruption. We also agree that that entity 
must enjoy adequate structural and operational independence to deliver 
effectively and efficiently on its core mandate…” The country’s need for a 
dedicated anti-corruption agency was pundit the 2019 State of the Nation 
Address (SONA). President Ramaphosa hinted to the urgent need to establish 
an independent anti-corruption directorate (IACD) within the NPA, which was 
met with mixed reactions (See discussions Chapter 1.2 infra). It is also 
noteworthy that the AU Convention calls for the establishment of an anti-
corruption agency pursuant to Article 5(3) of the convention (Pereira et al., 
2012:15; RSA, 2025:3).   
 
b) The SONA announcement by the President was received with mixed reaction 
– some applauding it and others calling it the revival of the failed Scorpions. 
The autonomy of IACD was immediately put into doubt, with some 
commentators describing it as “no different, no less unconstitutional and 
no better” than the failed scorpions (Hoffman 2019). In a more pointed 
attack on the establishment of the of the directorate Hoffman (2019) stated: 
Against this background the decision of the President to 
announce, during his SONA on 7 February 2019, that he intends 
to establish a State Capture Investigative Directorate in the 
National Prosecuting Authority is perplexing. He is a lawyer, he 
must surely understand that the anti-corruption machinery of state 
cannot be independent and secure in its tenure if it is within his 
own executive gift, ahead of the executive branch of government, 
to create it and to end its existence as well as to determine its 
terms of reference. The provisions in the NPA Act upon which he 
will rely in establishing the new unit are clearly inconsistent with 
the Constitution as it was interpreted in the two cases mentioned 
above. 
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These doubts, it is submitted, are justifiable given what has happened before and 
the caution issued by the courts with regard the independence of anti-corruption 
agencies. In Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others [2014] ZACC 32 (Glenister III), at para 32, the Constitutional Court stated 
that “[t]he overriding consideration is whether the DPCI legislation has inbuilt 
autonomy-protecting features to enable its members to carry out their duties 
without any inhibitions or fear of reprisal. It is therefore submitted that the IADC 
legislation must contain a clear provision which is functionally similar to that 
recommended in 7.5.1 for insertion in the NPA Act. 
 
c) It is further recommended that South Africa must follow a single agency 
approach of the multi-agency approach. It is submitted that a single agency 
approach avoids many challenges including duplication of functions by the 
different anti-corruption agencies and the resultant operational ineffectiveness, 
and the lack of proper control and co-operation to mention a few (Van Vuuren, 
2013). In chapter 6.5 it was stated that Majila et al., (2017) has recommended 
a single agency, which must be divided into three departments: “the Operations 
Department; the Corruption Prevention Department; and Community 
Relations”.  Majila et al., (2017) proposal echoes the provision of the ACC Bill, 
discussed item 7.6.7 below, which puts under the ACC four different units 
namely: a) the Special Operations Unit; (b) the Research, Prevention and Policy 
Formulation Unit, (c) Education and Public Relations Unit; and the (d) the 
Administrative Unit. It is submitted, in light of the recommendation by Majila et 
al., (2017), that the Directorate with separate but inter-dependent units is ideal 
for South Africa. It will also be aligned to the ACC Bill. To this end, the following 
departments of the IADC are suggested: (a) Operations Department; (b) the 
Corruption Prevention Department; (c) Education and Public Relations 
Department; and (d) Research and Policy Development Department. 
 
d) Another important issue to address is who will have the power to appoint the 
heads of the IACD. The current law provides that heads of these agencies are 
appointed by the President in terms of section 84 of the Constitution. The in-
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build safeguard is that the President makes such an appointment after 
recommendations of appointable person where made by the Judicial Services 
Commission. Therefore, the position can be maintained. Otherwise the country 
may require constitutional amendment through revising the provisions of 
section 84 of the Constitution. 
e) On 17 March 2011, the Constitutional Court in Glenister II case (at para [200]) 
held that “…[on] a common sense approach, our law demands a body outside 
executive control to deal effectively with corruption”.  This was again followed 
by the Constitutional Court in 2014 when the Chief Justice famously stated that 
“We are in one accord that SA needs an agency dedicated to the containment 
and eventual eradication of the scourge of corruption. We also agree that entity 
must enjoy adequate structural and operational independence to deliver 
effectively and efficiently on its core mandate…” Therefore to guarantee its 
independence and in line with the observation by the Constitutional Court in the 
2011 and the 2014 cases, it is recommended that the IACD must be 
accountable to parliament under the oversight of the anti-corruption 
commission proposed in paragraph 7.5.3 infra. It must not be accountable to 
the executive branch of the state such as the Ministry of Police. The IACD will 
thus have the characteristics of both the Hong Kong ICAC and the New South 
Wales ICAC. New South Wales ICAC is accountable only to Parliament and the 
Hong Kong ICAC is under the oversight of a few committees including the 
Operations Review Committee. The Operations Review Committee share 
some similar functions and responsibilities as those assigned to the ACC under 
the Anti-Corruption Commission Bill (ACC Bill) that is also discussed under the 
proposal in 7.5.3 infra. Botswana is rather an exception because the DCEC is 
under the Office of the President and formally and directly responsible to the 
president. Under normal circumstances, such accountability and oversight line 
should be a cause for concern. However, perhaps what sets it apart is the 
political will in Botswana to fight corruption. 
f)  At the time of submission for examination of this thesis, there was no information 
on the exact as to the composition and powers and functions of the IACD. It is 
submitted and recommended that the legislation to be enacted must draw 
largely from that setting the powers and functions of the Botswana DCEC (see 
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discussion in Chapter 6.4.7 infra), and some of the key provisions of the anti-
corruption commission bill (ACC Bill).  
7.4.5   Establishment of an Independent Anti-Corruption Court 
a) Corruption is so endemic in South Africa. Therefore, it is important that a 
specialised independent anti-corruption court (IACC) is established with 
dedicated resources deal with corruption, particularly if the proposed IACD was 
to succeed. This court will work with the IACD and the ACC. The special 
commercial crimes court may serve as a model for the possibility of such a 
court. 
 
7.4.5 Strengthen Sanctions for Corruption 
a) It is recommended that policy formulation on specific-minimum sentencing 
guidelines for corrupt or minimum sentencing legislation for corruption 
offences modelled on Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, section 51 
to 53. Alternatively, PRECCA must be amended and inserted to it a substantive 
provision of sentencing of corruption offender. This recommendation takes into 
account the discussions in Chapter 2.8 with regard appropriate sentences, 
particularly with the approach of the sentencing guidelines for corruption in the 
United States; rejection of the minimum sentencing guidelines in some 
jurisdictions such as Indonesia; the issues of abuse of public office for corrupt 
purposes and the fact that the South African court in Phillips v The State 
abhorred the small sentenced imposed by the trial court for corruption as 
inappropriate for the facts in question. 
 
b) To recap, sections 51 – 57 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
used to prescribe certain strict minimum sentences for a variety of crimes 
including rape and robbery.  It is submitted that this legislation was intended to 
promote reaching appropriate sentences. The enactment of the Act followed 
the outcry against serious crimes being perpetrated and the perception that 
courts were imposing very lenient sentences, while on the other hand the 
legislature did little about the situation. Therefore, any objection against such 
a minimum sentences legislation for corruption offences would pass muster 
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the constitutionality test following cases such a S v Dukaza, Sv Tilly, S v Tshilo 
2000(2) SACR 443(CC) and S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC) .  
 
7.4.6   Develop an Anti-Corruption Tool Kit 
a) The proposal in paragraph 7.5.4 regarding strengthened and minimum 
sentences for corruption will in my view be bolstered by the creation of a toolkit 
for corruption offences. The formulation and compilation of the South African 
anti-corruption tool kit (ACTK) can follow the multi-layered definition of 
corruption contained in the United Nations’ Anti-Corruption Toolkit. Also, it can 
assist the proposed South African ACC and IACD by providing guidance with 
integrity management. 
 
b) As highlighted in Chapter 1, the conception of corruption has different 
manifestations and some of the activities that in essence are corrupt activities 
may be labelled differently to avoid being regarded as corruption. A typical 
example is wasteful expenditure, which in South Africa has even been 
understood to included using state resources for indirect private gain. Also, 
bribery in South Africa is generally not treated firmly as a corrupt activity – it is 
in most cases treated as a mere common law offence involving illicit benefits. 
Although it may not be possible to have an exhaustive list of what constitute 
corruption and corrupt activities, the ACTK may assist in delineating key 
elements of what must be considered corruption including state capture in its 
different forms. The ACTK must not differentiate in seriousness the difference 
between active corruption and passive corruption. Likewise, the proposed ACC 
must not differentiate in severity of the sentence to be imposed the difference 
between passive and active corruption. And between grand corruption and 
petty corruption. The use of toolkit or toolbox has proven helpful in Namibia, for 
example. For instance, the Namibian ACA is using Integrity Management 
Toolbox developed by CEWAS to enhance its corruption prevention activities. 
The monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the toolbox is the 
responsibility of the Directorate Public Education and Corruption Prevention. 
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7.4.7 Establish Anti-Corruption Commission as a Chapter 9 Institution 
a) The establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) as a Chapter 9 
institution in South Africa will strengthen the country’s fight against corruption. 
The proposed ACC will have to work co-operatively with the independent anti-
corruption directorate (IACD) and the independent anti-corruption court (IACC) 
proposed in paragraphs 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 respectively.  Linking the ACC to these 
institutions will alleviate integrity and independence concerns that have been 
raised against establishing the IACD within the NPA.  
 
b) With regard to this proposal there will be no need to re-invent the wheel 
because already there is a Bill for the establishment of the Anti-Corruption 
Commission (hereinafter the ACC Bill). The relevant provision of the ACC Bill 
reads as follows: 
 
2. The Commission is hereby established in terms of Chapter 9 of 
the Constitution and must therefore— 
(a) be subject only to the Constitution and the law and exercise its 
power without fear, favour or prejudice in terms of section 181 
(2) of the Constitution; 
(b) be assisted by other organs of state through legislative and 
other measures to ensure its impartiality, dignity, independence 
and effectiveness in terms of section 181 (3) of the Constitution; 
(c) be free from political and any other interference from any 
person or organ of state in its functioning; and 
(d) be accountable only to people of the Republic as represented 
by the National Assembly. 
c) A commendable characteristic of the proposed ACC is that it is clearly to be 
accountable only to the National Assembly, and will be “free from political and 
any other interference from any person or organ of state in its functioning.” 
Equally relevant to the anti-corruption framework is the clear division of the ACC 
into three functionaries of — (a) the Special Operations Unit; (b) the Research, 
Prevention and Policy Formulation Unit, (c) Education and Public Relations 
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Unit; and the (d) the Administrative Unit pursuant to section 4 of the ACC Bill. 
It is submitted that the ACC may be structured in such a way to work closely 
and seamlessly with the IACD and the IACC. Section 10(e) of the ACC Bill, for 
instance, sets as one of the functions of the commissioners of the ACC 
authorizing corruptions investigations. Therefore, once completed the ACC can 
forward the outcomes of its investigations to the IACD and the ICC for further 
investigation and prosecution.    
 
d) In terms of section 11 of the ACC Bill the ACC “is a decision-making body 
focused on coordinating the investigation, prevention, education and fighting of 
corruption in the Republic of South Africa”. Section 13(1) on the Special 
Operations Unit states that the Unit “is the law-enforcement branch of the 
Commission and is concerned with investigation and prosecution of corrupt 
activities.” It is submitted that this may sound like a duplication of efforts in light 
of the proposed IACD, with possible consequences of blunting the operational 
and prosecutorial effectiveness of the country’s anti-corruption agencies as was 
discussed in paragraph 7.4.5 infra.   
 
e) It is submitted that with the advent of the establishment of the IACD (and the 
IACC) the lawmakers must revisit the provisions of the ACC Bill to ensure clear 
synergy with other anti-corruption bodies. Alternatively, the lawmakers must go 
back to the drawing board to start a comprehensive law making process the 
outcomes of which should be three legislations on the IACD, IACC and the 
ACC. 
7.4.8 Establish the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 
a) Article 5 of the UN Anti-Corruption Convention, to which South Africa is a party, 
requires State Parties to develop and implement a comprehensive National 
Anti-Corruption Strategy. To respond to this obligation, the proposed ACC could 
take lead in establishing the anti-corruption strategy and action plan. 
Comparatively, for example, in 2006 the Namibia Anti-corruption Commission 
(ACC) established as an independent and impartial body under section 2 of 
Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003, launched its National Anti-Corruption Strategy 
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and Action Plan, aimed at consolidating Namibia’s commitment to fight 
corruption (Wyland, 2017).   
 
b) Already the ACC Bill has paved the way for the possible development of the 
strategy. The South Africa must in the minimum set out a clear matrix and the 
action plan for fighting corruption. The strategy document must contain a 
framework with goals and strategic objectives with realistic implementation 
timelines. It is submitted  South Africa must develop a Monitoring and 
Evaluation Plan as a matter of urgency to operate as a framework or strategic 
document organisation the strategy.   
 
c) It is recommended that included as part of the key or core part of the strategy 
must be expression on: Increasing the level of political accountability; 
Preventing corruption in government offices, ministries, agencies and public 
enterprises; third objective targets Public Enterprises (formerly known as State-
Owned; Conducting extensive anti-corruption education;  Engaging civil society 
and the media in combating corruption; and supporting the role of the media in 
fighting corruption instead of regarding the media as the enemy of the 
government executives and politically connected families. 
 
7.4.8    Formation of the National Ethics and Integrity Directorate 
a) It is recommended that as part of institutional building and revitalization the 
South African government must establish the National Ethics and Integrity 
Directorate (NEID). The Directorate must be responsible for generating and 
implementing a National Strategy for Mainstreaming Ethics and Integrity in all 
Sectors and all Institutions in National Governance in South Africa. In particular, 
NEID must put in place a harmonized, nationally agreed understanding of ethics 
and integrity and a value system in the three arms of government and public 
service in general. NEID could also be responsible for conducting integrity 
assessment on law enforcement agencies involved in anti-corruption activities 
to determine their suitability and fitness to hold office. 
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b) It is further submitted that the proposed NEID will better located within the Office 
of the Public Service Commission, which currently is the custodian of the 
National Anti-Corruption Hotline. The Parliamentary Committee on Ethics and 
the proposed ACC must jointly and severally be responsible for the oversight 
of the ethical operations of law anti-enforcement agencies and related 
formations.  
 
c) It is further recommended that the provincial and local government of NEID - to 
be named Provincial Government Ethics and Integrity Directorate (PEID) and 
the Local Government Ethics and Integrity Directorate (LEID) respectively must 
be established.  Represented in the EID must be the proposed ACC, the NPA, 
IACD, PEDs and LEIDs, and these individuals must be champions of ethics and 
integrity values in their units appointed based on their unimpeachable ethical 
standards and moral compass.  This proposed composition of the NEID is 
borne out of the acknowledgement corruption and corrupt practices permeates 
all levels of the society and governance. NEID and its provincial and local 
equivalents will further promote the Minimum Anti-Corruption Capacity (MACC) 
requirements, which seek to ensure the existence of corruption free systems in 
government departments.  
 
d) In both his 2018 SONA and the 2019 SONA the President emphasized that 
Law enforcement integrity and effectiveness is critical to the fight against 
corruption, and was again buttressed in the SONA.  Anti-corruption stance and 
ethical behavior of law enforcement agencies is, for example, required in the 
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (General Assembly resolution 
34/169, annex). Article 7 of the Code puts on notice States Parties that “Law 
enforcement officials shall not commit any act of corruption. Parties shall also 
rigorously oppose and combat all such acts.”  Article 8 of the Code further states 
that “Law enforcement officials shall respect the law and the present Code. 
They shall also, to the best of their capability, prevent and rigorously oppose 
any violations of them.”  
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e) Such a directorate will re-inforce the operations of similar focused units or 
frameworks in the government such as the Public Sector Integrity Management 
Framework, which has been put in place. The Public Sector Integrity 
Management Framework was put in place to promote ethical conduct and 
augment the integrity management methods and standards in the public service 
(Kekae, 2017:15-16). 
 
7.4.9    Recalibration of Parliamentary Ethics Committee 
a) It is suggested that the current institutional set-up of the Parliamentary ethics 
committee must be recalibrated. A preferred approach would be to follow the 
United States model where the legislature through a Committee on Standards 
of Official Conduct (renamed Committee on Ethics in 2011) administer the 
ethics regime.  
 
In 2008, the US Congressional House created the Office of Congressional 
Ethics (OCE) whose responsibility is to review allegations of unethical conduct 
and make recommendations to the Committee on Ethics. The OCE staff is 
made up primarily of attorneys and other professionals with the necessary 
expertise in ethics law and investigations. An eight-person Board of Directors 
has an oversight responsibility over the activities of the OEC (Chêne, 2016:6). 
An important feature of the system is that private citizens are allowed to lodge 
complaints directly to OEC (Chêne, 2016:6). 
7.4.10 Streamline Anti-Corruption Oversight 
a) Streamlining of the current oversight entities for anti-corruption and law 
enforcement agencies would improve accountability and effectiveness of the 
South African anti-corruption entity/entities. Experience has shown that the 
more division or executive officials are bestowed with the oversight 
responsibility, the more difficult the monitoring and accountability assurances. 
This was demonstrated clearly as problem with regard the appointment of the 
Head of IPID. Due to the multiplicity of individuals and departments or 
government portfolios that should be involved in the decision-making, critical 
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decisions are often stalled by bargaining and inter-governmental institutions 
compromise. 
 
7.5.11 Institute General Public Disclosures and Life Style Audits of Government 
Executives and Public Service Officials 
a) As noted in Chapter 4, the PRECCA17 Bill calls for a regime that will permit the   
NDPP to petition the judge for lifestyle investigation.  The proposal in section 
23 of the PRECAA17 Bill must be extended to the audits of lifestyles of 
Government Executives and some key public service officials. Moreover, it is 
recommended that South Africa must establish a credible, effective and 
peremptory financial disclosure systems for government executives and other 
public officials.  
 
b) It is submitted that it must be made clear to those assuming office in the 
government that mandatory financial disclosures and lifestyle audits are part of 
accountability regime, and may not be resisted under the defence of the right 
to privacy. Through such measures, the state will be enabled to further obtain 
information relevant to combating corruption within its ranks. Such as, for 
example, information relating to the direct and indirect relationship of the 
officials with companies doing business with government and information on 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits obtained by the government executives 
from third parties. 
7.4.12    Strengthen Accountability Institutions 
a) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is established as the 
supreme law of the country and incorporates the rule of law within its dictates. 
The supremacy of the Constitution and its integration of the rule of law as a 
principle of substantive and adjective constitutionalism brings with it certain 
consequences. One of these is the expectation of accountability of state, and 
government free of corruption and the malignancy of economic nepotism. It is 
submitted that measures must be put in place to strengthen accountability 
institutions in South Africa towards corruption management.  
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7.4.12.1 Law Enforcement Accountability System  
a) It was highlighted in Chapter 5, with specific reference to the demise of the 
Scorpions and the troubled IPID, that accountability of law enforcement is a 
serious concern in South Africa.  Therefore, it is proposed that a new 
Comprehensive Law Enforcement Accountability System (CLEAS) must be 
introduced, to be linked to IPID. This is to avoid duplication of efforts because 
IPID is already tasked with police accountability responsibility. Like Hong 
Kong’s independent ICAC Complaints Committee (ICIC, 2015), IPID must be 
bestowed with the autonomous authority to examine complaints against the 
IACD or its staff, and to monitor how the IACD deals with corruption complaints 
and referrals for further investigation by the ACC.  
 
b) The model of the National police accountability systems crafted by the 
Netherlands provide valuable guidance on how to avoid misuse of powers by 
the police and drawing a balance between executing State directives and 
concerns of independence and/or integrity.  (see generally Handbook on Police 
Accountability, Oversight and Integrity, 2011). 
 
7.4.13    Adopt the Goal Model as Anti-Corruption Agencies Organisational 
Effectiveness Model 
a) Effectiveness is the degree of congruence between organizational goals and 
some observed outcome. Effectiveness studies (evaluation research) occur in 
a political context, and include: The organization, program, and offices are 
creatures of a political process. The results of the study feed into the political 
processes that sustain or change the organization. It is recommended that Goal 
Model, as the most common assessment model, be adopted by the South 
African anti-corruption agencies. The relevance of this model is that it defines 
effectiveness by the extent to which the organization achieved its goals. The 
only challenge that these agencies will have to address over time is this model 
limitations to the rationality of organizations. It cannot differentiate between 
official and operative goals. The relationship between goal attainment and 
consequences is not straight forward.  
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7.4.14 Introduce Public Awareness and Education as Anti-Corruption Strategy 
a) It is submitted that South Africa must introduce public education and awareness 
as a strategy in its broader anti-corruption framework. Education constitutes the 
basic defence to corruption and corrupt activities.  Education should be used to 
promote and facilitate the environment free from corruption and related corrupt 
activities. It should be appreciated that already the ACC Bill contains a provision 
to establish the Education and Public Relations Unit whose function is to ensure 
public education and awareness around corruption. The relevant section reads 
as follows: 
 
18. (1) The Education and Public Relations Unit is responsible for 
raising public awareness and fostering a culture of corruption 
fighting and ethical leadership by— 
(a) conducting anti-corruption campaigns; 
(b) defining and promoting, the ethical leadership in— 
(i) Schools; 
(ii) Companies; 
(iii) Universities; 
(iv) Workplaces; and 
(v) Governing bodies. 
(c) offering workshops to the above sectors on preventative 
measures against corruption, using the information of which 
shall be gained from the Research, Prevention and Policy 
Formation Unit; 
(d) creating accessibility to the Commission and its mandate 
through social media techniques; and 
(e) conducting public discussions on the nature, extent and 
dangerous effects of corruption and what can be done about 
it within society. 
b) Any efforts to fight corruption and corrupt activities should be underscored by a 
clear strategy on public education and awareness. Botswana is a typical 
example of the role and impact that public education in the country’s efforts to 
ferret corruption. It was discussed in Chapter 6.4.3, for example, that in 
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Botswana DCEC utilises public education and awareness to root out corruption. 
Public education and awareness responsibilities in Hong Kong are undertaken 
by the Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations.  
 
c) South Africa must consider, where appropriate and in accordance with 
international and regional anti-corruption conventions, including in the 
legislative framework of its anti-corruption bodies a provision or provisions on 
public education and awareness.  
 
7.4.15    Develop Best Practices and Information Sharing Guidelines 
a) Co-ordinated efforts are needed in the fight against corruption. It is therefore 
recommended that South Africa must have a systematic and consolidated 
approach in the identification of best practices and the pro-active and timely 
sharing of information to enable the anti-corruption agencies to take appropriate 
action. Such guidelines or arrangement will discharge the country’s obligations 
under article 56 of the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. Also, this approach will 
inculcate operations, co-ordination and inter-agencies operational 
effectiveness. It is submitted that this approach will strengthen the currently 
doubtful intra-agency coordination and inter-law enforcement cooperation.   
 
7.4.16 Form Public-Private Anti-Corruption Partnerships 
a) It is submitted that the formation of public-private anti-corruption partnerships 
will be central to the fight against corruption. This submission is informed by the 
fact that civil society and NGOs have been actively involved in unearthing 
corrupt activities in South Africa. NGOs like the Corruption Watch and the Helen 
Suzman Foundation, for instance, have been at the forefront of the country’s 
ground-breaking anti-corruption litigation. The Administrative Justice 
Association of South Africa, launched on 18 June 2018, is also one of the 
significant developments that must play a role in fighting corruption through 
public-private anti-corruption partnerships. Notable partnership is that between 
Department for Public Service and Administration with Business Unity South 
Africa (BUSA), which seeks to raise awareness on anti-corruption measures 
implemented in the public service. Other anti-corruption advocacy groups 
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include the Global Compact Network South Africa, National Business Initiative 
and the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF). NACF guides the public 
sector, the private sector, and members of the public on corrupt and corrupt 
activities (Kekae, 2017:89). 
 
b) It is further submitted that private organisation will benefit on the country’s anti-
corruption strategy by promoting ethical conduct, integrity, transparency and 
accountability.  The proposal for a much formalised public-private sector 
partnership is belied by the requirements of article 12 of the UN Anti-Corruption 
Convention, and the Resolution 5/6 of 29 November 2013, entitled "Private 
sector", and Resolution 5/4 of 29 November 2013, entitled "Follow-up to the 
Marrakech declaration on the prevention of corruption", both of which 
highlighted the importance of the participation of the private sector in the 
prevention of corruption.  
 
The magnitude of the scourge and the need to have multi-stakeholder 
involvement in anti-corruption initiatives was highlighted in 2006 by Geraldine 
Fraser-Moleketi, then Minister for the Public Service and Administration, in an 
address to the Conference of Internal Auditors of South Africa and the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners on 24 April. She stated:  
 
Given the magnitude of the scourge of corruption the Public 
Sector cannot act alone but needs to act in concert with other 
institutions from the civil society and business sectors to protect 
the public interest. Thus, there is little argument of the need for 
strategic partnerships to combat corruption. An anti-corruption 
approach that ignores this will not therefore succeed. 
7.4.17   Institutionalize Transnational Collaboration 
a) The NDPP concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the Director of 
Public Prosecutions of the Republic of Botswana as a means of strengthening 
relations and enhancing cooperation in the area of the fight against 
transnational crime (Annual Report National Director of Public Prosecutions 
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2017/18, at 113).  Ideally, the collaboration approach of the NDPP should be 
spread to other agencies and/or bodies responsible to combat corruption.  
 
b) It is submitted that South Africa can leverage on its membership to CAACC 
through the SIU, and should use the platform to form formal bilateral coalitions 
and collaboration towards fighting corruption. 
 
7.4.18 Powers and Functions of Chapter 9 Institutions 
a) The Office of the Public Protector has a constitutional mandate to carry certain 
functions pursuant to section 182 of the Constitution. Additionally, the Public 
Protector Act bestows upon the Office certain powers and responsibilities, in 
particular section 64 of the Act. It is submitted that there is a need to clearly 
define and streamline the operations of the Public Protector and of other anti-
corruption agencies such as the SIU and the Hawks to avoid duplication of 
investigations or fiddling in each other’s jurisdiction. Otherwise the operational 
effectiveness of all these institutions will in the long run be compromised.  
 
It is suggested, however, that the streamlining must not take away the ability of 
the anti-corruption law enforcement agencies (Blaauw, 2016), or of the 
proposes IACD and the ACC, to work in tandem with the Public Protector. This 
is because public sector corruption is still rampant in South Africa and the Public 
Protector’s office under Advocate Mandonsela was instrumental in unearthing 
corruption and forcing the hand of the government, with the help of the court, 
the act against allegations of corruption. 
 
b) It is submitted that best practices must be put in place to address any 
occurrence of what Blaauw (2016:23) calls “vague relationship” between the 
Office of the Public Protector and law enforcement agencies.  To borrow the 
words of Blaauw (2016:23), these institutions ‘complement’ and ‘reinforce’ each 
other and their relationship must “ensure horizontal accountability”. 
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There have been instance where the Office of the Public Protector and 
institutions like the SAPS, NPA, the SIU and the Hawks have been pulling to 
different directions. This was particularly evident around the investigation of the 
alleged acts of corruption by the former President Mr Jacob Zuma and other 
government executives. 
7.5   FUTURE RESEARCH 
Following discussions and findings in this study, the following areas / issues for further 
research have been identified:-  
a) Conduct studies on what measures must be put in place to avoid the IACD, for 
example, being another paper tiger: Critical to this research must be an 
investigation of the impact of not providing anti-corruption agencies with the 
necessary legal powers and resources to perform its functions effectively. 
Elsewhere it has been reported that an ACA “without the necessary budget, 
personnel and operational autonomy, would mean the perpetuation of the 
current ineffective anti-corruption strategy and business as usual for the corrupt 
politicians, civil servants, business people and citizens” (Quah, 2017:17). Also, 
it must be determined how the IACD and similar agencies will improve the 
countries standing on the CPI.  
 
b) Conduct empirical studies to determine how the rivalry amongst the existing 
anti-corruption agencies have contributed to the sluggish anti-corruption 
intervention in South Africa: This investigation must therefore deal in-depth with 
the tenants of organizational effectiveness and intra-agencies power relations.  
 
c) Investigate the link between anti-corruption and ethical leadership:  The 
relationship between ethical leadership and corruption must be determined. 
According to Cheteni and Shindika (2017:3), a great deal of research has 
particularly focused on ethics and neglected to pay attention to ethical 
leadership. It is for this reason that a number of African countries have 
witnessed severe maladministration of funds and corruption.  
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d) Determine the level of political willingness to prosecute corrupt activities: It is 
hoped that South Africa will investigate and prosecute corruption no matter how 
big or small the activity. Also, that high profile cases involving senior 
government officials will receive a consistent and decisive action with no fear 
or favour. Example should be taken from Hong Kong and Botswana that have 
prosecuted some of their senior government officials; this reflects the 
seriousness of the Country to deal with corruption. Botswana has “the long 
history of zero-authoritarian interference.” (Alo, 2014:57).  
 
e) Investigate why the current system and frameworks are failing to combat 
corruption and to consider how to best strengthen democratic anti-corruption 
institutions and the associated legislative frameworks: As priority to the 
investigation should be the determination if the Constitution have not placed the 
law enforcement agencies with the executive having great “influence on the 
creation, finance as well as the operation of the anti-corruption agencies” (see 
study by Sebudubudu, 2014:12). 
f) Investigate the pronounced and residual powers of the president with regard to 
the appointment of anti-corruption agencies and promulgation of laws that 
support such agencies: As provided for in section 84(2) (f) of the Constitution, 
which gives the President the powers to appoint commissions of inquiry, which 
was not established as a Chapter 9 institution or an Independent Anti-
Corruption Commission Against Corruption, because no provisions have been 
made in Chapter 9 (State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy) for 
the establishment of such a commission, which according to section 181(2) and 
section 181(4) respectively, should be independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law of the country. These commissions must be impartial 
and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour 
or prejudice and that no person or organ of state may interfere with the 
functioning of these institutions. 
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